

CATHOLIC DEMOCRACY
INDIVIDUALISM & SOCIALISM



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CATHOLIC DEMOCRACY
INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIALISM

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CATHOLIC DEMOCRACY :

INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIALISM

BY

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AUTHOR OF "MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND MORALITY"

WITH A PREFACE

BY

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PREFACE

I WELCOME the appearance of Father Day's treatise on "Catholic Democracy." Anything which serves to elucidate the thought of Catholics on the subjects comprised under that head is of the greatest use at the present time, when so often attempts are made, intentionally or unintentionally, to confuse the judgments which are passed on economic changes from a purely economic point of view with the judgments which we are obliged to accept from the standpoint of Catholic Faith. Catholics are sometimes very unfairly dubbed Socialists because they are unwilling to condemn as contrary to Catholic teaching remedies suggested by Socialists, which, however undesirable in a political or economic aspect, still do not contravene the teaching of the Church on faith or morals. Experience has shown how difficult it is to obtain from either Socialists or non-Socialists anything approaching a clear definition of what they really mean. And it is most unfair to appeal

to the teaching of the Catholic Church in support or condemnation of theories on which she has not pronounced directly or indirectly. This treatise will help in clearing men's minds and in restraining any undue tendency to hasty conclusions on either side.

FRANCIS CARDINAL BOURNE,
Archbishop of Westminster.

February 18, 1914.

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CATHOLIC DEMOCRACY

INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIALISM

PROLOGUE

THE remarkable progress of the people towards political power is the supreme social fact of our day. Coupled with it is an ominous breach between the existing organization of democracy in Europe and all positive Christianity. Is this cleavage permanent and necessary, or temporary and accidental? Does it spring from the nature of the systems at variance, or is it the result of purely adventitious causes? In other words, must the Church, by reason of her spirit and fundamental principles, oppose the new democracy; and must the new democracy, for similar reasons, continue to be in opposition to the Church?

The above are questions we have set ourselves to answer in the following pages; and our reply, based on history and a critical analysis of principles, is to the effect that there is no intrinsic opposition, but rather an interior harmony between Christianity and modern democracy—that the apparent irreconcilability of the two systems arises, not from any conflict of

essential claims, but from the extravagant and wholly untenable theories of Anarchy and Socialism which in recent times have been rashly transplanted into the uncongenial soil of Democracy, and, growing with its growth, have at length come to be commonly identified with it.

Our argument lays stress on the social teaching of the Church, contrasting its essential democracy with the anti-democracy of extreme Liberalism on the one hand and of Socialism on the other. In the errors contained in these theories the Church, as the guardian of natural and revealed truth, can have no part: she is bound to reject them. At the same time, as the living exponent of truth, she has also the function, which she is careful to fulfil, of assimilating and bringing to perfection whatever good these theories contain.

In discussing this subject, it is important to bear in mind that modern democracy is not an altogether new or isolated phenomenon; and that, therefore, it cannot be judged on the sole grounds of its present achievements without reference to the ideas and claims of its past. The vital elements of democracy, coinciding as they do with the rational and progressive forces of man's higher nature, are coextensive with civilization, and have always existed amongst cultured races. Modern democracy, therefore, is not of the nature of a new creation, but rather the actual stage of development of a universal tendency. It is the present phase of the world-aged uplifting of mankind towards the goal of individual and social freedom, of self-realization, of material, moral, and spiritual progress.

The fundamental ideas of the popular movement of to-day are thus identical with those of essential democracy. They comprise personal and social liberty, equality of justice, love of the brotherhood. With such ideas the Christian spirit and Christian teaching cannot but be in entire accord.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

NOT long ago the Catholic Church was freely attacked as being anti-democratic, and this not only in a political, but also in the larger social sense. This attack was made notwithstanding the fact that in the great democracy of the United States the Catholic Church was at that very time flourishing beyond all others, and, then as now, numbering amongst her clergy and laity the most pronounced and enthusiastic supporters of popular sovereignty. The calumny dates back more particularly to the period immediately before and after the French Revolution of 1789. The conditions of the time, and especially the circumstance that many of the Catholic clergy and laity were strongly opposed to the spirit and method of the Revolution, lent some colour to the charge. The attitude of the Catholics was, however, on the whole, justified. For though the revolutionary movement contained elements of good, and eventually resulted in good, bringing about, amongst other things, the overthrow of a corrupt and oppressive aristocracy and the emancipation of a suffering and downtrodden people, it was in reality the immediate outcome of a blind popular passion, rather than of a rationally controlled emotion. As such it

spent itself in fanaticism and anarchy. It was the horror inspired by these results, rather than lack of sympathy with democracy, that subsequently drove the Catholic body to side with the cause of the counter-revolution—a movement which began wisely, but later deteriorated into a mere reaction in favour of the old régime.

Catholics for the most part favoured the new movement only in so far as it contained the right elements of a counter-revolution, and served as a bulwark to oppose the mischievous components of the previous popular rising. At the same time, some ultra-conservative or over-timid Catholics undoubtedly made the mistake of whole-heartedly siding with the retrograde and unpopular cause. By so doing they unfortunately played into the hands of the Church's enemies, who only waited the first favourable opportunity of reiterating their charges of anti-democracy against her. Nor was it long before the occasion arose. By 1821 the reaction had brought about the uprising of the Carbonari in Italy, and within the next generation its ultimate development was manifest in the International Revolution of 1848.

During this time of heated political passion the charges against the Church of favouring oppression were renewed. From the Press, from the platform, and above all from the pulpit, the old libels were poured forth in a continuous stream. They grew wearisome by sheer monotony of repetition. The Church was intriguing against the State; religion was the enemy of Republican Governments; it was bent on

destroying the new democracy and restoring the old feudalism. The Church opposed the people, and the people must oppose the Church. The falseness of the accusations was obvious and undeniable, yet such is the force of reiteration that statements, however incredible in themselves, rarely fail, if repeated with sufficient audacity and frequency, to gain a certain measure of credence. And so in this case the undoubted calumnies came to be believed, and the historic Church of the poor to be regarded as the champion of the rich and powerful and as the enemy of the people.

This picture of the Church in the popular imagination was, of course, a gross caricature; but as we have already admitted, the slanderous accusations that gave rise to it, though false in themselves, had, as most successful calumnies have, a shadow of foundation. The complete removal of this in the course of subsequent years was one happy result at least of the libel. The "foundation" consisted in this, that the charges, while they had no bearing on the Church as a whole, did, notwithstanding, admit of a limited application to a small minority of her members. The consciousness of this served as a ferment and stirred up subsequent reaction in favour of social reform which has not yet died out.

One of the results of this reaction was the birth in France of the de Lamennais party, which had the newspaper known as *L'Avenir* for its organ, and for its motto "God and Liberty." Of de Lamennais this much at least should be said, that he was in reality a pioneer of Christian Democracy, and that he showed

himself to be deeply imbued with a true social spirit. He aimed indeed at uniting Catholics in a broad movement resting directly on justice and natural right. Unfortunately his scheme subsequently became involved in political agitation, which was its undoing. He erred also in believing that liberty was the positive foundation of everything, and in ignoring to a large extent the weight due to the even more important correlative principle of authority. Faulty in method and in theory de Lamennais' movement ended in failure, just as did the movement inaugurated by M. Sangnier, the leader of the Sillon in our own day. The Sillon was in fact condemned by Pius X. for reasons almost precisely similar to those on account of which the agitation of de Lamennais was discredited.

The Revolution of 1848 was followed by another Conservative reaction, which served as a further setback to Catholic social action, and prevented the party of progress from availing itself of what was certainly good in the de Lamennais programme.

Then came a period of severe political and religious struggle for the Church and the Papacy, in which the question of the temporal power was prominent. It lasted through the long pontificate of Pius IX., and only ceased after the first few years of Leo XIII.'s reign. For the former Pope, who from the windows of the Vatican might more than once have looked down on actual battle, it was in the literal sense a time of war. In such circumstances there was little opportunity for the Church, officially at any rate, to attend to the social and economic claims which were astir in Europe.

But with the first return of peace the Sovereign Pontiff gave his best attention to these subjects, and with very striking results.

Catholic social work, as we shall see again later, was still being promoted by the energy and zeal of particular Bishops and of certain sections of the clergy and laity in Europe, but it wanted the Papal approval to stimulate it to its fullest activity. This sanction of the Sovereign Pontiff came at the opportune moment. On May 15, 1891, there issued from the Vatican the famous Encyclical, "Rerum Novarum," which is perhaps better known as Leo XIII.'s "Letter on the Condition of Labour." The letter dealt fearlessly and trenchantly with the popular aspects of the social question from the point of view of Catholic ethics, and received, as indeed it deserved to receive, almost universal applause.

The welcome accorded to the Papal Encyclical was as sincere as it was enthusiastic, and was bestowed by politicians, preachers, and writers of various sects and schools of thought, who had this only in common, that they did not belong to the Catholic Church. In England the *Times* newspaper declared that the Encyclical was written with all the knowledge of a statesman, and that it breathed the spirit of Christian charity and goodwill, which, if widely accepted and imitated, would go far to solve the industrial questions of the day. The Anglican *Guardian*, representing the High Church party, spoke in the highest of terms of the Encyclical, which it describes as "siding with the working classes in a wise and moderate spirit, and with a constant care to distinguish legitimate claims from

those which are extravagant, and are set up only in the pretended interest of the working people." Predicting its likely results, the *Guardian* added: "The effects of the Encyclical cannot fail to be important. When we remember that, though reflecting, to begin with, the thought of but a single man, it will be adopted by thousands of Bishops, and by all the clergy under them, it becomes clear that we have not exaggerated the importance of this historic document. Its effect on the development of the social question will be immense."

The late Bishop of Manchester, Dr. Moorhouse, an Anglican prelate of considerable distinction and possessing wide influence, addressing a public meeting at the time, praised the wise foresight and the vast depth of knowledge revealed in the Encyclical, and added the memorable words: "The Pope has put his finger on the sore part of our social system, and either his word must be listened to, or the world will have to expiate its neglect by terrible calamities."

In France the Encyclical created an immense sensation, and many anti-Catholic writers and speakers were earnest in its praise. The Liberal newspapers and reviews expressed similar approval. M. Maurice Barrès, a Socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies, declared that the Pope had at length severed the chain which linked the Papacy with a dead political past, and predicted that in a few years existing mistrusts would cease, and that the democracy would no longer have an enemy in the priest. Writing also on "Leo XIII. and his Contemporaries," he exclaims: "Wonderful audacity, unforeseen *volte-face*, suddenly to alter the mental outlook on the old social forms of Europe of

hundreds of thousands of the faithful! I am filled with admiration and astonishment at the new policy. And the more I feel my incompetence to grasp all the consequences, the more is my respect and curiosity aroused by the illustrious old man who is said to be desirous to make a trial of it." It will be noted that these pronouncements of the Socialist deputy, like others which we shall cite, assume erroneously that the Encyclical expresses a new departure in the Church's attitude towards democracy.

A Liberal economist of opposite view, and one of the leaders of the old school, M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, in a critical study of the Encyclical which appeared under the title of "Papacy, Socialism, and Democracy," wrote: "It would seem that we are witnessing the return to the stage of one of its historic actors. The Papacy is reappearing after a thousand years in a new character in the theatre of politics from which the opinions of many people deemed it to be for ever banished. The Pope has shown that he has the spirit of his age, and without useless theorizing he has gone straight to the people and dealt with the subject that is deepest in their hearts—democracy."

The same chorus of approval greeted the Encyclical in Germany. There, the chief organ of Socialism, *Vorwärts*, in a leading article, wrote: "The Pope has gone in advance of all Princes and all Governments of civilized States, and has resolved the social question, so far as it is given to any existing power to resolve it." The *Breslauer Zeitung*, a German Liberal paper, likewise gave its full approval to the Pope's declaration, and described the Encyclical as "the manifesto of a wise

and generous man, who has studied with discernment the whole economic and social position of the day."

The effect of the Encyclical on Catholics was immediate, but its results in terms of concerted popular action cannot even now be regarded as at all adequate. It stirred thought and stimulated the activity of individuals. But Catholics, as a body, lacked a condition which was absolutely necessary for rising to the height of the splendid opportunity provided for them by the Head of the Church. They were wanting in practical agreement. By this, of course, there is not intended to be conveyed the least imputation of disloyalty against Catholics in relation to the pronouncement of the Pope. From the outset, the Encyclical was accorded a wholehearted allegiance and the warmest welcome. But notwithstanding its enthusiastic reception and the social activities it evoked—possibly even because of these—the manifesto did later on create, or at least bring into prominence, considerable disagreement of views amongst Catholic social workers. The disagreement in all cases was confined entirely to matters in themselves of minor importance. What was essential in the teaching of the Encyclical was the necessity and proper correlation of the joint principles of authority and liberty in the working out of any programme of social reform.

Now these principles were fully accepted by Catholics. But the difficulty arose in applying them. Here came the rock of division. The Catholic body represented two opposite tendencies, and was split, as we shall have occasion to notice again later, into the two groups of Catholic Conservatives and Catholic Progressives.

While both groups professed the fullest attachment to the two cardinal principles of the Encyclical, it was evident that the Conservatives leaned rather to the side of individual liberty, and the Progressives to that of authority and State intervention. The practical difficulty was to adjust legislative demands for the good of the people to these two opposite tendencies; and the difficulty was not a slight one.

This question threatened in its results to be exceedingly hurtful to the Catholic cause, and to paralyze the efforts which were at that time being made by the Church in all the countries of Europe, but especially in Belgium and Germany, on behalf of the working and industrial classes.

But the vigilance of the People's Pope was alive to the gravity of the danger, and by a timely intervention it prevented the worst evils. On January 15, 1901, just ten years after the publication of the immortal "*Rerum Novarum*," a second Encyclical, commencing with the words "*Graves de Communi*," issued from the Vatican, dealing directly with the subject of Christian Democracy. This document, which was no less weighty than its forerunner, accurately defined the nature and limits of Christian Democracy, and earnestly exhorted all Catholics to set aside theoretical disputes and to come to a practical agreement in regard to the main lines of popular social action.

With the nature and principle of Christian Democracy as set forth in the Encyclical, we shall deal at length in subsequent chapters. It will be sufficient here to cite its essential definition. Christian Democracy, according to the Pope, is an organized social movement

based on the principles and ideals of Catholic faith and action, and conducted under the guidance of ecclesiastical authority, to help the poor and the working classes. It is exclusively social and entirely Catholic. Therefore, whilst embracing the whole of Catholic theory and practice in the sphere of social justice and beneficence, it has no extension into the field of purely party politics.

On the nature of Christian Democracy and its radical disagreement with Social Democracy, the Pope says :

“What Social Democracy means, and what Christian Democracy ought to mean, does not admit of doubt. The former, more or less extreme, as the case may be, is by many carried to such wicked extravagance as to reckon human satisfaction supreme, and to acknowledge nothing higher, to pursue bodily and natural goods only, and to make the whole happiness of man consist in attaining and enjoying them. Such persons would place the supreme power of the State indiscriminately in the hands of the masses of the people. Moreover, they would abolish all distinctions of rank, and make all citizens equal, in order that all might equally have access to the good things of life. They would likewise do away with ownership, confiscate private fortunes, and socialize the instruments of labour. But Christian Democracy ought to have as its foundation the principles laid down by Divine faith, having regard, indeed, to the temporal advantage of the poorer and less educated, but designing therewith to fit their minds for the enjoyment of things eternal. Accordingly, to *Christian Democracy* let there be nothing more sacred than law and right; let it bid the right of having and

holding to be kept inviolate; let it maintain the diversity of ranks, which properly belongs to a well-ordered State; in fine, let it prefer for human society that form and character which its Divine Author has imposed upon it. Clearly, therefore, *Social Democracy* and *Christian Democracy* can have nothing in common; the difference between them is no less than that between the sectarianism of Socialism and the profession of the Christian law."

Proceeding, the text of the Encyclical shows the aloofness of Christian Democracy from purely political aims of whatever sort.

"Far be it from anyone to pervert the name of *Christian Democracy* to political ends. For although Democracy, by its very name and by philosophical usage, denotes popular rule, yet in this application it must be employed altogether without its political significance, so as to denote nothing whatever besides this beneficent Christian action upon the people. For natural morality and the precepts of the Gospel, for the very reason that they transcend the temporary conditions of human existence, must necessarily be independent of any particular form of civil government and adapt themselves to all, so long as there is nothing to conflict with virtue and right. They are therefore, and remain in themselves, absolutely external to all conflict of parties, and vicissitudes of occurrence, so that, under whatever kind of government, people may and ought to abide by these precepts, which bid them love God above all and their neighbours as themselves."

A little farther on the Pope says: "Just in the same way must Christian Democracy repudiate another ground

of offence, which arises from paying so much regard to the interests of the poorer and weaker classes as to seem to overlook the wealthier and more powerful, who are nevertheless of equal importance to the preservation and development of the State. The Christian law of Charity, which we have just mentioned, forbids this."

Against the danger of overthrowing lawful authority the Pope also adds a warning: "God forbid that under the name of *Christian Democracy* should lie the surreptitious aim of throwing off all obedience and turning away from those in lawful authority. The law of nature, no less than that of Christ, enjoins respect for all such as in their several degree hold office in the State, and further enjoins obedience to their lawful commands."

On the rule of practical agreement amongst Catholics, the greatest stress is laid.

"What is of the greatest consequence," the Encyclical declares, "is that in a matter of so much importance Catholics should be found to have but one and the same spirit, will, and action. And for this spirit of unity and agreement of wills to be rightly maintained, it is essential that all shall refrain from giving any causes of dissension in hurting and alienating the minds of others, by writings in the newspapers and speeches to the people." "It is quite natural," continues the Encyclical—and the advice would seem to be needed not a little in our day—"for people to think differently in doubtful questions, but those who address themselves to the subjects in a proper spirit will preserve this mental calm, and not forget the respect which is due to those who differ from them. If minds

see things in another light, it is not necessary that they should become alienated forthwith. To whatever opinion a man's mind may incline, if the matter is yet open to discussion, let him keep it, provided his disposition is such that he is ready to yield if the Holy See should decide against him."

As a further means to insure this desirable unity and agreement amongst Catholics, the duty of obedience to episcopal guidance is emphasized: "Finally, we again enjoin, and with greater insistence, that whatever schemes people take up in the popular cause, whether individually, or in association, they should remember that they must be entirely submissive to episcopal authority. Do not let them be beguiled by an excessive ardour for charitable enterprise, which, if it induces any relaxation of due obedience, is itself false, unproductive of solid benefit, and displeasing to God. Those who please God are those who are ready to give up their own ideas and listen to the bidding of the rulers of the Church absolutely, as to His own."

These declarations and counsels of the "Graves de Communi" were repeated many times by Pope Leo XIII. in similar documents, and also in addresses delivered by him to working men's pilgrimages. They have since been frequently confirmed by his successor, and universally accepted and approved by the Catholic Episcopate. Hence they represent in outline the official teaching of the Church on the nature, scope, and limits of "Christian Democracy."

In the next chapter we shall consider the subject in its historical bearings.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SURVEY

“CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY,” understood in the sense already defined, is not a growth of yesterday or the day before. In its essential features of liberty, equality, and fraternity, it is as old as the Christian Church, into which her Divine Founder originally breathed His spirit of compassion for the poor—a spirit which has never left her, and which has found its natural expression in her persistent assertion of the principles of charity and social justice. As might be expected, the idea connoted by the term “Christian Democracy” has expanded with the accelerated strides of political and economic progress, and with the general awakening in recent times of men’s consciences to the needs and the claims of the poor. But it would be a mistake to suppose that even the more distinctively modern phase of this idea originated with the first Papal enunciation of it by Leo XIII. in 1891. It had been conceived in theory and reduced to practice several years before that date by Catholic workers in more than one country of Europe. In England its principles found an eloquent exponent in Cardinal Manning, whose constant championship of the toiling and suffering classes was seconded by Archbishop Bagshawe, and

supported in different parts of the country by other ecclesiastics—as, for instance, by the late Monsignor Nugent, well known in Liverpool for his philanthropy and ardent advocacy, through many years, of social and moral reform.

But it was in Belgium and Germany that the greatest success attended the religious movement on behalf of the people. In Belgium this success was undoubtedly mainly due to the strenuous labours of the Catholic Democratic League, which wisely directed its efforts, not only towards improving the material conditions of the working classes, but also towards restoring their moral status, and settling the disputes between capital and labour on a satisfactory basis. In Germany the movement received its chief impetus and guidance from the annual Catholic Congresses first organized by Adam Francis Lennig, Dean of the Cathedral at Mainz, in 1848. These Congresses were later stimulated to their highest activity by the unanimous support of the Bishops, and, above all, by the inspiring genius and eloquence of the Bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm Emmanuel Baron von Ketteler, described by Leo XIII. as his “famous precursor.” But to this subject we shall have occasion to return later. It is only mentioned here to point the lesson of the continuity of the theory of Christian Democracy. Observe, then, that this idea, so far from being new, is as old as Christianity, and that any semblance of novelty which it presents is due to modern conditions. The old Gospel principles remain intact and unaltered, save that their new setting has imparted to them a fresh and more striking impressiveness.

We must accordingly go back to the New Testament—especially to the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles, in which the conceptions of love, equality, brotherhood, the dignity of man and of labour, which Christ brought into the world, are more fully expressed and developed—if we would discover the true genesis of the idea of Christian Democracy. In these official writings of the Apostolic Church the distinctions of Jew and Gentile, Barbarian and Scythian, bond and free, are swept away, and “Christ is all in all” (Col. iii.). The slave is the equal and brother of his master, and the highest posts in the Church are open to all (Phil. xvi.). Labour also of every kind is declared to be no longer dishonourable; on the contrary, it is held to be the normal and honourable condition of livelihood, St. Paul giving memorable expression to this doctrine in the words: “If any man will not work, neither shall he eat” (2 Thess. iii. 10).

Thus early was the germ of Christian Democracy set in the soil. Its full development, however, was far distant, its growth extending over the long period of a thousand years through which the Church and Christendom by slow and gradual steps progressed to completion.

During the first three centuries, on account of the bitter and persistent persecutions prevailing, the seed for the most part seemed buried in the ground. But even then, though producing fewer apparent effects, it did not fail to germinate and to show many extraordinary interior and spiritual results. As striking evidence of this we have only to point to the approved and generally admitted fact that the charity of the

Christians of that period far surpassed anything that the world has since seen, their benefactions being out of all proportion to their numbers and resources.

So well too in those early days of the Church were practised and preached the democratic principles that all things were created for all, and that particular owners are only stewards of God's possessions, that Tertullian, writing in the third century, could proudly boast, in reproach of Roman civilization, that "all things are common amongst us except women." The Christian principle, moreover, that not the Roman citizens alone, but every human being, bond or free-man, was clothed with a sacred individuality, was a commonplace retort on the lips of the earliest Confessors and Martyrs of the Church. In fact, the prevalence of these principles of social justice, together with the changed attitude of men towards labour, and the transformed relations between masters and slaves, compelled the Roman rulers of those days to admit that the Christian sect had worked a revolution. And a revolution in truth it was before which the old pagan order, built on selfishness and slavery, was destined to go down and be eventually superseded by a new civilization of love and liberty.

It was not, however, until the commencement of the fourth century, when the Church at length emerged from the Catacombs, and was able to take an active part in public life, that the wider organization of Christian Democracy sprang into being. Needless to say, no identity with the modern movement, either in details of method or in particular applications of prin-

ciples, is claimed for that early organization. Yet it ran on similar lines, and was animated by the same teachings and motives of supernatural faith. So much was this the case that to the concerted popular action of that day the words of Leo XIII., enumerating the objects of the modern movement, exactly apply. The aim of Christian Democracy was then, as it is now:

“To make the condition of those who toil more tolerable; to enable them to obtain little by little the means by which they may provide for the future; to help them to practise in public and private life the duties which morality and religion inculcate; to aid them to feel that they are not animals but men, not heathens but Christians, and so to enable them to strive more zealously and more eagerly for the one thing necessary—the ultimate good of life—eternal salvation.” (Encyclical “*Graves de Communi*,” on “Christian Democracy”).

And, already even in the days of Constantine, so high and widespread was the Church's reputation for administrative capacity and zeal for the poor, that when—owing to the corruption of the magistrates, the relentless extortion of moneylenders, and the constant invasions of the barbarians—unprecedented wretchedness existed in the Empire, it was the Church that was called upon by the State to relieve the distress, and Catholic Bishops were chosen, in preference to the civil officials, to distribute bread to the starving multitudes.

This overwhelming evidence of the Church's influence at this time in managing and directing social affairs is confirmed by a no less unwilling witness than Julian

the Apostate, the declared enemy of Christianity, who, in a letter to the pagan high-priest of Galatia, exhorts the pagan priesthood to emulate the Christian clergy and not allow themselves to be outdone by them in the field of popular action.

From such instances the inference of the important position of the Church in the fourth century, as a democratic and socializing force, is beyond question; and this conclusion is yet further confirmed by the excellent institutions which she commenced to found at this time for the relief of poverty and the amelioration of the condition of the people.

But it was not until the period of the Middle Ages, ushered in by the crowning of Charlemagne, A.D. 890, that the Christian Democracy of the Catholic Church assumed its full stature and perfect proportions. Previous to the commencement of that period, Greek and Latin elements preponderated in Western culture; but after it, and until the rise of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, the German and Romance nations combined to form a united Christendom, and to rebuild the civilization of Europe on the ruins of the paganism of the past. Then there began to be formed an entire system of laws, customs, and institutions in furtherance of the material and spiritual well-being of the people, which eventually effected the reorganization of society on a Christian and democratic basis, since described as "a golden thread of democracy running through the whole course of Church History unbroken and untarnished amid its surroundings of iron and stone." We can only briefly refer to a few of the salient

steps in this great evolution of Christian Democracy which covers a long period of the Middle Ages.

Charlemagne's reign opened with the passing of drastic laws to restore the ancient discipline of the Church, and to remedy the social deterioration that had supervened in Gaul after the death of Gregory the Great. The new laws restored the ecclesiastical property that had been misappropriated, and secured its being once more regarded in practice and in theory as "the patrimony of the poor." They also specially charged the feudal lords with the duty of providing for their needy retainers, and encouraged and assisted the monasteries to renew their former zeal, and rival their best traditions as industrial, social, and religious centres. To this call the Benedictine monks, who were destined to become the chief actors in the social regeneration of Europe, nobly responded. From the commencement they showed themselves to be prudent and zealous administrators of public charity, and later they did a great work in promoting industry and in the formation of democratic ideas. The labours of the monks themselves were prodigious. They also employed great numbers of servants whom they instructed in the performance of useful works. Their kindly treatment of their dependants had the further effect of affording a salutary lesson to the haughty secular lords of the period.

Another lesson, which the times required, was that of social equality; and this the monks not only taught in their schools, but enforced in practice by giving to their scholars a completely equal treatment. In such ways

the monks did much to advance the cause of democracy, and to bring about a much-needed readjustment of society on the lines of Christian humanity and brotherhood.

The thirteenth century was marked by the coming of the friars, whose teaching and example of apostolic poverty was particularly beneficial at this time of luxury and avarice. The model they set served to recall the rich to a higher ideal of life, and to bring about an increased sense of social responsibility amongst all classes of the people. The influence of the friars is also generally credited with a large share in the destruction of serfdom in Europe.

Such at its best was the dominant power of monasticism, which, for upwards of five hundred years, represented a principal, if not the main, source of the Church's organized efforts on behalf of the people. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the spirit and the work of the monks declined, and with the advent of the following century their social influence ceased.

Next in importance after the monasteries came the hospitals. These institutions fulfilled the functions now divided between hotels, asylums, almshouses, and modern hospitals or infirmaries. They were ordinarily managed by members of religious or quasi-religious brotherhoods. As the Middle Ages advanced the hospitals and the brotherhoods grew more and more numerous. And up to the middle of the fifteenth century they continued to render valuable service, but after that time the zeal which animated them disappeared and their usefulness ended.

Other agencies contributing to the betterment of the social and economic condition of the people were the pious foundations, the artificers and trade guilds, and the "Montes Pietatis." The foundations were endowments of land or other productive property, the revenue of which was devoted to benefiting the poor and working classes. Of these foundations the greater number were controlled by the monasteries and hospitals. Some, however, were under the management of the parish clergy, and those in the free cities were largely administered by the civil authorities, who gradually added to their functions until, in the fifteenth century, the municipalities practically monopolized the administration of charity. Notwithstanding, even through this period the Church maintained her paramount social and political power, as is shown by the Guilds and Montes Pietatis, which played so important a part in the later history of the medieval cities.

The Guilds, in which rich and poor mingled without class distinction, were self-governing corporations, designed to protect and encourage arts and commerce, and to check competition between their members. In part co-operative and in part benefit and insurance societies, they rendered mutual assistance, and provided special help for unemployed and indigent members. But in the main the Guilds were composed of small owners of capital. On entry into a Guild there was a period of apprenticeship, during which the new member worked for a master, but subsequently he became a master himself, or worked at his trade as a journeyman. Above all, the Guilds looked to securing for their members as fair

a division of property as possible, and to safeguarding them against the crying evils of modern capitalism—monopoly and destitution.

As a result of the industrial economy of the Guilds, wages were rarely challenged, excessive toil was unknown, and strikes were needless. Matters of dispute were readily settled in the general meetings of the members, in which masters and men voted and took counsel together. Thus, established on a basis of security, justice, and freedom, these institutions were singularly distinguished by the spirit of loyalty and brotherhood which animated all their members and gave force to their corporate existence. How wide a gulf separates these democratic industrial Guilds of the Middle Ages from the sectional Trades Unions of our day !

During the nineteenth century there was much progressive legislation regulating the hours of labour, and lightening the lot of the labourer. Such legislation was necessary then as it is now. In the Middle Ages, however, the need was anticipated by the frequent holidays of the Church, and by the numerous, though less frequent, holidays of the Guilds. In England, according to a conservative estimate, there were at least thirty-two religious festivals of obligation, besides the Sundays, on which no work could be done. According to some accounts, the number of days of obligation almost equalled the Sundays, so that, roughly speaking, the working week consisted of five days only. There were also numerous regulations dealing with the early stopping of work on the eves of festivals and other occasions. Consequently, though the working day might be longer in olden times, there were fewer working days, and the

workman had as much, if not more, leisure for rest and improvement than at present. Thus in those days was the health and recreation of the workman consulted by the Church.

The Montes Pietatis, which were originally a protest of religion against the prevailing custom of usury, or the extortion of interest on money borrowed, not for capital, but for immediate need, were founded by the Franciscan friars. They were charitable institutions designed for the lending of small sums of money to the poor at an exceedingly low rate of interest, or, in certain cases, at no interest at all, on the security of objects pawned. These objects, if not redeemed within a fixed time, were publicly sold at auction, and, if the price realized exceeded the loan, together with the interest, the surplus was returned to the owner. Any profits accruing were set aside for working purposes, and for the extension of the charity. Owing to the principle on which they were conducted, the Montes Pietatis were a great boon to the poor, to whom their easy terms afforded a much needed deliverance from the rapacity of the Jewish money-lenders of the period. Besides this immediate relief to the poor, the Montes Pietatis exerted a considerable influence in the general regulation of loans; in fact, they prepared the way for the subsequent universal acceptance of the principle that interest, when moderate, is not only just, but even desirable and socially necessary.

Both the Guilds and the Montes Pietatis, like most of the other institutions of the times, were the direct result of the Church's activity, and were built on the one foundation of the Catholic religion.

The claim of the Church to be regarded as favouring

true democracy is more than ever apparent when we observe the courage and consistency with which, in her capacity of teacher, she has maintained the same principles of justice and charity throughout the vicissitudes of her history. Never, whether in the days of her highest power and prosperity, or in those of her deepest affliction and adversity, did she swerve from the line of her traditional doctrine, or fail to assert before the world, as the times required, the Gospel principles of Democracy which she had received from her Master.

Surrounded at first by a pagan civilization, which for thousands of years had rested on slavery, and which even now depended on that institution for its very existence, the Church prudently and gradually unfolded her principles of freedom. She neither directly attacked compulsory labour as in itself immoral, nor did she stigmatize the sale and purchase of men as a crime which was in immediate conflict with human right. In fact, she had no Divine warrant in the Gospel for so doing. But she effectually attacked the abuses of slavery, and also succeeded in undermining by her doctrines of personality and property the foundations of human inequality and indigence on which the servile system, so long regarded as normal and necessary, rested.

Next, when confronted by feudalism or villenage, into which at the advent of the early Middle Ages Christian influence was gradually transforming servitude, the Church continued to adapt her lessons to the changed conditions. Thus at that time the medieval theologians and canonists commenced to lay particular stress on the

responsibility that Kings and lords had to God for the people committed to their care. And while they inculcated the duties of loyalty and obedience on the part of vassals and serfs, who were bound to the soil, they were insistent on proclaiming their rights to protection, security of tenure, and the proper freedom of men.

Later, with the development of the commercial life of the cities, which was accompanied with greater freedom but with less security, the Church emphasized the principle of justice in wages, and gave expression to the doctrine that gains ought to be the fruit of labour and not of exploitation. The medieval Church likewise maintained the necessary right of every human being to a livelihood from the common store of nature's bounty. It was no uncommon thing either in those days for the Bishops to raise their voices against the secular power in condemnation of such evils as the oppression of the people by landlords, royal tyranny, the extortion of moneylenders, and the enslavement of freemen. Nor were the representatives of the Church less fearless or persistent in proclaiming the duties of almsgiving, the stewardship of wealth, and the brotherhood of men.

The continuity of the Church's teaching is further demonstrated by a comparison of the writings of the earlier Fathers with those of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Schoolmen. In both the principles of authority and private ownership are defended, while at the same time in both still greater stress is laid on the rights of the people in relation to the governing power, the stewardship of wealth, and the duty of almsgiving.

Of so much democratic leaning in the Fathers, as is involved in a care for the popular liberties and for the well-being of the multitude, there can be no question when due attention is paid to their writings in which property is declared to be common, and the possessors of wealth, who refuse to distribute their superfluous goods to the needy, are branded as "robbers" and "thieves." Such passages have been often quoted by popular agitators, and are part of the stock-in-trade of the Socialist orators of our day.

And indeed no less favourable to the claims of democracy, though less rhetorical and more concisely expressed, are the political theories of the unjustly-abused scholastics, of whom St. Thomas is the chief representative. Replying in his "*Summa Theologica*" to the question, "Is it lawful for anyone to possess anything as his own?" St. Thomas says: "Two things are open to man respecting any exterior good. The one is to *manage* and *dispense* it; and so far as that goes, it is lawful for a man to have property of his own. It is also necessary to human life. . . . Another thing within the reach of man regarding exterior goods is the *use* of them. In that respect a man ought not to hold exterior goods as exclusively his own; but as common possessions, so as readily to share them with others in their need. Hence the Apostle (1 Tim. vi. 17, 18) says: 'Charge the rich of this world to give easily, to communicate to others'" (Second Division of the Second Part, or "*Secunda Secundæ*," Q. lxvi., Art. 2).

On the question of popular power over government

the teaching of the Schoolmen is equally opposed to the intolerant monarchism which attributes an immediate Divine right to Kings, and to Rousseau's theory that the popular sovereignty is inalienable. St. Thomas clearly lays down that although sovereignty may not ordinarily remain with the people, yet it is from them that it is always immediately derived. And on this ground he asserts the right of the people to dethrone tyrants. In his "*Summa Theologica*," in reference to the power of making laws, he declares :

"Law properly regards the order that is to be taken towards the general good. Now to order anything towards the general good belongs either to the whole people, or to the public representative who has care of the whole people. For in this as in all other things the ordering of the means belongs to him to whom is committed the carrying out of the end as his special function. . . . A private person cannot compel another to act virtuously ; for he can only admonish, and if his admonition fails, he has no coercive power such as an efficacious law requires. This coercive power belongs to the multitude, or to a public personage, to whom it is competent to inflict penalties. And therefore it is only the holder of this power who can make laws". And elsewhere in his treatise on government, he writes ("*Summa Theologica*," 1^a 2^a, Q. xc., Art. 3) :

"The cruelty of tyrants should be proceeded against by public authority rather than by the private attempts of individuals. In the first place if a public body has the right to provide a King for itself it can without injustice dethrone him, or limit his power should he

abuse it by acting tyrannically. Moreover the public body is not therefore to be accounted as acting disloyally, because it throws over a tyrant, even though it had previously submitted itself to him in perpetuity; for he has deservedly incurred this treatment by his own unfaithfulness, not ruling over the people, as his office of sovereign requires, even apart from any express compact with them" ("De Regimine Principum," Lib. i., Cap. vi.).

The reason underlying all this is, as has been stated, because the sovereign power is conceived as originating with the community. Therefore that it may begin to reside in any person as the supreme ruler, it is necessary that it come to him from the consent of the community.

Francis Suarez, the celebrated Jesuit theologian of the seventeenth century, holds the same doctrine of the transference of power from the people to the Prince. In his treatise, "De Legibus," he writes: "It follows that whenever lawfully acquired civil authority is found in any one man or Prince, it has proceeded from the people and commonwealth either proximately or remotely, and cannot consistently with justice be held otherwise" ("De Legibus," Lib. iii., Cap. iv. 2). Bellarmine, De Lugo, and Vasquez, as well as the latest commentators, entirely concur in these views.

A further fact worthy of notice is that the scholastic teaching of St. Thomas has recently been revived in the Church, and is the actual authorized basis of Catholic social and economic study.

It admits, then, of no doubt that, in the days of the

Middle Ages, the Church represented the truest interests of the people, material as well as moral; that it was through the Church that the voice of the people was heard, and that it was by the Church that the power of the people made itself felt. And as a result of this posture of affairs, more especially on account of the social institutions and teaching of the Church, Kings on the whole ruled wisely; men and labour were held in honour; riches were better divided, and the various classes of the community were more closely united than in any other period of the world's history. It was, in fact, owing to the popular influence of the Catholic Church of the period that, notwithstanding the passions and violence of the times, she was yet enabled, in the words of Dr. Cunningham, a Protestant writer, "to succeed in moralizing industrial and commercial conceptions and institutions, and in inspiring men with a keen sense of personal responsibility in the employment of secular power of every kind" ("Western Civilization," vol. ii., p. 104).

Mr. Woodrow Wilson, the new President of the United States, whose long years of study and research as professor of political science have eminently qualified him to speak, says of the democratic influence of the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages: "The only reason why government did not suffer dry rot in the Middle Ages under the aristocratic system which then prevailed was that most of the men who were efficient instruments of government were drawn from the Church—from that great religious body which was then the only Church, that body which is now distin-

guished from other religious bodies as the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church was then, as it is now, a great democracy. There was no peasant so humble that he might not become a priest, and no priest so obscure that he might not become a Pope of Christendom; and every chancellery in Europe, every Court in Europe, was ruled by these learned, trained, and accomplished men—the priesthood, and that great and dominant Church” (“The New Freedom,” pp. 82, 83).

Mr. Woodrow Wilson might have further confirmed his argument by instancing the fact of Pope Calixtus I. having passed from slavery to the chair of Peter. Nor was this the only Pope reputed to have been originally of servile condition.

Such was the golden age of Christian Democracy and the flower of its progress. The period closed with the end of the fifteenth century. Since then, owing to a variety of causes, but chiefly in consequence of the breaking up of the close alliance of the Catholic Church with the Christian State and the general opposition to organized religion—both results of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century—the Christian Democratic movement has received a serious check from which it has not yet recovered. In this set-back the cause of the people suffered from the first.

The new period opened with an appalling increase of distress among the poor, coupled with a corresponding growth of luxury in the ranks of the rich. In all classes of society works of benevolence and charity sadly diminished. The result was that the relief of the poor

and the care of the workers began to fall more and more on the hands of the municipal authorities and the State; and the practical problem of poverty grew increasingly difficult for the Church, which, notwithstanding, continued to assert her principles, and to put them into practice as far as the altered conditions permitted.

No longer a part of a united Christendom, and regarded with suspicion by the State which had supplanted her, the work of the Church lay henceforth in indirect rather than in direct action. She could not make or administer laws, but she could use her influence to direct and promote them. It was competent to her also to supplement State activities by her own voluntary efforts. Both these works she accomplished with singular success. But her greatest triumph was in the field of organized charity. Herein she was assisted by a number of religious congregations and secular associations—having for their object the relief of distress and suffering. These institutions began to come into existence at this period and combined to form, from the Catholic standpoint, its most important social feature.

Prominent amongst the religious agencies was the Order of Charity founded by St. John of God in 1540. This congregation spread so rapidly that at the close of the eighteenth century it numbered 2,914 religious brethren, with 281 hospitals under their care. In 1633 the Sisters or Daughters of Charity were instituted by St. Vincent de Paul. These devoted religious, by their corporal and spiritual works of mercy extending over nearly three hundred years, have worthily sustained the

memory of their founder, who was probably the most remarkable social worker ever known to the world. About the same time, in 1643, Blessed John Eudes founded the Sisters of the Good Shepherd for the rescue of girls and fallen women. And nearly two centuries later, in 1854, the institution of the Little Sisters of the Poor for the care of the aged poor was approved by the Holy See. The work of both these religious bodies is the admiration of the modern world.

Of lay associations to befriend the suffering, and to bring the contact of personal service to bear on the lives of the poor, the greatest by far is that which was begun in Paris about the year 1833 by Frederic Ozanam, and has since gone under the name of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. This society, which is now spread all over the Catholic world, and has a total membership of over 200,000, in addition to its work in distributing alms and assisting the poor by advice, maintains in many places, nurseries, orphanages, schools, libraries, and even employment bureaus. It is recognized to be amongst the most effective of existing organizations for the betterment of the people.

In France, notwithstanding the religious persecution, the total number of Catholic charitable societies in 1901 exceeded 4,000, and the number of persons attended by them was 107,400. In the United States in 1908 there were 272 orphan asylums with 42,597 inmates, besides 1,054 other charitable institutions. And since these statistics may be taken as fairly representative of those countries also, they afford a striking testimonial to the actual work of the Church on behalf of the poor.

The lay and religious institutions of orphanages, reformatories, hospitals, and asylums, just described, represent in terms of charity the aggregate practical results of the Catholic social endeavour of our day. But the Church's zeal has not been confined to the field of charity. It has also been strenuously exerted on the side of justice, the claims of labour having, as we have seen, been brilliantly expounded by the highest ecclesiastical authority, and embodied for all times in the Encyclical letters and addresses of Popes Leo XIII. and Pius X. These same claims also find abundant expression in the modern Catholic Labour Movement, to which reference has already been made, and which will receive fuller treatment in a subsequent chapter.

From this general review we conclude that the Catholic Church has been consistently earnest and successful in her efforts on behalf of the people, and on the whole has resolved the social problems of every age more adequately than any of her rivals; that the chief defects of her work, though occasionally due to admitted abuses which crept into her various organizations, are, in most cases, to be attributed, not to her system, but rather to the lack of means and resources, of which political and religious opposition too often deprived her; that, finally, were it not for the evil results of the "Reformation" of the sixteenth century, the bitter suffering and the crying injustices of the proletariat of the present day would not now exist, and the Church would still be able to cope with the modern developments and actual conditions of industry.

CHAPTER III

INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM

THE meaning of the term "Individualism" is more easily understood than expressed. The reason of this is to be found in the wide comprehensiveness of the word, which allows of its being interpreted in many and different senses, and applied to a large range of sciences. In these it stands either for a principle or for a theory, according as the degree or extension of its signification is more or less limited.

In theology and religion Individualism is the theory which professes belief, but refuses to submit matters of faith to an authoritative teacher.

In ethics it is the principle which claims that the individual conscience is the sole rule of conduct to be followed, independently of every other external or objective standard. The Intuitionism of the Scottish Common Sense School of Philosophy, promulgated by Reid, as well as the autonomous morality of Kant, and the various systems of Hedonism, which make individual utility or pleasure the standard of right and wrong, are all forms of ethical individualism. These theories have, however, of late lost much of their importance, the trend of modern ethics being almost entirely directed towards a social conception of morality.

Catholicism, inasmuch as it recognizes the supreme authority of the Church in regard to faith and morals, is opposed to both ethical and religious individualism. Protestantism, on the contrary, with its principle of private judgment, gives them a preponderating approval.

Political individualism has been defined as "the theory of government which favours the non-interference of the State in the affairs of individuals"; and this definition would appear to be sufficiently correct, provided that it is taken, as it commonly is, to represent a general presumption against State interference, and not any specific theory of the function, or lack of function, of the State in regard to the affairs of individuals.

The proviso is necessary because the individualistic conception of politics is far too wide to allow of its being incorporated in any cut-and-dried system. As a matter of fact, it varies in degree almost indefinitely, the theories of non-interference ranging from the denial of all government to the assertion of the State as an institution, at least, for the maintenance of order and the enforcement of justice. At the present time political individualism is for the most part moderate in expression, and widely removed from the doctrinaire theories of the eighteenth century in which it originated. Practical individualism in politics is far from opposing all Government intervention, and it fully recognizes the need under existing circumstances of some legislative checks. What it insists on is the general principle that, where unity of action is not a social necessity, the fullest liberty should be granted to individuals. If this liberty is abused by them, the proper remedy lies rather

in the education and training of wiser and better individuals than in the curtailment of freedom.

Nor are arguments wanting to support this position. Of these, perhaps the strongest is drawn from the errors and follies involved in even the most carefully planned legislation. Herbert Spencer, as will be remembered, insisted on this point, and never wearied of urging upon his generation the truth that it is impossible for legislators to foresee where the results of their legislation will end. In "The Coming Slavery" he says: "The legislator contemplates intently the things his act will achieve, but thinks little of the remoter issues." He then goes on to give instances of the ways in which State legislation works unexpected ills. And in his essay on "The Great Modern Superstition" he holds up to ridicule the idea, which is far more prevalent now even than then, that social ills are readily remedied by legal enactments. "The great superstition of the past," he writes, "was the divine right of Kings. The great superstition of the present is the divine right of Parliament."

It is in economic science, however, that modern individualism finds its most characteristic development. Here it is represented by the theory of natural liberty to "truck, barter, and exchange," a theory first taught by Adam Smith, and subsequently developed by the *laissez-faire*, or "let alone," school of economists. As originally formulated, the theory of liberty expressed the right of the individual to the largest measure of contractual freedom compatible with the equal freedom of others. But later it made further and extravagant claims, demanding in the name of free competition and

contract, not only the exclusion of all national and municipal enterprise, but also the banning of every form of capitalist and labour association. For obvious reasons these extreme opinions are now "taboo." But moderate economic individualism still finds supporters amongst not a few thoughtful persons, who remain convinced that the best guarantee of social welfare and the surest remedy of industrial ills consist, not in forsaking principles which in the past have been the life of modern progress, but in applying them in such a way that they shall lift up every individual to a higher level of efficiency, and so render him a more effective contributor to the common good.

Such are some of the recognized forms of Individualism. But in its widest acceptance the word implies more than any particular theory or group of theories, and displays rather a general inclination or propensity towards an individualistic ideal. The ideal or goal is that of freedom; and though this goal is modified in different subject matters, the tendency it gives rise to is constant and unmistakable. That tendency is to magnify personal liberty in contrast to authority, and to exalt private interest over immediate public advantage.

In social science, with which we are directly concerned, Individualism may be defined in general as "the disposition to prefer the private rights and free activities of individual members of society to the social claims and collective enterprise of society as a whole." So understood Individualism is opposed to Collectivism, which prefers the whole to the part and authority to freedom. At the same time the two con-

ceptions have this character in common—both are unreal in themselves and consequently unattainable. As absolute ideals they are untrue, and the goals to which they point can never be reached. In this connection it has been well said that there is truth in Individualism and truth in Collectivism, but that there is no true Individualism, nor any true Collectivism. Truth in fact is a sphere, whilst these are, at best, hemispheres. At the highest computation, therefore, they are half-truths; and half-truths are proverbially worse in their effects, and more dangerously misleading, than whole falsehoods. Hence absolute Individualism and absolute Collectivism are unreal and could not exist. When, therefore, these terms are applied to particular polities they must be understood as relative expressions, and the systems they represent ought not to be judged off-hand and on purely *a priori* grounds, but only after due consideration of the circumstances which indicate the comparative measure or degree in which they embody or fulfil their respective ideas.

Extreme Individualism is anarchy: extreme Collectivism is Socialism. Against both the Church makes her strongest protest. Otherwise her position is neutral. She is neither individualistic nor anti-individualistic: she lays down no inflexible law; she forges no unnecessary fetters for the individual or for society—either in politics or economics. She is content to shape her attitude to the varying systems which pass before her, not by any rigid, unalterable rules, but by considerations arising out of the actual needs of individuals and the welfare of society.

In the history of social development Individualism and Collectivism have always existed side by side, the one serving to correct the other. The latter, however, has generally predominated. At least this is true of Christian civilization until comparatively recent times. All through the Middle Ages, moderate Collectivism showing itself in the direction of labour and protective legislation was the important social force. But with the commencement of the sixteenth century, the balance of superiority in influence shifted. Since then, for over three centuries, and indeed until within the last sixty or seventy years, the spirit of personal liberty and of preference of individual activity and interest to co-operation and the collective interest of society, as embodied in the principle of authority, has prevailed throughout Western civilization.

The history of the rise and growth of this world movement, of which we are now witnessing the decline, is set in a variety of events which acted and reacted on one another, and were in part its causes and in part its effects. Chief amongst them were the decline of the power of the Church, the abolition of Feudalism, the Industrial Revolution, the Philosophy of the eighteenth century, and the new science of Political Economy.

To refer to these briefly.

The decline of the power of the Church as a social and political force began with the Protestant Reformation which originated in Germany in 1517, and spread rapidly through Northern Europe. The movement was not only a rebellion of private judgment against religious authority, it was also the revolt of individual liberty

against the collectivist tendency which was undoubtedly largely embodied in the Catholic Church.

At the same time that the Reformation triumphed over the Church in the northern countries of Europe, the ancient system of Feudalism, which had grown up with the Church, and shared her spirit of social responsibility and co-operation, commenced to disappear. Under the Feudal system, the land of the country was held by the people on condition of military service to the great lords. By this arrangement vassals depended on the lords as well for the soil which they cultivated for their immediate support as for protection against enemies and the safeguarding of their rights. But the lords in turn were also dependent on their vassals, since their power consisted in the number and efficiency of the retainers they could muster in battle. The interests of the lords were therefore linked up with those of their vassals, and the interests of the latter were bound up with the land. Consequently there was reciprocity of relations which welded the classes into the closest social unity. But the new system of society completely changed all this.

The change, as far as we are concerned with it, came about somewhat in this way. Owing to the development of sheep-farming and the higher price of wool, the demand for land at this period greatly increased. The natural result was that land commenced for the first time to have a commercial value over and above the use value which it formerly possessed as a means of support for the tiller. As a consequence the land gradually came to be more and more regarded as the capital of

the landlord, who, instead of allowing it to be possessed and tilled by the labourer in return for his personal services, according to the old terms, now rented it to him for money.

The centralization of authority in the King and the introduction of regular armies combined also at this time to bring into existence the new Court nobles, whose power was not in men, but in money, and whose main concern was not the well-being of their tenants, but the amount of income they could secure from the rent of their lands. This accentuated the existing evil.

Another change was the growth of the wages system. Through the greed of powerful landowners desirous to exploit their land to the utmost, large numbers of the smaller peasant proprietors, who formerly tilled the soil and lived by its fruits, were evicted from their holdings by force or fraud, and, becoming dependent on the sole capital of their labour, were compelled to barter this for paltry wages. The growth of the wages system and the dispossession of land were so rapid at this period that an eminent authority—Thorold Rogers—estimates that by the middle of the seventeenth century half the people of England were dependent on the hire of their labour, and were in receipt of weekly wages from land monopolists. This was the beginning of voluntary contracts between employers and employed, which has since developed into the fierce struggle between capital and labour.

But the all-important factor in the growth of the modern movement of Individualism was what is known as the "Industrial Revolution." This had its source in

British enterprise in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1607 the first English colony of Virginia was founded in America, and in 1612 the first trading station was opened at Surat, in India. These settlements led to the subsequent foundation of our Indian Empire, and to our temporary colonial supremacy in North America. Australia and the Cape of Good Hope were later added to our possessions. The enormous expansion of commerce following on these events soon made the old methods of industry inadequate to the new conditions. At the same time it caused a powerful stimulus to be given to mechanical invention, which responded to the call with wonderful and far-reaching results. First Arkwright's spinning-jenny revolutionized the spinning industry, and gave birth to the factory system, which speedily spread through the world. Then steam-power began to be more extensively used, and became a valuable auxiliary to the new machinery, which almost everywhere took the place of manual labour. Later on the electric telegraph and other electric appliances developed. The final result was a complete transformation of method in manufacturing, mining, freight, traffic, and commerce, which has since received the name of the "Industrial Revolution."

The change brought with it many benefits. It was also attended by serious evils, as we shall see later. Meanwhile, perhaps the greatest gain of all was the increased initiative and character which the new industrialism conspicuously effected. By virtue of its system, containing special incentives to individual enterprise, it called for commercial and industrial freedom. But this claim carried with it the further demand for a wider

individual liberty exceeding commercial limits, and entering into all the relations of life. In this way it threw men back on their own resources and developed their mental and moral power.

The demand for freedom in commercial and industrial pursuits received further countenance and support from the new science of political economy, which Adam Smith (1723-1790) first invented as a science distinct and separate from general sociology. The Physiocrats, or Liberal economists, who gave birth to the political philosophy of the eighteenth century, had preceded him. It is also certain that the English economist drew his inspiration from the theories of these philosophers, which were in turn based on Rousseau's doctrine, and particularly on his teaching concerning the innate goodness of human nature, and the necessity of following its tendencies into every field and every department of human activity. But whereas the Physiocrats embraced the whole social order, Adam Smith confined himself strictly to social economy. It is also made clearly evident in the great work on the "Wealth of Nations," which was published in 1776, that he differed from the Philosophers both in method and in doctrine. In the former he is less *a priori*, and in the latter he is less individualistic and absolute. But these are only accidental divergencies and differences of degree. Essentially his system of political economy was a structure with liberty for its basis and the law of interest for its motive.

Adam Smith had disciples. The chief of these were Ricardo (1772-1823) and Malthus in England, and J. B. Say (1767-1832), Rossi, Cherbuliez, and Bastiat, in France. By their means he founded a school of

economic Liberalism, which claimed the several titles of official, orthodox, and classical, and held a position of supremacy in the field of political science for over a hundred years. In the struggle between Protection and Free Trade in 1843 it gained a signal victory, chiefly owing to the championship of Richard Cobden and John Bright, supported by the English Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel. Since that time it gradually gave place to a moderate Liberal school, whose adherents, while faithfully maintaining the fundamental principles of the orthodox teaching, applied them less rigorously, and gave greater attention to experiment and induction.

With the original Liberal philosophy of Rousseau, which was adapted and shaped into a political system by Quesnay, Dupont de Nemours, Mercier de la Rivière, the Marquis de Mirabeau, Turgot, and other leading Physiocrats of the reign of Louis XVI., we shall have occasion to deal later. It is only necessary to add here that this system was immediately responsible for the revolt of civil freedom against Government authority, which more or less affected most countries of Europe during the eighteenth century, and came to a head in France at the French Revolution. The political crisis, attended as it was with confusion, violence, and bloodshed, speedily led to political reaction. Men soon tired of disorder. The cause of political freedom became discredited for a time, and the period of war and anarchy closed with the military dictatorship of the first Napoleon. But the fever for social and economic liberty survived, and caused the individualistic ideal to maintain a general ascendancy almost up to the middle of

the nineteenth century. About that period the reaction, which gradually led to the transition of public opinion back to Collectivism, set in. But up to that time, as we have seen, and for a space of fully three hundred years previously, it was Individualism that almost exclusively possessed the best intellects of Europe, and fired the popular imagination with the love of freedom.

Obviously the movement and the spirit that animated it contained much that was useful and even indispensable. On the moral side it developed character and manly independence. On the economic it produced our modern industrial progress. But, as is the usual fate of popular movements, the one we are considering eventually deteriorated and suffered abuse. It fell the victim of the narrowness of its own supporters, who, obsessed and blinded by an excessive passion for liberty, were incapable of weighing other considerations, or of viewing social matters from any but an individualist standpoint. In the hands of these men Individualism degenerated. By loudly proclaiming the sovereign supremacy of the individual and private right, and almost completely ignoring the collective personality of the State and the great socializing forces that are involved in the necessary supremacy of society as a whole, Individualism came rightly to be regarded as an extreme and untenable doctrine. It led eventually to the reaction of present-day Radicalism and Socialism, which have this much in common—that they are a revulsion from the old Liberalism. But it was in the anarchic Democracy of the French Revolution that Individualism may be said to have culminated.

CHAPTER IV

ANARCHIC DEMOCRACY

THE French Revolution of 1789 opened a new chapter in the history of the world. It found a corrupt and completely effete public order resting on a definite system of political principles, which had maintained this order in existence for many centuries, and to which it now owed whatever life it possessed. This organization of society the Revolution swept away, replacing it later by a polity that was entirely new. The old order was the Catholic Democracy of the Middle Ages; the new order was the anarchic Democracy of modern Liberalism. While the former exhibited a phase of human development, which, though incomplete, was still based on sound principles, the latter represented a false ideal which had no parallel in history, and whose principles were opposed to true philosophy.

As we shall immediately see, the new democracy was in substance the expression of Rousseau's "Sovereignty of the People" theory, in accordance with which "the general will is always right, and always tends to the public advantage." Its essential ideal is incidentally described by John Stuart Mill in his "Representative Government" as being "no longer the rule of the majority, still less of a class, but the rule of all." He says:

“The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the whole people equally represented. The former (the rule of all) is synonymous with the equality of all citizens ; the latter (the rule of the majority or of a class), strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege, in favour of the numerical majority, who alone possess practically any voice in the State.”

The central fact of the new Liberal polity was, therefore, the recognition of the principle of universal equality, and the admission of the masses to power in their individual right.

That such a system was without parallel in history is proved by a glance at the most advanced democracies of ancient Greece and Rome, or at those of medieval Europe. In those democracies it is evident that the principle of equality was not accepted, and that citizenship was not regarded as a natural right, but held to be a privilege granted by the State only to those whom it judged to possess the necessary knowledge and political wisdom.

The several republics of Greece and Rome were in fact highly exclusive forms of government. For though the sovereignty in every case was invested in the body of the citizens, the actual exercise of it, owing to the rigorous qualifications for citizenship, was confined to a small class of the people. In the Athens of Pericles, for instance, where ancient democracy attained its highest development, citizenship was restricted to those who were the sons of an Athenian father, himself a citizen, and an Athenian mother. Thereby all the

slaves who formed the larger number of the population, as well as resident aliens and allies, and Athenians disqualified by their descent, were without share in the government. And this system was at the time, and continued long after to be, in entire accord with the Greek idea of democracy. Aristotle, for example, expressly taught that it was not necessary for all classes to vote to constitute a democracy, and that the suffrage should be strictly limited to the citizen class. Where all vote, he held, it was an ochlocracy, or government by the crowd. So that to Aristotle democracy in the modern sense would have simply meant "mob rule."

In the medieval free cities such as Florence, Pisa, Venice, and Genoa in the south, and Hamburg, Nuremberg, and Frankfort in the north, we find the nearest approach to modern democracy. But even in these democracies at their best period—when, emancipated from the control of Dukes and feudal aristocracies, the functions of government were directly exercised by the burgesses themselves, or by parties immediately deriving their authority from them—the suffrage was extremely limited. In those days also, as in ancient times, representative government as it now exists, or government by deputy, was practically unknown. So that the masses of the people were completely excluded from all share—both direct and indirect—in the management of the State. The ancient and medieval democracies were in fact, for the most part, moderate republics or oligarchies, ruled by the best men of the middle class, who formed a natural aristocracy of merit.

But mere contrast with the past is not sufficient

condemnation of a new system. Nor is the fact that democracy in earlier days largely embodied the principle of aristocracy a criterion of the true character of an institution, the nature of which is progressive, and which is ever tending to widen the sphere of freedom. The revolutionary doctrine we are about to consider must be judged solely on its merits, and tested by its principles. By these it stands or falls.

Now what are these principles? They are precisely the principles developed by Locke, Rousseau, and the various French Liberal philosophers of the eighteenth century; and they will be found to be fundamentally contained in Rousseau's "Social Contract," a glance at which will reveal a grossly exaggerated individualism exalting the interest and liberty of the individual to the serious detriment of society as a whole.

"Man is born free, and is everywhere in chains." These opening words of the "Social Contract" give a clear indication of the optimistic view of human nature consistently adhered to by the author as well in this treatise as in his other works.

The foundation of Rousseau's doctrine is that man is endowed with the *essential* attributes of goodness, equality, and freedom. These constitute his inalienable birthright, and attach to him by reason of his nature. That he is actually deprived of them to a large extent is due to a culpable accident on his part. As man came from the hands of Nature, he was a noble and unrestrained being, admirably adapted by his own powers to provide for all his needs. Originally, therefore, he had no need of society. He was free and self-

sufficient. That this splendid savage did eventually abandon his free state, and enter into the association of citizenship, was a result of his own choice. The change, however, was retrogressive. It was a falling away from a higher and natural state of existence to a lower and artificial condition. In the light of this misfortune of humanity, it became the State's duty to avail itself of the only remedy, and to restore as far as might be to each individual his birthright of freedom. Hence the great problem which Rousseau set himself to resolve was how "to find a form of association in which the person and property of every associate shall be protected and defended by the force of the community, and wherein each individual, while united with all, may, nevertheless, remain as free as before, and obey none but himself" ("The Social Contract," Bk. i., Chap. vi.).

Any practical solution of the problem was impossible. In particular the proposal to give unrestricted liberty to every individual member of society contradicted itself. Men cannot contract to live in society, and remain as free as before. None the less Rousseau affected to find means to achieve even this. After postulating the absolute equality of all so that each adult male shall count for one, and nobody for more than one, he goes on to build up the perfect State as follows:

"Let each individual unit contribute the offering of himself to the universal and supreme will, and receive in return the offering of the rest. This voluntary act of association will at once produce a new collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly

has voices, and this body will receive by the same act its unity, its life, and its will " (*ibid.*).

From the fusion of the rights of the contracting parties, which yet remain to them intact, arises the moral personality and power of the State. Such was Rousseau's conception of the only legitimate form of civil society.

A little further discussion will render the practical contradictions contained in the above scheme still more apparent. In theory the power of the people is unlimited. They are independent and sovereign. Their freedom is absolute. But how is it in practice? This theoretical power and freedom immediately vanish. For the people as individuals are actually deprived of even their natural rights. The general will, which in practice is the will of the majority, being supreme, the individual will is coerced or annihilated. The sovereign people are thus in reality subjected to the arbitrary rule of a governing majority, and rendered liable to any form of tyranny.

Rousseau himself, when brought face to face with the practical aspect of the question, was compelled to make the following admissions :

" The act of association contains a reciprocal engagement between the public and individuals, and every individual, contracting so to speak with himself, is engaged in a double relation, as a member of the sovereign towards individuals, and as a member of the State towards the sovereign. But we cannot apply here the maxim of civil law that no man is bound by engagements made with himself; for there is a great difference between being bound to oneself and to a whole of which one forms a part.

“We must further observe that the public resolution which can bind all subjects to the sovereign in consequence of the two different relations under which each of them is regarded, cannot, for a contrary reason, bind the sovereign to itself; and that accordingly it is contrary to the nature of the body politic for the sovereign to impose on itself a law which it cannot transgress. As it can only be considered under one and the same relation, it is in the position of an individual contracting with himself; whence we see that there is not, nor can be, any kind of fundamental law binding upon the body of the people, not even the social contract.”

And a little further on, proceeding to describe the character of the general will, he adds:

“Now the sovereign, being formed only of the individuals that compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs; consequently the sovereign power needs no guarantee towards its subjects, because it is impossible that the body should wish to injure all its members; and we shall see hereafter that it can injure no one as an individual. The sovereign, for the simple reason that it is so, is always everything that it ought to be.

“But this is not the case as regards the relation of subjects to the sovereign, which, notwithstanding the common interest, would have no security for the performance of their engagements, unless it found means to insure their fidelity.

“Indeed, every individual may, as a man, have a particular will contrary to, or divergent from, the general will which he has as a citizen; his private interest may

prompt him quite differently from the common interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will be less harmful to others than the payment of it will be burdensome to him. . . .

“In order, then, that the social pact may not be a vain formulary, it tacitly includes this engagement, which can alone give force to the others—that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free” (“The Social Contract,” Bk. i., Chap. vii.).

The reasoning contained in the foregoing argument is of a trivial and verbal nature, being dependent for its logical sequence on metaphysical distinctions—such as those between “the public and individuals,” “the two different relations,” “the particular and the general will,” “private and common interest”—distinctions which exist in the order of ideas, but are not, at least formally, fulfilled outside it. The argument, moreover, is vitiated, because it is based on the false assumption that these distinctions really correspond to separate, actually existing differences.

As a political philosophy, therefore, Rousseau’s system is indefensible. Notwithstanding, it continues to exert considerable influence. It has actually, and even because of its inconsistencies, given rise to the opposite extremes of Liberalism and Socialism. Its salient ideas also find expression in all those democratic polities which, like the present Republic of France, assign to

individuals, as a matter of right, and independently of their intellectual and moral attainments, an equal share in the election of those to whom the function of government is directly entrusted. Its echo is likewise heard in the agitation for the "Referendum," in the "One man, one vote" demand, in the dogma of the "Mandate of the people," and generally in the claim of the omnipotence of the people's will, and its all-sufficiency as the source of right and duty.

But this modern theory is far too important and widely accepted to allow of its being summarily dismissed. To refute Rousseauism it is necessary to discuss the theory in at least sufficient detail to show the incorrectness of its chief arguments and method.

Let us first deal with Rousseau's method.

The treatment of this subject, even at some length, in connection with a theory which is professedly logical will be at once justified, if we remember that method is only another name for a system of right procedure for the attainment of truth. Such method or procedure is necessarily relative, and not cut and dry, or absolute. It is even elastic and conditioned by circumstances. Accordingly method varies in various sciences. But what really matters is that in every case that method or combination of methods is employed which the particular science requires. For no matter how weighty the arguments, or how true their premises and conclusions, if the right method is not followed, there can be little expectation of real progress. The faulty method is sure, sooner or later, to bar the progress towards truth.

As every student of logic knows, method is twofold—

deductive and inductive. The former starts with broad and self-evident principles, and argues from them to particular conclusions; the latter seeks to find principles or law underlying and explaining individual facts. Deduction is the shorter and easier method, and when properly employed serves a most useful purpose in the pursuit of knowledge. But it easily lends itself to abuse, as for example when it is employed independently of facts to form a theory, and then to explain away the facts by the bare assertion of the theory.

In practice regard should be had to the following caution:

So long as the subject matter under consideration consists exclusively of general truths of universal, or almost universal, application, the deductive method is generally sufficient, but when there is a further question of principles which apply to the particular and ever varying facts of concrete experience, then the use of the inductive in addition becomes an absolute necessity. Such is the case with social science which has constantly to take into account a variety of circumstances arising from alterations of environment, differences of customs and habits, and divergencies in needs and ambitions of men and nations. To neglect these vital differences is to render all political theorizing influences ineffective and futile.

Now it was precisely into the error just described that Rousseau and the Liberal economists of the eighteenth century fell. These economists, later known as Physiocrats (*φύσις*, *nature*, and *κράτος*, *power*), from their attributing the production of wealth to nature

alone, made the mistake, following Rousseau's example, of applying a purely *a priori* process of reasoning to a mixed science which depended in an at least equal measure, on a *posteriori* argument.

That sociology is in reality a mixed science, involving for its study a twofold method, is readily discoverable from its nature, which is described as "a practical science directing the activities of men to the social good or happiness of the community." For, if we accept this definition, these deductions follow. First, since human activities and happiness have their source in an immutable human nature, they must, therefore, imply an invariable element; and this element can be reached by *a priori* reasoning. Thus it is within the competence of reason to deduce from the inner moral and spiritual nature of man the ideal he must follow to attain the goal of happiness. From the same source reason can likewise point to certain general tendencies—for instance, the proneness to procure ownership, and the desire to form associations for the securing of rights. And from these it is enabled to derive the primary individual and social obligations affecting mankind. Further, reason can apply the principles contained in these general laws, as particular rules, to the practical conduct of life. But, on the other hand, in addition to these natural rights and duties, there are many things, including most practical conventions and customs, which are dependent on contingent realities, and are subject to the varying modifications of time and place, and the changing conditions of men and nations. These represent a mutable element which can

only be accurately gauged by the observation of facts. But the fulfilment of this function is proper to induction. Synthesis, therefore, as well as analysis, is demanded. Hence both deduction and induction are required for the successful pursuit of social science.

Such, however, was neither the conviction nor the practice of the Physiocrats, who persisted in following a rigidly *a priori* method. Their procedure consisted in viewing human nature only as an abstraction, or as a term of thought, and in drawing from this incomplete survey speculative theories and abstract principles for the government of men in society, whilst men really stood in need of practical reforms and concrete rules. Thus, they set out with the idea of man as a universal unrelated being, identical in all ages and states of society; and from this hypothetical and unreal conception they proceeded to deduce the rights of man, as man, and to construct a system of social science on the basis of pure reason.

The result of this restricted intellectualism was an unreal system which prescinded from the facts of life, and fell at every turn, as we shall see, into the logical fallacy of *petitio principii*, commonly known as "begging the question." And this was what might have been expected. To produce a real and satisfying philosophy of life the whole range of human nature must be taken into account, and men and women considered in their actual conditions, with their passions, emotions, desires, ambitions; and not as they might be in ideal circumstances, or as they should be, if they conformed to specific mental conceptions and categories of thought.

The limitations of the Rousseau school arose directly out of this fault in method. Saddled with this drawback, even right ideas and sound principles could scarcely have issued in a satisfactory theory. But the Liberal system was further weighted with a heavy load of positive errors for which the method of its originators was again mainly responsible.

That many of the leading ideas of Rousseau's philosophy, and of the Liberalism to which it gave birth, though plausible, and highly popular at the time and since, were in fact radically false, we have next to show.

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of the Liberal philosophy was contained in the aphorism that "man is essentially good, and consequently his tendencies are likewise good." After what has been said the fallacy underlying this partly true statement will not be hard to discern. That man in the abstract or in his specific nature is good is wholly undeniable. The statement is an immediate derivative of the metaphysical truth that claims goodness as the necessary attribute of whatever exists. But a metaphysical truth is not infrequently a physical falsehood. This is due to the fact that the spheres of the physical and the metaphysical are distinct and separate; and that what is predicted of the one is not necessarily fulfilled in the other.

Most things in concrete existence contain many imperfections which make them less good, or even bad, in common estimation. The same is true of man. The ideal is perfect, and leaves nothing to be desired. But the expression of it in human experience falls far short

of the original. Reason and experience both go to show that human nature in its actual development is prone to many inconsistencies, and Christian faith, which ought to be the foundation of social science, confirms this by its doctrine that man's nature has been hurt by an original fault whose evil consequences are always with it.

The premiss on which the argument rests being disproved its conclusion that "all man's" tendencies are likewise good is readily refuted. In the first place, this conclusion, inasmuch as it has no support from its own syllogism, has no logical claim to assent. But this is not all. For the statement that "all human tendencies are good" is not only without internal proof, but it is positively disproved by overwhelming external evidence. It has in fact arrayed against it the whole testimony of mankind. For has not the race of men at all times condemned those who indulged "their natural tendencies," and honoured those who controlled them? And when did the wise and virtuous, or even the sane, either amongst Pagans or Christians, ever allow that man, in yielding to the cravings of the passions of the moment, acted in accordance with virtue and wisdom? This argument of the consensus of the opinion of mankind is conclusive, and therefore further refutation of this particular proposition is superfluous.

The principle of unrestricted individual liberty which the Physiocrats derived from Rousseau's teaching, that "man is born free," seems to come next in importance. This law of liberty is based on the fact of a common nature shared equally by all. It is also supported by arguments drawn from the theory of human equivalence

and public utility. Thus it is urged, that as the members of society have a common nature, and are endowed with common tendencies, which are all equally good, they ought to be considered equal and accorded equal social and political rights. The argument from utility centres in the motive of personal interest. In every individual the predominant tendency is to seek without limit his own interest. This is the motive which chiefly prompts to endeavour, and most of all secures success. But seeing that the whole of society is made up of a number of individuals, it is clear that its collective interest is simply the sum of the interests of its members; in other words, the personal interest of each is the common interest of all. If therefore every individual be allowed to follow his natural bent, and to pursue freely his own particular interest, this will be to the general advantage, and the best possible social condition will ensue as a matter of course.

The errors and sophisms contained in the above arguments are many and manifest. In the first place, we are confronted with the fallacy already noticed of confusing man's abstract nature with his concrete and individual being. Men are represented as being endowed with equality and freedom on the ground of being equal by nature.

But in what sense are men equal by nature? And what is the extent of this claim to equal rights? Undoubtedly, as we have seen, all men in the abstract are equal, and are entitled to equal treatment. That is, if abstraction be made of the individual differences that separate men from one another, they possess identical

natures and rights. The result of this abstraction is the formation of a universal idea of human nature in which the characters are common to all mankind. But the consideration based on such an idea implies a view of men not as they really are, or as they actually exist in the physical order, but as they are pictured by our minds in the metaphysical order, as the shadowy existences of thought. As soon as we remove men from this formal setting, and consider them as they exist in the concrete, viewing each human nature under the circumstances, conditions and limitations that actually clothe it, the case is entirely altered, and the claims of absolute equality fall to the ground. Essential equality remains, natural rights remain ; but personal equality and equal individual rights vanish.

Thus the law of liberty of the Physiocrats—"All men have equal rights"—is a true statement so long as it is confined to those common rights of men that follow directly from their nature considered in its abstract essence. But if it includes, as it is intended to include, rights that are derived from human nature in the concrete and clothed with a variety of individual attributes and personal traits of character, it is entirely erroneous.

The argument of utility as connected with the motive of personal interest is likewise false. It asserts that as every man has a natural tendency to pursue his personal interest so each man has only to follow this tendency for all to be happy. The underlying assumption is that humanity and society are made up of a mere collection of individuals who have no natural and inviolable relations towards one another and are united

only because they have elected or chosen to live together in common. But this assumption is false and unwarranted. Man is not naturally independent, and he did not freely contract to enter society. By his very nature he is a social being, and he is born into the world not only as an individual but also as a member of society. Hence human society is not made up of a miscellaneous multitude of independent persons, but of members united by a common bond of reciprocal rights and duties and together forming an organic whole.

With the breaking down of the individualist assumption, the rest of the argument asserting that social happiness is essentially bound up with personal interest, falls to the ground. The assertion though plausible is clearly false. It is plausible in that there is mixed with its error an element of truth. It is true that self-interest plays an important and indispensable part in promoting the material prosperity of nations. But it is untrue to attribute to it the function of being the exclusive or primary cause in the promoting of social well-being. On the contrary it is at best a secondary and subordinate cause. Nor is the reason of this far to seek. For, as will be readily admitted, personal interest of its own nature is a socially disintegrating principle, which, if left to itself, can only succeed in loosening the bonds of society and spreading dissension. To achieve social good it needs the direction of a higher unifying principle which must be derived from something superior to individuals and their rights, and superior even to society itself. That principle is the principle of law and justice sanctioned by God. Without it the motive

of self-interest will necessarily lead to pure selfishness, and the fulfilment in practice of the ignoble motto—"Everyone for himself and the devil take the hindmost."

Such was the "sovereignty of the people" theory which marked the climax of Individualism, and which reigned supreme through the ranks of democracy until close on the middle of the nineteenth century. Then for the first time the triumphant doctrine of a hundred years came to be widely disputed and vigorously attacked by eminent writers and speakers of all nationalities. The crown was fallen from its brow. It had failed to fulfil the idea of democracy. It could not meet modern requirements. Since then the liberal system has fallen on increasingly evil times, and has come to share more largely from day to day the penalty of popular disappointment—popular abandonment. Notwithstanding it has endured, and it continues to find in our day not a few, who still cling to its main principles believing that in them is yet discoverable the largest available portion of truth. Failing to see anywhere among the various sections of fragmentary democracies the whole of the beautiful ensign of "the progress of all through all, under the leadership of the best and the wisest," they range themselves under a torn, but, what to them appears a serviceable remnant of the flag, and think that by so doing they are best serving the entire cause of democracy. But herein again is delusion and error. Truth can only be served by truth; and the whole truth, and only the whole truth, is equally the law of democracy, as of the whole realm of science.

Unfortunately the revolutionary democracy we have

been considering is not merely an imperfect conception. It is even worse than a half-truth. It has all the elements of a positive evil and is a principle of disintegration and ruin. The torn flag of "the independent and supreme dominion of human nature" is a sign of the refusal of man to acknowledge the relations that bind him to God and to society. It is the standard of revolt, and it represents the revulsion of unreasoning pride against the order established by God." "Peace and prosperity," as St. Augustine wrote, "are found only in order."

The revolutionary democracy of Liberalism is, therefore, a sign of anarchy, and a symbol of the destruction of progress. It is an anarchic democracy, disinherited of truth, self-condemned, and discredited.

It led, as it was bound to do, to reaction.

CHAPTER V

TRANSITION AND REACTION

THE first steps in the change of public opinion from "Individualism" back to "Collectivism" would seem to have been brought about by the economic results which immediately followed the "Industrial Revolution" and the new political science.

The evils of this revolution in industry were many and grave.

Notably there was the abuse of labour in factories. Young children were taken into the mills, and employed for twelve or fourteen hours a day in arduous labour. Often they were sadly neglected and cruelly beaten. Women and men also suffered severe hardships.

The absence of security was perhaps an even greater evil. A time of grinding toil was likely at any moment to be followed by a period of unemployment, for which, owing to the scantiness of wages, no provision could be made. This unsatisfactory state of things was due in no small measure to the fact of the workers being politically powerless. They had no municipal or national vote, and consequently they were unable to exert any practical control over the circumstances and conditions of their labour.

The housing question in the towns now also appeared in an acute form for the first time. Crowded towns rapidly grew up around the factories, and jerry-built and insanitary houses were hurriedly erected to receive the country population which everywhere hastened to flock into the centres of industry. The result was serious physical and moral evil. Thousands of families were huddled together in dark narrow rooms and dismal underground cellars. Naturally, under such conditions, the workers deteriorated both in bodily health and in intellectual and spiritual character.

Since then protective legislation, first inaugurated in England by the Factory Act of 1802, and a general extension of the franchise, has already done much to check abuses. Still many of the evil effects of the Industrial Revolution yet prevail.

This is especially the case in regard to the housing question which continues to be one of the biggest and most insistent social problems in industrial cities and towns. The latest English Blue Book on this subject contains eloquent statistics to show that the homes of our workpeople are very far from satisfactory. A fair indication of this is also gathered from the conditions which are described as existing in even so prosperous an industrial centre as Manchester. From facts stated in a recent leading article of the *Manchester Guardian*, it appears that one-eleventh part of the city's population lives in the single district of Hulme, which is only one-forty-fifth part of the city's area; that in this district the average number of people to the acre is 132, while in the rest of the city the average is 33; that of over

13,000 houses, over 1,100 have no baths; and that in this district the only easily accessible open space is a small disused graveyard. Its death-rate is also shockingly higher than elsewhere in Manchester.

Other causes of reaction against Individualism existed in the practical application of the new system of political science. That the individualist creed of economy had achieved stupendous material results was beyond question. To it were clearly to be attributed the colossal fortunes of the time, the immense wealth of productive capital, and the enormous developments of international commerce. These results, together with an unprecedented growth of scientific inventions, and an ever increasing abundance of physical comforts, constituted the credit side of the system which, however, was not without its debit side also. This latter consisted in the association of extreme and wretched poverty with all this wealth and luxury. And it was the frightful contrast of these two extremes of social conditions that appalled the public conscience, and led first to a revulsion of feeling from Liberal economy, and then to a vigorous campaign against it.

The attack centred on the orthodox school of Adam Smith, Say, Ricardo, and others, whose teaching was roundly denounced by the Radical and Socialist orators of the early and middle portions of the nineteenth century as an immoral doctrine fraught with the darkest guilt of the worst social crimes. The doctrine was charged in particular with having raised riches to the position of the highest end in life, of having subordinated men to money, and of having encouraged the

acquisition of wealth by the motive of pure selfishness, and through the means of conscienceless greed.

That good grounds for some of this denunciation of the Liberal political economy of the time existed should be sufficiently evident from what has already been said. But it is equally certain that it was not all the truth. Before passing judgment on the economic individualism of the orthodox school, the fact should be recognized and borne in mind that its exponents were far from regarding their theory as universal and absolute, and admitting of no modification in practice. On the contrary, they were careful to set it forth as an experimental *fact* which was the outcome of history and capable of adjustment to the requirements of changing times and circumstances, and of being supplemented by protective and State legislation.

What the political science of the age really taught was that wealth was the natural basis of industrial progress. It assumed also that a proper self-interest was a predominant motive of human action. It therefore contended that ample scope should be allowed for this *force* in the pursuit and production of wealth. In other words, it encouraged a large measure of Individualism and free competition in commerce and industry, believing that the material gain of the entire community would best be secured thereby. Political economy, therefore, as set forth by its best accredited exponents, however dangerous it might be in its tendency, was certainly not immoral. That it deteriorated and became distorted in the hands of less representative theorists is highly probable. Also in practice it was

certainly grossly abused. Wealth, which was the proper aim of Industrialism, came to be regarded as a chief end of human life. A blameless self-interest, based on a proper sense of duty, gave way in large measure to pure selfishness, and the liberty of free bargain degenerated into the licence of heartless greed and grab.

To a great extent this degeneracy was occasioned by the utilitarian ethics which at the commencement of the nineteenth century greatly influenced political science. The philosophy of utilitarianism as propounded by Jeremy Bentham (1749-1832) and James Mill (1773-1836) received its name from the principle it favoured, that human acts are right or wrong only according as their consequences are generally useful or hurtful in promoting the end of life. But its chief corruptive influence lay in its misinterpreting the object of life, and in identifying the temporal purpose served by political economy with the spiritual end of the whole of man's being. This error found expression in the Benthamist theory of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," it being well understood that happiness consisted exclusively in the pleasures of this material world and the exclusion of pain. Temporal happiness may well be the proper concern of statesmanship, but it is certainly not, as the utilitarian school taught, the last end and final good of mankind. It was this teaching which, like a maggot in good fruit, corrupted and destroyed much that was otherwise healthy in the economic science of the time.

But apart from the rights and wrongs of particular economic doctrines the manifest evil consequences

which followed them contributed largely to bring about the reaction of public opinion from a general tendency to extreme Individualism, to the opposite tendency of extreme Collectivism.

The example of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), a philosopher who went with as well as led his age, is a notable sign of the change in the political views of the times. Reared from childhood in the straitest political sect of his father's rigid utilitarianism, he yet admitted at the age of twenty-five, as his most recent biographer tells us, an attraction towards an idealizing Toryism, accompanied by "a disgust for the stench of trade which clings to Glasgow, Liverpool, and other industrial centres"; and, later on, though reputed to be a Radical, he expressly denounced the doctrine of Liberalism, that every man should be "his own guide and sovereign master," as a "narrow and mischievous heresy, based on ignorance of man's nature." In fact, revulsion from "logical utilitarian narrowness" induced him, as he afterwards said, to take "temporary refuge in its extreme opposite." But though the refuge was only temporary, he never fully returned to his former position, as his theories on political economy, which were signalized by striking encroachments on the orthodox school, plainly show. Except in religion Mill was never again an extreme Individualist. He went as far as to express his opinion that the policy of *laissez-faire*, when it had finished its destructive work, must expire. And in 1848 he declared Socialism to be the greatest element of improvement in the present state of mankind. Many of Mill's theories, in fact, touched the fundamental prin-

ciples of Socialism at several points. At the same time in other vital respects he differed widely from the Socialist school; and he always insisted that the welfare of the community must begin and centre in individual improvement.

In regard to the Socialist doctrine of proprietary right Mill drew a distinction between landed and movable property. Dominion of the soil he held to be the inalienable heritage of the community. Private property in land, therefore, was necessarily contingent, and always conditioned by the consent of the State. The revenue of such property he divided into two parts, of which one represented the reward of capital, and the other the price of monopoly, the latter belonging entirely to the State, which had the right to exact it in the form of taxation.

The Socialistic principle of "the right to work" he was not prepared to deny absolutely; but he recognized that practical effect could not be given to this claim by State-provided employment at remunerative wages, as long as the number of labourers was subject to indefinite increase. It should, however, be practicable for the State to guarantee employment, provided that it took upon itself the function of controlling the excessive multiplication of the people. This new office of Government he thought might, with the further education of public opinion, yet be assumed and beneficially realized in the future.

In regard to the organization of labour, he favoured the principle of voluntary association as distinguished from the enforced co-operation of Socialism, and he

encouraged the workers to use freely their united capital in order to effect a more rational production and a more equitable distribution of wealth.

In his "Political Economy" (Bk. iv., Chap. vii.), Mill thus sets forth his idea of the scheme of industry in the future: "The formal association, however, which, if mankind continue to improve, must be expected to predominate, is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief and workpeople without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves."

On account of these views John Stuart Mill is claimed by a section of modern Socialists as a champion and upholder of their system. Though this claim, as we have seen, cannot be said to be true, it is certain, notwithstanding, that his opinions represent a marked recession from Individualism, and a long step in the direction of Collectivism.

The birth of the new movement is, moreover, incidentally connected with the epoch-making revolution in France. Not that the revolution was a Collectivist movement or the result of the Collectivist spirit. On the contrary, it was the revolt of individual liberty following on feudal despotism and the absolutism of Louis XIV. At the same time the Revolution was the actual condition which set free the new forces of social democracy. Then for the first time the *bourgeoisie*, or third estate, attained to power, and signalized their

triumph by proclaiming the reign of "liberty, equality, and fraternity." From the first "fraternity" was only a shibboleth, or party catchword, and meant nothing. But both "liberty" and "equality" had real significance. They expressed the demand which was at the heart of the Revolution for individual right through political unity.

But this was not all. The demand necessarily carried with it the further claim for social unity, as the march of events revealed. No sooner, in fact, were liberty and equality in political matters gained than they were seen to imply for a large section of the people only freedom and equality in misery. Then more than ever were the forces of unchecked competition let loose on the world. The result was the social uplifting of one class and the ruin of another. On the one hand large numbers of the *bourgeoisie* rose to the position of wealthy and independent capitalists. On the other the multitude of unprotected artisans were dragged down beneath the sweeping tide of conflict and rivalry, only to emerge again as the new fourth estate of penniless proletarians. It is these proletarian victims of an excessive individual liberty who, under the banner of Socialism or the Labour party, are now demanding the restriction of personal freedom, and clamouring for the establishment of a new solidaric commonwealth on the basis of public right and collective possession.

Thus "the reign of terror" of the Individualist revolt became the birth-pang of Collectivist Socialism.

Thenceforth in all the countries of Europe was unfurled the red flag of Communism, denoting everywhere

the emancipation of industry from the tyranny of capital, and the application in divers degrees of the principles of collective democracy, industrial association, and State-ownership of the means of production. Moreover, wherever it appeared it gathered around it intelligent, zealous and enthusiastic supporters. From the commencement the progress of Socialism was assured. It has since continued to advance rapidly and steadily. As a result, in the course of little over half a century its propaganda has developed from a series of isolated local activities into the present international and world-wide movement.

Of the history of Socialism and of the further growth of the Collectivist reaction for which it stands it is impossible here to give any full account, and in the following chapter we shall only attempt to trace the broad outlines of the movement.

CHAPTER VI

HISTORY OF SOCIALISM

THOUGH various forms of Communism have been conceived and attempted from the earliest times onward—as witness the polity of the island of Crete, 1300 B.C., Lycurgus's Sparta, Plato's ideal republic, and in the Christian era the Albigenes and other sects who, at different times, fell away from the Church, partly through denying the lawfulness of private right—still, the Socialism which sprang into being in the nineteenth century is rightly regarded as an essentially modern movement, a new development in the history of the world. For whereas the previous institutions were at most only superficial results artificially produced by powerful agitators, modern Socialism is a natural phenomenon, having its cause in the conditions of industry, and existing and flourishing wherever material civilization is highly developed. Again, whereas the motive of the Communism of the past was obviously an irrational passion of greed, the object of present-day Socialism is, in the case of its more enlightened promoters, a sincere desire to correct injustice, and to apply a remedy to admitted social ills, as the following brief history of the subject will show.

The founders of modern Socialism were, in France,

Babeuf, Saint-Simon, and Fourier ; and, in England, Robert Owen. Of the four, Francis Noel Babeuf (1764-1797), or, as he styled himself in revolutionary times, Gracchus Babeuf, was the first to raise the Socialist standard. The foundation of his theory was the idea of equality, which he found ready to hand in the two maxims of the Constitution of 1793: "All men are equal by nature and by law," and, "The purpose of society is the happiness of all." The legal declaration was, however, for most people, a dead letter, and Babeuf used the fact to prove his thesis. Attributing the failure of the new Constitution to private ownership, he set himself to apply an economic remedy, and drafted resolutions to the effect that all production and distribution should be regulated directly by the people; that all should be obliged to work ; and that everyone should receive a share of the products of the common industry according to his needs. His adherents were assured that these plans, if accepted, would lead to an immense increase in production. Both the idea and the promise attached to it have much in common with the demands and tactics at present formulated by Herr Bebel and other modern Socialists. Babeuf later formed a secret society to further his aims, which resulted in his being found guilty of conspiracy against the Republic, and guillotined on May 27, 1797.

Whilst Babeuf rested his plans of reform on the idea of equality, the Count de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), who was a member of an ancient and noble family, took the philosophy of labour as his basis. He had lived in Paris through the Revolution, of which he narrowly escaped

being a victim, and he came forth from the terrors of that ordeal impressed with the necessity of a new social order, founded on industry and science. The distinctive character of the new order was that the workers who had hitherto held the lowest place must take the highest. Moreover, the principle on which its hopes and theories rested was that labour alone was the foundation of wealth, and the sole source of value. This was borrowed from the Liberal economists who, as we have already seen, had in other ways also prepared the way for the Socialists. From this principle Saint-Simon derived the conclusion that industry, or labour in its wider sense, was the necessary standard of society, and that it was the duty of the State to apply this measure to all social institutions. In this way the rights of the workers would be restored to them, and their position would at length be recognized. But beyond this Saint-Simon had only general views on the subject of the new order, and he made no practical attempt to advance it. Later on, however, his ideas were more definitely stated, and reduced to practice by his followers, especially by *Enfantin*, and his still more famous disciple, *Bazard*. He thus became the founder of a new school of social development.

The keynote of the Saint-Simon school was the principle of association. In the old order of society man had been exploited by man. In the new order the globe must be exploited by man associated with man. To effect this there was only one means, and that was to socialize capital, or to make it the property of the State, to be publicly administered for the general good.

That this function might be effectually discharged by the State, the State itself must be organized on the principle of merit in such a way that all the different members would be employed according to their talents, and rewarded according to their deeds. Hence the motto of the Saint-Simon school: "To each according to his capacity; to each capacity according to its works." To further insure the carrying out of the idea of association and collective ownership of capital, Bazard advised a complete alteration of the laws of inheritance, so that the State should become the universal heir to property, and distribute the common wealth, not according to the dictates of affection founded on blood relationship, but solely in accordance with merit. *Enfantin* had preceded him by advocating, as a conclusion from Saint-Simon's principle of labour, that the unearned increment, obtained without working, by landowners and capitalists, was unjust and should be abolished. Since then the same doctrine has been set forth in endless variations in Socialist literature.

About the same time Charles Fourier (1772-1837) instituted another system, based on Rousseau's principle of the inherent goodness of man's nature and its desire of enjoyment. He adapted it in the following way: A moral law of attraction, corresponding to the physical attraction governing the heavenly bodies, exists in human society, and would rule all human actions, if men only submitted themselves to the Divine compulsion. That law is the attraction of the passions. If men were allowed to satisfy all their passions they would be perfectly happy. Unfortunately the existing

plan of society opposes the fulfilment of this ideal. He therefore planned a new form of social life in which the attractions of the passions might as far as possible be gratified, and the greatest amount of enjoyment secured. The means he employed to bring about the desired result was a novel organization of industry. According to the new scheme all proprietors, while keeping their right of ownership of the means of production, must work their possessions in common. They were to unite in "phalanxes" of about 1,800 persons, and dwell together in commodious and beautiful buildings called "phalansteries." Here they would work each according to his own liking, in agriculture or manufacture, or in any other of an abundant variety of profitable and pleasing occupations. The conduct of labour was to be scientific, and such as to make toil attractive. The hardest work would be the best paid, and unpleasant labour replaced by machinery as far as possible. Out of the profits of the common work a very comfortable minimum income was to accrue to the workers. The remainder might be divided between labour, capital, and talent. In this way work would proceed from the passion of enjoyment, and become a pleasure. Fourier essayed to carry out his plan, but, needless to say, the attempt failed.

Robert Owen (1771-1858), the father of English Socialism, conceived a similar idea. He believed that the root evil of industrial society lay in the competition between man's labour and machinery, and that this competition could only be checked by the united action of the workers amongst themselves. To bring

this about he proposed the scheme of forming communities of from 500 to 3,000 workers, who should be provided with the best machinery and share the profits of their work in common. Owen partly realized his scheme by establishing a number of co-operative societies in England and America. But these societies, as well as his other Socialistic enterprises, though most carefully organized, resulted in failure.

A new form of Socialism was invented about the time of the Revolution of 1848 by Louis Blanc (1811-1882), who, in his brilliant work on "The Organization of Labour," preached the necessity of political reform preceding social reform. The first necessity, he declares, is a Democratic State founded on universal suffrage ; and the first duty of such a State is to emancipate labour. But the only effectual means to emancipate labour is to put the instruments of labour into the hands of the workers. To this end he called upon the State to establish "social workshops," in which suitable occupations should be guaranteed to every citizen. At first capital would have to be provided by the State, but later the workshops would become self-supporting and self-governing ; they would also rapidly increase in number, and eventually absorb the whole organization of national industry. Though the anticipated result was not realized, Louis Blanc still gained a large amount of attention for his scheme. By becoming a member of the French Provisional Government, in which labour was fairly well represented, he so far succeeded that in his period of the Revolution he caused a decree to be signed in which the Government undertook to establish

“national workshops” after his design to relieve the pressing distress and lack of employment then existing in Paris. The experiment, however, failed disastrously and has never since been repeated.

Louis Blanc’s best service to Socialism was on the side of theory. In his book “*Le Droit au Travail*” he developed the argument of the right to work with which we are now familiar as a commonplace of Socialist controversy. Everyone has a right to live. But to live it is necessary to work. Therefore all have a right to work. By formulating this doctrine Louis Blanc added a new fundamental principle to the theory of modern Socialism.

Another and different scheme was conceived by Proudhon (1809-1865), whose aim was to bring about the reign of Collectivism by taxing landed property to extinction. The single tax theory was later on, at the time of the 1883 agitation, more fully explained and developed, and eloquently advocated in England and America by Henry George. Proudhon’s Socialistic writings were numerous and, like his harangues, were conspicuous for their irreligious and blasphemous character. “God is evil” and “Property is robbery” are his two most famous sayings. The assertion that property is robbery he strove to justify by declaring that the possession of property necessarily implied an unjust appropriation of the results of another’s labour. The appropriation took the form of rent or interest, but both these transactions involved injustice, because work could only be repaid by work, and property was incapable of making any equivalent return to labour. Proudhon eventually adopted other

principles which were subversive of all government, and by reason of them he has come to be regarded as the founder of modern Anarchism.

The Christian Socialist movement in England of 1848 is another landmark in the history of Socialism. Its leaders were Frederick Denison Maurice and Charles Kingsley, both distinguished clergymen of the Church of England. They held that the Liberal theories of Individualism were based on selfishness, and were destructive of society. The principle of each for himself must give place to that of everyone for his neighbour. They likewise favoured the scheme of placing industry on the basis of association. And in order to bring this about the Christian Socialists joined their forces with those of the Rochdale Pioneers, and rendered able assistance in promoting the co-operative movement of 1844, which at the time signally benefited the working classes. The views of the Christian Socialist school were set forth with marked literary ability in *Politics for the People*, *The Christian Socialist*, and in Charles Kingsley's "Yeast" and "Alton Locke." Their aims were generous, but the practical results of their efforts were unsatisfactory.

Such was the advance-guard of Socialism. It comprised leaders who were exceedingly effective as pioneers, and who individually did splendid introductory work. But so far none of them were more than isolated centres of activity. The time, however, had now come when the movement, already grown more general, required a wider organization and a more scientific basis. Both requirements were soon to be met; and it was reserved for Germany, who had hitherto held aloof from the

Socialist agitation, to come to the front, and supply them. This she did mainly through three eminent men, Ferdinand Lassalle, Rodbertus, and Karl Marx. These men, notwithstanding some divergence of views, worked conjointly to systematize the isolated theories of Socialism into a science of Democracy, and to organize its various schemes into a great international union. All three were State Socialists.

In the opinion of Lassalle (1825-1864) the working classes were destined to succeed the capitalists as the rulers of society. The latter first received their power at the times of the struggle for freedom of the French Revolution, but since then they had deteriorated, and, by following a selfish policy, forfeited their right to govern. The era of beneficent working-class rule in the interest of humanity as a whole was proclaimed at the Revolution of 1848 when, for the first time in the history of Europe, universal suffrage was adopted by the Government of France. Still, through the want of capital, working men continued to be prevented from achieving their mission; and they remained bound to submit to work under the capitalists for a wage which, according to "the iron law of wages," as conceived by Lassalle, could only average a bare subsistence. These conditions must be remedied by the State. But how? Though Lassalle had no faith in co-operative stores, yet he strongly held that workmen should form themselves into associations for production, and that the State should endow such associations with capital, or at least provide them with the guarantee of its credit for loans. In a word, Lassalle's plan for the solution

of the social problem was State-aided productive associations.

Rodbertus (1805-1875) was another type of State Socialist. According to his suggestion, production and distribution should gradually be handed over to the nation, but meanwhile landlords and capitalists should remain in possession of their share of the national income. Any increase of production was to go to the workers. From Lassalle's productive associations Rodbertus withheld his consent, but he agreed with him on the main lines of his theory, including "the iron law of wages," and the principle of labour being the sole source and measure of value.

The man, however, who exercised the greatest influence in bringing about the development of Social Democracy was Karl Marx (1818-1883). Marx's great book, which he called "Capital," contains the fullest explanation of his theories on social science, and its special relation to history. The evolution of history, according to the teaching therein set forth, is purely materialistic, and is determined neither by philosophical, nor moral, nor religious notions, but solely by economic conditions. It is, therefore, only necessary to change these in order to introduce a new civilization, and a new social order. The change, moreover, is being actually effected, inasmuch as the conditions, which in the past brought about the monopoly of capital in the hands of a few, are continuing to exert their influence in reducing this monopoly to the exclusive possession of the State. This is the materialistic conception of history which both Marx and Herbert Spencer borrowed from Comte.

A further explanation of the progress and doctrine of the Capitalist system is provided by Marx's famous doctrine of "value" and "surplus value." In every object of merchandise there are two values, "a value in use" and "a value in exchange." The "use value" is a natural endowment, and corresponds to the inherent usefulness of the object, or its capacity to satisfy human wants. The "exchange value," on the contrary, comes from without, and depends exclusively on the amount of human labour expended on the particular object. "Exchange value" provides the ratio in which different kinds of "use values" may be bartered for one another, and corresponds to the ordinary meaning attached to the word "value." In commercial transactions, accordingly, the only consideration is the amount of labour which is expended on goods and which is considered to be embodied in them. The doctrine of "surplus value" arises from the general theory, and is a direct application of the notion of exchange value to labour force. Thus the value of labour as an article of exchange or barter, like any other merchandise, is held to be determined by the average energy it represents, or by the price of the food ordinarily required to sustain the worker in the performance of his task. But it also has a use value which is a gift of nature costing nothing to the labourer, but very remunerative to the capitalist employer. The difference in the one value over the other is called the "surplus value." And it is this value as representing the margin of pure profit which is the chief object the capitalist has in view when purchasing labour force. He pays directly for the exchange value

of the labour he employs, but his aim is to obtain its specific use value, or the power which the labour has of producing values many times exceeding its own. The seller of labour on his side is forced by circumstances to acquiesce in the bargain. Being destitute of the instruments of labour, or the means of applying it profitably, he is compelled to hire himself to the possessor of capital. The result is that he receives in exchange for his labour a wage which just enables him to exert it by supplying him with the means of subsistence.

The wage in the above transaction exactly represents the price of the "exchange value" of the workman's labour. To the extent of that value, therefore, he receives a just recompense. But for the "use value" of his labour he receives nothing. This for a twofold reason he is obliged to surrender free of cost to the capitalist. First, the two values are inseparable. He cannot sell one without at the same time parting with the other. Then the "use value," strictly speaking, does not belong to him. It is no more his property than the use value of oil or coal is the property of the oil or coal merchant. At the same time the purchased labour is exceedingly valuable, and when utilized by the capitalist in his factory gives rise to the products of "surplus value" which vastly exceeds the value of the workman's wage. Such "surplus value," as we have seen, is pure profit to the capitalist. It is the end he has in view in all his commercial and industrial enterprises. It is the beginning middle and end of Capitalism, the life and soul in fact of that system.

There is, therefore, a necessary antagonism of interest between capital and labour. This antagonism, moreover, being inherent in the system, is of a permanent nature and must continue. Hence in it is contained the key of modern history and the secret of the social evolution of the future. Concentration of capital in increasingly large businesses will gradually destroy the smaller ones, and the growth of wretchedness will go on until it becomes insupportable. Then the few surviving capitalists will no longer be able to control the industrial world, which will rise in revolt, and after seizing on political power, will proceed to take over the instruments of labour, the capital of the country. The organized working classes will next recognize, as the result of a bitter experience, that production is a social work, and they will carry it on, no longer for individual gain, but for the benefit of society as a whole. In this way Socialism will be at length realized as the necessary evolution of capitalism.

On the practical side Marx and his friends, particularly Engels, exercised an enormous sway on the course of Socialism by establishing the "International Association of Working Men." The general draft of the new organization was passed in 1864. Two years later, in 1866, it held its first general congress at Geneva, when the Constitution of the Association, as drawn up by Marx, was approved. Before the end of the same year it had obtained a secure footing, not only in Germany, but also in England, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Holland, Austria, and America. Yet, notwithstanding this rapid progress, the career of the

Association was destined to be brief. For lack of a sufficiently flexible organization, the "International Association" perished in 1873. The international Socialism to which it had given birth, however, survived. Since then, notwithstanding local divisions, and the eleven years' war waged against it in Germany by Bismarck, international Socialism, as a whole, has continued to make steady progress, and to such an extent has it advanced that it may now in truth be said to represent the strongest political and economic force of the world. The movement counts in its ranks many millions of enthusiastic party workers. It also possesses an increasingly large Press, and exercises a strong influence on the trade union and co-operative organizations of the working class. Its parliamentary strength is likewise growing in all the countries of Europe. In America Socialism is gaining much ground. It has also forced its way into Argentina and Japan.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: WHAT IT IS NOT

WHEN Proudhon in his examination before the courts in connection with the events of June, 1848, was asked, "What is Socialism?" he replied, "Every aspiration towards the amelioration of society." "In that case," said the magistrate, "we are all socialists." About the same time Lord Melbourne expressed himself almost identically in the memorable utterance—since become a commonplace remark—"We are all socialists now." These sayings, identifying Socialism with all praiseworthy efforts to better society, are the immediate outcome of inward subjective feeling rather than the result of reasoned objective thought. Hence, however excellent as expressions of sentiment and humane conviction, they are of no value in defining the true meaning of Socialism. The difference between the Socialist system and the aspirations of well-meaning humanitarians is wide. Social amelioration is one thing, Socialism with its network of intricate and impracticable theories is another.

As a result of the obscurity which surrounds the study of Socialism many are deterred from investigating this subject, whilst many who attempt the inquiry are, for the same reason, unsuccessful. The main sources of

error in regard to the principle of Socialism are: (1) The many loose and incorrect definitions given of it by Socialist writers and critics; and (2) the consequent misrepresentations of current public opinion. Before concluding what Socialism is, we must therefore first decide what it is not, and eliminate some prevalent errors.

A typical example of a loose description of Socialism is contained in Mr. H. G. Wells's plausible and cleverly-written book, "New Worlds for Old." Socialism, as he understands it, "is a great intellectual process, a development of desires and ideas that take the form of a project for the re-shaping of human society upon new and better lines" (p. 3). Obviously such an account of Socialism, notwithstanding that it may afford "an ampler proposition," gives no satisfactory idea of the specific nature of Socialism. As a general description it is equally capable of being applied to Radicalism, Anarchism, Tolstoyism, Eddyism, or Mormonism; and it is difficult to conceive any up-to-date social or religious "ism" which would not be only too willing to claim it.

Similar in respect of futility and vagueness is the Rev. R. J. Campbell's definition of Socialism from the moral standpoint. In "Christianity and the Social Order" (p. 152), the author writes:

"From this (the moral) standpoint, Socialism may be defined thus: 'All for each; each for all.' It means from the individual the utmost for the whole; for the community it means the best for the weakest. It is the denial of the ape and tiger qualities, and an appeal to the higher

motives of justice, compassion, and public spirit. It is along this line that Socialism is making its most powerful appeal to-day, and gaining the largest number of adherents. Will anyone seriously affirm that this is something other than Christian, or indeed that it was not the very starting-point of the Christian appeal?" There is no need of any affirmation of the sort. For the ideas contained in Mr. Campbell's statement are thoroughly and even exclusively Christian. They belong by every right to Christianity, and are the proper dress and adornment by which that religion has always succeeded in attracting the multitude of mankind and in arousing hope and enthusiasm in the human heart. All that needs to be affirmed is that Mr. Campbell's ideas do not constitute the principle of Socialism, and that this principle has no right to masquerade in the guise of Christianity so as to deceive the unwary and gain "the largest number of adherents." The definition is wholly erroneous and dangerously misleading.

A modern English authority, Mr. Thomas Kirkup, describes Socialism thus: "The essence of Socialism is this: it proposes that industry be carried on by associated labourers jointly owning the means of production (land and capital). Whereas industry is at present conducted by private and competing capitalists served by wage labour, it must in the future be carried on by associated labour, with a collective capital, and with a view to an equitable system of distribution" ("An Inquiry into Socialism," pp. 11, 12). And in his "Primer of Socialism," he defines Socialism as "An

association in which the free development of each is the free development of all." Such a statement of principle, this writer declares, would be accepted by all Socialists. And this is likely enough. But first, the statement unjustly begs the question of freedom; and, secondly, as it stands, it would be accepted with equal readiness by those who oppose Socialism, precisely on the ground of its being a compulsory and servile polity. The fact is, the principle of association with which this author identifies Socialism is far wider than that system, and cannot therefore be confined in its limits.

The same lax use of definition likewise characterizes the writings of the Fabian essayists. G. Bernard Shaw, for instance, interprets Socialism as the desire of men that "the capricious gifts of nature might be intercepted by some agency having the power and the goodwill to distribute them justly according to the labour done by each in the collective search for them. This desire is Socialism; and as a means to its fulfilment, Socialists have devised communes, kingdoms, principalities, churches, manors, and finally when all had succumbed to the old gambling spirit, the social Democratic State, which yet remains to be tried" ("Fabian Essays: Economic," p. 4). And Mr. Sidney Webb, identifying Socialism with Democracy in its economic aspect, writes: "There is every day a wider consensus that the inevitable outcome of democracy is the control by the people themselves, not only of their own political organization, but, through that, also of the main instruments of wealth production; the gradual substitution

of organized co-operation for the anarchy of the competitive struggle; and the consequent recovery, in the only possible way, of what John Stuart Mill calls 'the enormous share which the possessors of industry are able to take from the produce.' The economic side of the democratic ideal is, in fact, Socialism itself" ("Fabian Essays: Historic," p. 35). After what has been said there is no need to enlarge on the inexactitude and misleading inadequacy of these unscientific explanations.

Like errors and parallel inaccuracies are discoverable in the definitions of some of the leading Continental authorities. Thus Roscher, the great German economist, describes Socialism as including "those tendencies which demand a greater regard for the common need than consists with human nature." Such an account, at least if taken literally, is rather a condemnation than a definition of Socialism. For tendencies which do not consist with human nature must be judged to oppose it. They cannot, therefore, be accepted as offering a proper basis for any sort of organization of human society.

According to Adolf Helm, "Socialism is every tendency which demands the subordination of the individual will to the community." This definition is clearly wrong, for were it correct, every political system except the most thoroughgoing Anarchism, would be Socialism. Janet's description, though more precise, is on the same lines: "We call Socialism every doctrine which teaches that the State has a right to correct the inequality of wealth which exists amongst men, and to

establish legally the balance by taking from those who have too much in order to give to those who have not enough, and that in a permanent manner, and not in such and such a particular case." So also is the definition of the French writer, E. de Laveleye, which declares Socialism to be "every doctrine which aims at greater equality of social conditions and endeavours to obtain this by State legislation" ("Le Socialisme Contemporain," 6th edition, p. 12).

Obviously these definitions fail to bring out the peculiar and distinguishing doctrines of Socialism, and only succeed in substituting for them certain general aims which that system shares with most forms of modern government. They err also by over-comprehensiveness, thus transgressing the law of logic that every true definition should coincide with the thing defined, and neither exceed nor fall short of the meaning contained in its subject. Von Scheels' definition of Socialism as "the political economy of the working classes" ("Schonberg's Handbuch der politischen Oeconomie," vol. i., p. 107) will serve as a last example. Were this definition true, then Conservative democracy, and every system favouring the poorer and weaker portion of society would be Socialism, which of course is not the case.

From the ideas of learned experts let us now turn to consider the opinions of ordinary persons, and ask ourselves what the generality of people commonly believe Socialism to be. Undoubtedly a considerable section of distorted religious opinion inclines to regard the system simply in the light of a new evangel of love

arisen on the ruins of Christianity. The religion of Christ according to this view was in its time a great socializing force. But that time is long past. By abandoning its true principles and adhering to individualist teaching, Christianity not only became discredited, but it lost its power to preach and practice social charity. It became a dead creed, and gave place to the live faith of modern Socialism. The aim of the new "religion" is, by means of organized association, to unite men to help one another in struggling against the disintegrating forces of Individualism and the growing evils of industrial competition.

In favour of this argument, which is essentially false, the two following admissions must, notwithstanding, be made. First, many professing Christians, contrary to the principles of their religion, do actually display a selfish individualism which is a scandal to believers and unbelievers alike. And secondly, Socialism by asserting the principles of solidarity and altruism, undoubtedly offers a useful barrier to the destructive atomist theory which the new paganism would still retain as the corner-stone of our industrial and social life. But these principles, as we have seen, do not constitute Socialism. They are accessories borrowed from Christianity. Socialism is not religion. To the extent that it claims to be religion it ceases to be Socialism and becomes Christianity.

Nor is Socialism charity or philanthropy. It is true that the movement has reawakened charity in many breasts, and raised the alarm of social responsibility. But the opinion which identifies it with all efforts to

relieve suffering and to uplift mankind is demonstrably false. Socialism is not charity; and the spirit and practice of benevolence were factors of civilization long before Socialism was thought of.

Another and still larger section of public opinion sees in the Socialist movement only a variety of schemes of definite political and social reforms on the basis of existing society. From this point of view, Socialism is nothing more nor less than the proper self-expression in the form of a system, of the general tendency to Collectivism, which is admittedly the salient feature of modern political organization.

In all civilized communities certain functions are performed by the body politic in its own name, and on behalf of its members, or for the public good, as distinct from individual gain. Such functions are Government or municipal enterprises; and examples in point in this country are the Civil Service, the Post Office, Tramways, Water Supply, Gas Works, and Schools. It is obviously necessary and wise for the State to undertake as much of these corporate works as it can without prejudice to its individual members and with advantage to itself as a whole. The postal business in England might be done by a number of private companies, but it has been socialized with excellent results. Thus in 1905 our national Post Office is said to have employed 192,000 people, and its profits then represented an income of about £500,000 per annum. If individuals had been allowed to conduct this business for private gain, the £500,000 profit would have failed to be paid directly to the nation for its immediate service, and would have

gone instead to shareholders of companies for their own purposes. As it is, this wealth becomes the property of the nation, which by means of it is able to regulate the wages, hours, and conditions of a multitude of State servants, and to secure for them a reasonable, healthy and happy life. Nor in practice is there the least suspicion of any hindrance to general enterprise. On the contrary there is abundant evidence that the efficiency of this section of the country's business has stimulated effort in other departments.

In connection with this subject it is important to recognize that the exact limit within which collective administration is practical and useful can only become known by experiment. Being largely dependent on circumstances it varies in different countries and at different times. It is for the statesmen and politicians of the particular countries to apply the principle according to what they conceive to be the balance of the national gain. But as this is exceedingly hard to gauge, the question of the larger or narrower limits of State control and corporate activities will always be a principal source of discussion and disagreement of view in the social and political world. The division of opinion on the subject is acute at the present time in all civilized countries. But undoubtedly the trend of popular sentiment is strongly in favour of the widest possible extension of the Collectivist principle. So universal, in fact, is this feeling that it may be avowed without fear of contradiction that few thoughtful persons would be found nowadays ready to go back to the individualistic legislation of the past, and that many sensible and honest

men would, on the contrary, willingly see the pace of advance on the lines of this sort of Socialistic reform hastened rather than retarded in the future. In that general sense it may be said: "We are all Socialists now."

The Socialism implied by this admission is not, however, Socialism in the true or strict sense of the word. It may be called administrative Socialism, as it sometimes is, but it is far from being the new and revolutionary polity of Social Democracy. The latter system differs, as we shall see, essentially or in kind from the existing order of society; the former differs from it accidentally only, or in degree of application of an already recognized principle. To administrative Socialism, as has already been implied, a large majority of persons at the present time adhere. And, in fact, it is not easy for the student of actual social problems to disagree altogether with this belief. But again, such limited extension of the principle of State control or corporate activity is not essential Socialism.

Another widespread error confuses Socialism with any and every system of Communism. True, Socialism is a form of Communism, but for that very reason also, the one cannot coincide with the other. The two ideas and their contents are necessarily distinct. Communism is the genus; Socialism the subordinate species. For while, according to logical law, the genus can always be predicated of the species, the converse of this does not hold—*i.e.*, the species cannot always, or universally, be predicated of the genus. Thus, it is true to say that every horse is an animal; it is not

true that every animal is a horse. Therefore, though all Socialism is Communism, *not* all Communism is Socialism.

It may help to avoid further obscurity in this matter if we recall in a general way some of the principal systems of Communism. They are classified roughly as follows: First there is what is called negative Communism, consisting simply in the negation of private proprietary rights together with the assertion of the unrestricted right of everyone to the enjoyment of all things. This extravagant and dangerous doctrine, which in the early 'forties found a zealous propagandist in Adam Hess, has long since ceased to attract public notice; and it certainly is in no sense a part of the programme of Modern Socialism. Neither do the other kindred systems of periodic division of property, and of destruction of all capital, including that which is owned collectively, form any part of the orthodox Socialistic programme.

Next in order of crudeness comes extreme Positive Communism, which advocates the production, possession, use and administration of all goods in common. Under this system there would be common meals, common dormitories, common hospitals, common nurseries; in fact, all social needs would be supplied and enjoyed in common, and would be arranged for on the basis of public institutions. This was the doctrine of some of the earliest Communists, and it is also said to have been adopted in the creeds of certain religious sects. That it largely entered into the Simonist and Fourierist dreams of social reconstruction is also

apparent. But it is equally clear that it in no sense constitutes the principle of the actual movement.

Nor again is Anarchism to be confounded with Socialism. The general theory of Anarchism originated, as has been said, with Proudhon. It owes its development, however, chiefly to Michael Bakunin (1814-1876) and Prince Kropotkin in Russia, to Johann Joseph Most (1846-1906) in Germany, and to Élisée Réclus in France. Prince Kropotkin and Élisée Réclus are perhaps its greatest living exponents.

Anarchism is twofold—Individualist or Philosophical, and Communistic. Both stand for the abolition of government and the reconstruction of society on a basis of almost unlimited freedom. But while Communistic Anarchism aims at the forcible overthrowing of government and the setting up in its place of a communal society differing from a Socialist community only in that it is not realized through the State, Individualist or Philosophical Anarchism relies purely on voluntary association and peaceful means to bring about its ideal of individual sovereignty. Even now Anarchist theories are very inadequately conceived and expressed. They are accordingly commonly mistaken for, and confused with, the revolutionary methods and violence of practical anarchists, whose sole object would seem to be the destruction of civil government and of every form of ruling power. The leading principles of Anarchism, however, are sufficiently clear and simple. Stated negatively, they are the denial of external authority in any form whatever, and of every system of private proprietary right in land and capital. Positively, they

are an assertion of the need of the free action and the free consent of individuals for a basis of social and industrial reconstruction. This is at once economic Communism and political Individualism. And it is to the combination of these opposing elements that we must look for the explanation of much of the confusion and deception which commonly exist, and are prevalent even amongst Socialists, in regard to the nature of the connection between Socialism and Anarchism.

Anarchists on their side profess antagonism to Socialism chiefly on the ground of the use which Socialists make of political means to advance their cause. But Socialists on the other hand express towards Anarchism feelings of amity, and even profess to cherish the anarchist ideal as at least a dream of the ultimate fulfilment of their own system. Mr. H. G. Wells, for instance, in "New Worlds for Old," writes : "That anarchist world, I admit, is our dream, but the way to that is through education and discipline and law. Socialism is the schoolroom of true and noble anarchism, wherein by training and restraint we shall make free men. But these are long views, glimpses beyond the Socialist horizon" (pp. 257-258). And so the dream of Socialism awakens into the nightmare of Anarchism !

And yet the view set forth by Mr. Wells is neither new nor unorthodox. It is in fact borne out by Engels' theory of the State—a theory which admittedly expresses the relation of the Marxian to the anarchist school.

The gist of Engels' theory is as follows : "In the old societies the State was an organization of the exploiting

class for the maintenance of the conditions of exploitation that suited it. Only officially could it be said to represent the whole society. But in the new Socialist organization the State will at last become really representative of the entire community. It will in fact be so closely identified with society that it will cease to exist as a separate entity. The first act wherein the State really appears as representative of the entire society—the appropriation of the means of production in the name of society—will be its last independent act as a State. Under Socialism the State will be superfluous. It will not be needed even as a repressive authority, for the simple reason that in a community from which class rule, and the anarchy of production, and the collision and excesses of the struggle for individual existence have been removed, there will be nothing to repress, nor any need of coercing men who are united in the spirit of common association and loyal service one to another. In place of government of persons there will be administration of things, and control of productive processes. The State will not be abolished; it will die away" ("Umwalzung der Wissenschaft," pp. 267 and 268).

Engel's opinion clearly indicates a condition of society not fundamentally different from that of the anarchist. But it must always be borne in mind that this idyllic condition of society which Engel and other Socialist writers so readily assume exists only in the realm of imagination and has never—from the garden of Eden downwards—as far as we know, had any existence in fact. In reality the only common ground

between Anarchism and Socialism is the rejection by both of the right of private capital and their common claim of economic equality. Outside of these principles and in all matters of constructive policy and the relations of persons to law and governments, the two polities are in direct antagonism. Fundamentally Anarchism is extreme Individualism ; whilst Socialism is extreme Collectivism. Except in so far, therefore, as extremes are said to meet, these two systems stand entirely apart one from the other. There is no true parity and indeed but little analogy between them.

Another mistake is the confusing of Socialism with Syndicalism. The word Syndicalism is derived from "Syndicat," the French equivalent for a "trade union." The idea is that the "syndicats" or "unions of workers" shall endeavour by direct, as opposed to indirect or Parliamentary action, to overthrow the present industrial system, and set up a new organization of labour in its place. To execute this Syndicalists propose to eliminate the Capitalists and shareholders who now own industries and pay wages, and to give the manufactures and industries of all kinds into the possession and control of the trade unions to be administered in the interest of the manual workers. Simply expressed the plan is for the combined operatives in every business to capture the capital of the industry and to "run the concern themselves" for their exclusive advantage and without the assistance of moneyed employers, whether private individuals or State officials. Syndicalism then is not Socialism. Though the two systems have certain points in common,

there are marked differences between them. Both aim at the abolition of wage labour, and of private ownership of the means and materials of production and exchange, but whereas Socialism would transfer these to the State, Syndicalism would hand them over to the workers themselves. Socialism is economic State tyranny. Syndicalism is the tyranny of a single class in the various branches of industry. Syndicalists would overthrow the State and recognize no authority in industry but that of their own trade unions. The principle of the nationalization of industries is consequently equally abhorrent to them as that of individual enterprise or private capitalistic possession. Syndicalism is purely a trade unionist movement. If some Socialists sympathize with Syndicalists, it is not because they desire their system as an end, but because they are willing to use it as a means to achieve the common end of the destruction of the existing form of industrial society. The Syndicalists call their method "direct action" because it relies, as we shall see, on the immediate effects of strikes, and is independent of the delays of Parliament.

Such is the principal aim of the French and Italian "Syndicats" or "trade unions," but it is only fair to state that, until recently, British Trade Unions have avoided this extreme, and have had no share in any revolutionary desires hostile to industry. On the contrary trade unionism has proved over and over again its usefulness as a help to good relations and prosperous working in various industries. Moreover, the majority of trade unionists in this country are sincerely

endeavouring to reconcile the wider advantages of trade and industry with their own immediate interests. The older and more responsible leaders are certainly in favour of maintaining the best relations between employers and workmen, and though the belief in the usefulness of political activity, as exercised by a Labour party in Parliament, is decreasing, and discontent with the standard of wages is increasing, the trade unions have no immediate quarrel with the Parliamentary, or with the Capitalistic system as such. Least of all are they deceived by the illusions of pick-men managing mines, and of carders or combers controlling cotton mills. If at the present time there are in some sections of British Trade Unionism certain indications of that movement becoming a curse rather than a blessing to industry, this is due not to the system itself but to the introduction within it of the alien principles of Syndicalism.

The means relied on by Syndicalists to attain their end are "class warfare" and the "general strike"; which methods, they falsely assume, establish their claim to be the true followers of Marx. The basis of their assumption is false, because though Marx looked to "class warfare" and to violence for the ultimate triumph of Socialism, he did not seek to produce them. In his mind those elements of disorder were latent in the Capitalist system, and would develop with its growth. Syndicalists, on the contrary, seek to create these results from without.

M. Georges Sorel, the intellectual exponent of French Syndicalism, sometimes called Sorelism after himself,

does not in the least hide the revolutionary character of the system. "The teaching of experience," he writes, "goes to prove that if sufficient pressure be brought to bear on the middle classes, and especially if they be harassed by the dread of revolution, they will readily submit to spoliation. The future belongs to the party which is prepared to make the most daring use of the revolutionary spectre" ("Réflexions sur la Violence," pp. 16, 17). On the subject of the general strike he says: "No sooner did the new Syndicalist school of Marxian and revolutionary Socialism awaken to a clear consciousness of the true meaning of its doctrine, of the objects of its activity, and of the character of its origin, than it declared itself in favour of the general strike, and broke away from the old, official, Utopian, and political dogmatists, who held the general strike in abhorrence. It was thus forced to enter the true revolutionary movement of the proletariat, which, for long, had made the acceptance of the idea of a general strike the test to distinguish the Socialism of the workers from that of the amateur revolutionary" ("Réflexions sur la Violence," p. 86). The Italian leaders, Lagardelle and Labriola, express themselves in substantially the same sense.

The revolutionary nature of Syndicalism further reveals itself in the motive which prompts it to use the strike as a weapon in industrial strife. Herein Syndicalists differ widely from trade unionists. The trade unionist strikes in order to obtain the highest wages that his employer can afford. The Syndicalist strikes for wages which he knows to be higher than

the employer can pay, his whole purpose being to reduce capital to bankruptcy, and so enable labour to seize the abandoned industries.

In England Mr. Tom Mann is the chief advocate of "direct action," he and those who agree with him declaring themselves tired of Parliamentary action, and announcing openly that they look to the paralysis effected by gigantic strikes to get the industries out of the hands of the Capitalists. The American representative of the system is Daniel de Leon, whose party is even more opposed to the Socialists at the polls than they are to Republicans or Democrats. Syndicalism has greatly developed in the past ten years, especially in France and Italy. Moreover, it is responsible for much of the recent labour trouble throughout the civilized world, some of which has been accompanied by the wanton and wilful destruction of property known as "sabotage," another method adopted by Syndicalists to harass Capitalists and reduce them to extinction.

If Syndicalism may be said with some latitude to form the extreme left of Socialism, Revisionism may be said to form its extreme right. This latest modification of Marxian Socialism was first introduced by Edward Bernstein in a series of magazine articles which appeared in 1897. In the following year they were republished in book form, and created an immense sensation in Germany. The new rendering subjected the old Marxian dogmas to a relentless criticism based on the facts of modern economic experience, and its influence is visible in many of the recent works on Socialism which have appeared since 1898. But its

main work has been destructive rather than constructive. As far as it is a constructive system at all, Bernstein's Revisionism is not Socialism, but a system of Social Reform on the basis of modern Liberalism. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald is its principal exponent in England.

Lastly, there is moderate Positive Communism, which limits the application of the principle of community of goods to capital and to productive wares, as distinct from ordinary income and non-productive commodities. But at this point we reach a form of Communism in which, as we shall see in the succeeding chapter, is discoverable the true nature of Social Democracy.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: WHAT IT IS

WHATEVER value the loose assumptions of Socialists and of the general public may have as sidelights on Socialism, they are quite unavailing as a basis for the logical discussion of the subject. For that, recourse must be had to the teaching of Karl Marx, which continues to be the only philosophy of Scientific Socialism, as well as the fullest expression of the idea and aims of the international movement.

Of this teaching a compendium will be found in chap. xxxiii. of Marx's famous work on Capital. In this chapter the author resumes in a few clear and definite statements the substance of his entire theory, showing how the primitive system of small private ownership, in which labour and private property in the means of production were really united, the workman owning both the tools and the products of his work, gave place to the system of large capitals of to-day; and how this system must in turn give place to the Socialist or Collectivist system of the future.

At the outset he claims the original system of small ownership to be the true form of private property which he describes as existing "only when the means of labour and the external conditions of labour belong

to private individuals," and as being "the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both." This form of industry again is "an essential condition for the development of social production, and of the free individuality of the labourer himself." At the same time he points out the manifest drawback of inadequate productiveness which attaches to the system, and which he attributes chiefly to the excessive sub-division of the means of labour. "This mode of production presupposes parcelling of the soil, and scattering of the means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces of nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers."

Therefore, though, according to Marx, up to a certain point or period of industrial civilization, the method in question, because it was based on the essentially true idea of self-earned private property, necessarily served a useful purpose, it was bound notwithstanding to disappear eventually before the weightier forces of the large capitals of modern times. "The method," to resume the words of Marx, "is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organization fetters them

and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labour . . . forms the prelude to the history of capital."

This stage of development of the accumulation of private capital he further describes as achieved by a series of forcible methods of expropriation of the immediate producers, and as carried out "with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions, the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious."

In such ways was self-earned private property, based on the individual labourer's connection with the conditions of his labour, compelled to give way to capitalistic private property resting on the nominally free wage-labour of others. But this was not to be the end of the struggle. Marx goes on to show how in the future the concentration of the means of production in large businesses is destined to become more and more acute, so as finally to result in the entire destruction of private capitalistic property, and the institution in its place of public ownership.

With this transformation of property there will be a corresponding change in the form of industry. Instead of the present mode of production by means of private capital, stimulated and regulated only by the free competition of private enterprise, there will be a unified

organization of industry on the basis of public ownership, and control of all the means of production. Then will the Socialist goal have been attained.

The theory is forcibly expressed by Marx as follows : " As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialization of labour and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited, and therefore common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, take a new form. That which is now to be exploited is no longer the labourer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many.

" Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop on an ever extending scale the co-operative form of the labour process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labour, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this the inter-

national character of the capitalistic régime." Marx goes on to show how "along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation," an "increasing mass of misery, oppression and slavery, and degradation, and exploitation" will arise; but this will be met by "the revolt of the working class." This class is represented as "always increasing in numbers, and disciplined and united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalistic production itself," the monopoly of capital becoming a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. "Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated."

The following is a summary of the whole process: "The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era—*i.e.*, on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production."

The chapter concludes with this significant passage :
“The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process incomparably more protracted, violent and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialized production, into socialized property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers ; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.”

The industrial ideal of Socialism as conceived by its greatest authority, and set forth in the masterwork on the subject, is, therefore, briefly : Collective instead of private ownership of capital ; corporate control of production in place of the distracting competition of private enterprise ; unified social organization of labour ; and, finally, public distribution of the collective produce of the common labour of all in proportion to the value and amount of work done by each.

That this industrial ideal is the groundwork of modern scientific Socialism is convincingly proved as well by the wholesale criticism by Socialists of the existing capitalistic and competitive system of industry, as by prevalent Socialistic theories on such subjects as the predominance of labour as a factor in value ; economic equality ; the right to work ; the abolition of money, rent, and interest ; State control of industry ; and many other items of positive social reform. That it likewise expresses the idea and aim of the international movement is evident by a glance at the official Socialist programmes.

The first of these programmes, or platforms, as they were also called, is that of the German Labour party, known as the Gotha Programme. Under date, Gotha, May, 1875, it contains the following: "Labour is the source of all wealth and culture, and as useful work in general is possible only through society, so to society—that is, to all its members—the entire product belongs: while as the obligation to labour is universal, all have an equal right to such product, each one according to his reasonable needs.

"In the existing society the instruments of labour are a monopoly of the capitalist class; the subjection of the working class thus arising, is the cause of misery and servitude in every form. The emancipation of the working class demands the transformation of the instruments of labour into the common property of society, and the co-operative control of the total labour, with application of the product of labour to the common good and just distribution of the same.

"The emancipation of labour must be the work of the labouring class, in contrast to which all other classes are only a reactionary mass."

This selected portion of the programme represents the economic aims, and consequently the essential aspirations of the movement. Its political ends are set forth in subsequent passages.

The Gotha Programme held till 1891, when it was replaced by the revised Erfurt Programme, which was adopted as being in closer harmony with Marxian principles. This latter programme, which is still the most authentic exposition of Socialist aims and objects,

after a preliminary rehearsal of the evils of capitalist monopoly, goes on to say: "Private property in the instruments of production, which was formerly a means of securing to the producer the ownership of his produce, has nowadays become a means of dispossessing farmers, labourers, and small merchants, and of making capitalists and landowners who do not labour the possessors of the produce of labour. Only the transformation of private property in the means of production into common property, and the change of private production into socialistic production, or production for and through society, can effect that the extensive industry and the ever-increasing productiveness of social labour, shall become for the exploited classes, instead of a source of misery and oppression, a source of the highest prosperity, and of universal and harmonious perfection.

"This social revolution implies the liberation, not only of the labouring class, but of the entire human race which is suffering under the present conditions. But this emancipation can only be the work of the labouring classes, since all other classes, notwithstanding their clashing interests, take their stand on the platform of private property in land and in the means of production, and make the preservation of modern society on its present basis their common object.

"The struggle of labour against capitalistic oppression is necessarily a political one. The labouring class cannot carry on its industrial struggles, and develop its economic organizations, without political rights. It cannot effect the transfer of the means of production

into the possession of the body social without possessing itself of political power.

“To give to this struggle of the labouring class spontaneous activity and unity, and to assign to it its natural direction, is the end and aim of the Social Democratic party.”

At a Conference of the Labour party held at Hull on January 22, 1908, the following resolution, showing the object of the party, was passed: “That in the opinion of this Conference the time has arrived when the Labour party should have, as a definite object, the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, to be controlled by a democratic State in the interests of the entire community, and the complete emancipation of labour from the domination of capitalism and landlordism, with the establishment of social and economic equality between the sexes.”

Mr. Kirkup also takes this and much more for granted. He writes: “Still, it should be said that the basis of Socialism is economic, involving a fundamental change in the relation of labour to capital, a change which will largely affect production, and will entirely revolutionize the existing system of distribution. But while its basis is economic, Socialism implies and carries with it a change in the political, ethical, technical, and artistic arrangements and institutions of society, which would constitute a revolution greater than has ever taken place in human history, greater than the transition from the ancient to the medieval world, or from the latter to the existing order of society” (“History of Socialism,” p. 10).

Finally we have the manifesto of the Socialist party of Great Britain, founded in 1911, with the object of "establishing a system of society based upon the common ownership and democratic control of the means and instruments for producing and distributing wealth by and in the interest of the whole community." This society makes the following declaration of its principles :

"The Socialist party of Great Britain holds: 'That society as at present constituted is based upon the ownership of the means of living (*i.e.*, land, factories, railways, etc.) by the capitalist or master class, and the consequent enslavement of the working class, by whose labour alone wealth is produced.

" 'That in society, therefore, there is an antagonism of interests, manifesting itself as a class struggle, between those who possess but do not produce, and those who produce but do not possess.

" 'That this antagonism can be abolished only by the emancipation of the working class from the domination of the master class by the conversion into the common property of society of the means of production and distribution, and their democratic control by the whole people.

" 'That as in the order of social evolution the working class is the last class to achieve its freedom, the emancipation of the working class will involve the emancipation of all mankind, without distinction of race or sex.

" 'That this emancipation must be the work of the working class itself.

“ ‘That as the machinery of government, including the armed forces of the nation, exists only to conserve the monopoly by the capitalist class of the wealth taken from the workers, the working class must organize, consciously and politically, for the conquest of the powers of government, national and local, in order that this machinery, including these forces, may be converted from an instrument of oppression into the agent of emancipation and the overthrow of privilege, aristocratic and plutocratic.

“ ‘That as all political parties are but the expression of class interests, and as the interest of the working class is diametrically opposed to the interests of all sections of the master class, the party seeking working-class emancipation must be hostile to every other party.

“ ‘The Socialist party of Great Britain, therefore, enters the field of political action determined to wage war against all other political parties, whether alleged labour or avowedly capitalist, and calls upon the members of the working class of this country to muster under its banner, to the end that a speedy termination may be wrought to the system which deprives them of the fruits of their labour, and that poverty may give place to comfort, privilege to equality, and slavery to freedom.’ ”

From the foregoing we are justified in forming the following conclusions :

1. Socialism, or Social Democracy, is primarily an economic scheme, having for its principal object the socialization of the means of production. Its imme-

diate concern is with food and labour. Instead of the present system under which individual owners of capital, in consideration of their private interest, and only checked by the competition of others, consent to supply society with the products it demands, the new scheme provides that the whole community, now possessing "collective capital"—that is, all the means of production—in common, and having all its members united in social labour groups, shall publicly regulate the "collective labour" of all, and equitably distribute its results to individuals.

2. Secondarily and subordinately, however, Socialism implies a complete civil policy affecting the relations of individuals to the State, the Family, and the Church. The general trend of this policy, which concerns itself with every branch of public and private life, may be gathered from the present-day agitations of Socialists to promote universal suffrage, State care of children, secular education, the spread of materialistic conceptions of life, and the spirit of revolt against traditional and established authority. As a further means to break down the present economic system, and to introduce "the goal of the future," practical Socialists also advocate the introduction of State-aided production, co-operation, profit-sharing, and other centralizing schemes, which, while they are not Socialism, are yet more or less akin to Socialism, and enter into its general purview.

3. Socialism in the abstract, or theoretic Socialism, is the Collectivist principle applied to industry. It is the logical entity of the system, and it constitutes its essential idea.

4. Socialism in the concrete, or practical Socialism, is the sum total or aggregate of Socialistic aims and ideals, considered in their relation to Society, and as embodied and expressed in the words, actions, and personalities of all those who strive to attain them. In this sense, Socialism is a corporate influence, and a strong social force.

5. While, therefore, theoretic Socialism is an idea, an economic principle, practical Socialism is the living movement, the actual reality in all the Protean forms under which it manifests itself.

6. As an economic system standing for the transformation of the means of production into the common property of Society or of the State, Socialism implies two cardinal principles, the one positive, the other negative, in expression. The positive principle asserts the exclusive right of the State to possess the means of production; the negative denies the individual's right to share in this claim or to possess capital.

7. Politically the system of Socialism professes to be essentially democratic. It claims to be a polity in which the supreme power is placed in the hands of the collective body—a government of the people, by the people, for the people. Hence its advocates call themselves "Social Democrats," and their system "Social Democracy."

8. And so we arrive at the following definition of the system as a whole: "Social Democracy, or Socialism, is a system of political economy which denies the right of private ownership of capital, and attributes to the democratic State the inalienable ownership of all the

means of production, together with the duty of the administration and distribution of all economic goods.”

Such, at least fundamentally, is the prevalent scientific Socialism which goes by the name of Social Democracy, and with which alone the criticism of the following pages will be concerned. Other systems claiming more or less than what is here set forth are therefore outside the scope of the present discussion. Thus, agrarian Socialism which denies only the right to own land privately has no direct claim on our attention. Nor has administrative or State Socialism, which, while admitting the right of private property in the means of production, increasingly tends to place its administration in the hands of the State. Still less do the immediate efforts of modern Radicalism to tax capitalistic property in order to bring about a more equal distribution of wealth, or social reforms limiting the principle of *laissez-faire* in favour of the suffering class, come in the plan of this discussion. Our concern is with the complete system of Social Democracy as a living reality and as actually entering into practical politics. This is the form of Socialism which is on its trial before the Church and before the world to-day, and it is of this, and of this alone, that we have to ask ourselves: “Is it right or is it wrong?”

CHAPTER IX

SOME FUNDAMENTAL FALLACIES OF SOCIALISM

BEFORE attempting to discuss the merits of Socialism, two observations suggest themselves. The first is, that the Socialist scheme as it stands cannot be regarded as a fixed system. Socialism is still in the fluid state. It is a living movement which is actually changing from day to day, and is liable to still further changes. How the movement is to develop will depend, to a large extent, on the degree of wise and sympathetic understanding which is accorded to it. Like all human activities, the present Socialist aspirations are part of the material for the development of the social organism. On the vital power of Society to reject what is bad in these, and to assimilate what is good, will depend the final result.

The second observation, which follows as a corollary from the first, consists in a warning against the dangerous assumption that everything contained in Socialist teaching is false. Pure or unalloyed error, fortunately for mankind, has never gained free access to the human mind. But modern Socialism has not only approached that shrine, it has gained admission, and even acquired an accepted position therein. In this respect the success of Socialism, which is a present

intellectual influence, and promises to be a great social force of the future, is indisputable.

The substance of the foregoing remarks is well illustrated by the view expressed in an excellent speech by Mr. Philip Snowden at Blackburn, on January 28, 1911, on the subject of the progress of Socialism in Great Britain in the last fifteen years. He is reported to have said:

“The membership of the Greater Labour party, of which the Independent Labour party was by no means an unimportant, and certainly not the least influential part, was nearly two million. There was no other political party in the country which had a paid membership that could compare with it. But their progress was not to be estimated by numbers alone. Their greatest success and influence had been in the moulding of public opinion, in the change their educational work had wrought in the political thought of the country. They had influenced the policy, the ideas, and the progress of every other political party. Questions were now supported by all parties which were advocated alone by Socialists fifteen or twenty years ago. They had in the last five years succeeded in getting passed into law measures which were looked upon as Utopian when he came into that movement, such, for instance, as the question of the feeding of school children. Yet the more they influenced other political parties to do their work, the more difficult it would be for them to build up a numerically strong independent political party.”

Looking forward to the future, Mr. Snowden said

that "It might be doubted whether they could build up in this country an overwhelming independent Socialist party, definitely socialistic and doctrinaire in its ideas in their own day and generation. He thought the development would be rather on the lines of an active Labour party, Socialist to a very great extent, influencing other political parties who had the means by their numbers to give effect in legislation to democratic demands."

So much is beyond dispute. But to come to criticism. The first requirement in order to defeat error is to recognize the admixture of truth which it contains, and to separate this from its falsehood. Thereby sophistry is forestalled, and error is disarmed of its principal weapon. Hence, to vanquish Socialism, which admittedly contains many elements of truth, there is evident need of winnowing the chaff from the wheat by a careful examination of the essential ideas of the system and of the principles or beliefs forming its ground-work.

We will commence with these fundamental principles. First in order of importance is the law of equality, or the principle of the equal rights of all men. This principle is at once a necessary presupposition of the Socialist system and a main argument of its thesis. That the system presupposes equality is discoverable from the fact that Socialism means collective or common property, and common property implies equal rights. The argument for Collectivism is as follows: Equality is a natural law of man's being, and should, therefore, find its fulfilment in respect of all members of the human race. This, however, is not the case,

and the failure is due to the private possession of the means of production. Were this cause removed and capital socialized, the goal of equality would be speedily reached. Hence reason proclaims the necessity of Social Democracy.

The doctrine of the equal rights of all did not, of course, originate with Socialism. It was invented, as we have seen, by Rousseau and the Liberal school. But it was borrowed by the Socialists, who re-expressed and modified its formula to suit the requirements of their different systems.

The present Socialist claim exists in forms varying in degree from the extreme demand made by the large majority for absolutely equal rights, to the moderate assertion of economic freedom made by the more enlightened.

The extreme position finds expression as well in the Gotha Programme (1875), which calls for "the removal of all social and political inequality," as in the later revised Erfurt Programme (1891), which contains the following significant statement: "The Social Democratic party of Germany does not contend for new rights or privileges for the labouring classes, but for the abolition of the rule of the classes and of the classes themselves, and for equal rights and equal duties of all without distinction of sex or pedigree." Bebel, Stern, Kautsky, Liebknecht, and others share in this demand for absolute or perfect equality of rights.

Elsewhere in these pages this extreme claim for equality has been already refuted, so that here it is only necessary to recall briefly the conclusion arrived

at. All men in the abstract, and apart from the circumstances that actually condition their being, are essentially equal. But in the concrete, or as they individually exist, they are far from being equal or possessing any claim to share the same rights and duties. This both Marx and Engels, as well as some other leaders, saw clearly enough. They accordingly formulated a much more moderate demand which was widely accepted at the time, and continues to represent the opinion of some of the more enlightened sections of modern Socialists. Recognizing the actual need of some diversity of rights and duties amongst men, they describe the practical equality immediately aimed at by Socialism as consisting in the abolition of class distinctions, and the reduction of all to the status and condition of labour. "Equality," wrote Marx in his "Criticism of Social Democracy," "consists in the fact that labour is the one standard of measurement applied to all. No class distinctions will be acknowledged, because each individual is simply a labourer like all the rest; at the same time, unequal talents and capacities will be acknowledged as privileges of nature. There are, therefore, unequal rights." Engels expresses the same opinion. "The real substance of the proletarian demand for equality," he writes, "is the demand for the abolition of class distinctions. The demand for any further equality inevitably leads to absurdities." (Quoted in Cathrein-Gettelmans' "Socialism," p. 185.)

But even this modified claim for equality cannot be justified. Class distinctions in most cases spring

directly from "unequal talents and capacities," and are, like them, "privileges of nature." The demand for the abolition of social differences is therefore absurd as well as unjust, and any attempt on the part of the Socialist State to enforce it would be not only tyranny, but an outrage against nature itself.

The next tenet to claim our attention is Marx's theory of "surplus value," which is the basis of the criticism of capital made by the working classes of Europe to-day. The chief points of this teaching, which has been previously explained, are summed up as follows: Every commercial object has an "exchange value" and a "use value." The latter consists in the useful qualities of the object which go to make it desirable. The former is represented by the average amount of human labour which is necessary for its production. This average labour force is called "social labour," and is proved to be the cause of exchange in the following way. In every business transaction a certain equivalent is sought which is the cause of the contract. But this equivalent can only be found in the "social labour" embodied in the exchanged goods. For if not, it must be supposed to be discoverable in their natural qualities. But this hypothesis is precluded by the fact that these qualities, so far from being alike or equal, are usually completely opposite. Therefore, in "social labour" consists the commercial or exchange value of articles. Hence practically their whole price properly belongs to those who have made them. Yet notwithstanding, the greater part of this is withheld from the rightful possessors, and appropriated in the

form of excessive profits by capitalist employers whose unjust accretion is "surplus value."

The injustice of the theory can also be expressed thus: When capitalist employers sell manufactured goods they ought to return the full price to the workers, with the exception of the deduction of a sum representing the cost of the raw material, the wear and tear of machinery, and the recompense of their own share of the work. But employers, instead of acting in this way, make large and quite disproportionate discounts which go to swell their own capital, and prepare the way for further enormous profits and the accumulation of immense fortunes. The excess or "surplus value" so acquired is a manifest injustice to labour, since it arises from the labourers receiving as wages only what will obtain for them daily necessities, which is ordinarily far short of the full value of their work, seeing that they work ten or twelve hours, while their wage may be produced in six. The injustice, moreover, is bound up with the system, having its rise in the capitalist wage-labour method of production. Therefore the system is unjust, and should be abolished in favour of Socialism and the reduction of all to the status of workers.

The theory and its arguments sound plausible, but a simple distinction will serve to destroy them both. The distinction is between "equality in usefulness" and "equality in specific identity," or "in sameness of nature," and concerns the meaning of the terms "equivalence" and "equivalent." Equivalence stands for equality in value, and an equivalent is that which represents that equality. But equality of value must not

be conceived to exist only between things of the same kind or of identical nature. It is quite as fully realized, and, for the purposes of exchange, more so in the case of objects whose worth in terms of usefulness is either the same or similar. Moreover, in ordinary experience the equivalent sought in business transactions is never associated with the former, but always with the latter. People buy objects on account of their usefulness, their worth, or their fitness to afford them pleasure. These qualities accordingly are the chief factors in determining the prices or commercial value of the goods. The labour force expended in making them is a matter of quite secondary consideration. At the same time, inasmuch as it forms a part of the cost of production, it must, of course, be paid for by the purchaser. Also good workmanship, as far as it results in better qualities in the articles produced, has the effect of enhancing the prices. But mere embodied labour is no real measure of worth. Were it a real measure we should have to judge artificial jewellery as being more valuable than real jewellery, and bad art as often being superior to good. The theory of "surplus value" is therefore baseless, and its conclusions fall to the ground.

Chief amongst these conclusions is the scheme to reduce everybody to an equal social footing by universally applying the standard of labour. This plan is unwarranted as well as futile. It is unwarranted because, even if the premise which is the theory of "surplus value" were true, the only just result of it would be that each person should receive a share of the collective production proportionate to the work he supplied.

The plan, moreover, is futile because it is impotent to effect the object intended. It is powerless to abolish rank or prevent individual betterment. For, granting that a skilled craftsman succeeded in time in earning a considerable income from the State, there could be nothing to hinder him from retiring from active work and employing others to labour in his place. Cases of the kind would naturally multiply and soon lead inevitably to the return once more of rich and poor, masters and servants, and the whole series of social and class distinctions.

Another principle akin to that which we have been considering, but yet not identical with it, is that labour is the sole, or, at least, the chief, source of wealth. This principle exactly coincides with the teaching introduced into political science by Adam Smith, and further developed by Ricardo, that "all goods considered from an industrial standpoint are only the product of labour, and cost nothing but labour." Since then the principle has been incorporated in various forms into Socialism, of which it has come to be a principal groundwork. Thus the Gotha Programme (1875) opens with the following passage: "Labour is the source of all wealth and culture; and since universally efficient labour is possible only through society, it follows that the universal duty of labour being supposed, the entire product of labour belongs with equal right to the entire body of society—that is, to its individual members, each according to his individual wants.

"In the present state of society labour materials are

monopolized by capitalists, and the dependence of the labouring class thence arising is the cause of misery and slavery in all its forms.

“The liberation of labour requires the transformation of all labour materials into the common property of society, and the social control of all labour, together with the application and just distribution of the entire proceeds of labour, for the use of all.”

It is true that Marx criticizes the foregoing statement and dissents from the expression that “labour is the source of all wealth.” None the less, his theory of “exchange value,” which is essentially based on Ricardo’s doctrine, proves him to be in substantial agreement with what he criticizes. The explanation is, that while Marx strenuously denied that “labour was the source of all wealth,” he persisted, notwithstanding, in teaching that all commercial value was derived from labour, and from labour alone. According to Marx, while national wealth consists of “use values,” which are due at least as much to Nature as to labour, private and commercial wealth which arises from “exchange values,” and consists in the accumulation of “surplus values” in the hands of private capitalists, is effected solely by the appropriation of others’ labour. But whatever may be said of Marx’s particular position, Smith’s and Ricardo’s principle was fully admitted by Rodbertus and other leaders of scientific Socialism. Its influence, moreover, looms large in the modern movement. Proof of the untruth of the principle is contained in the testimony of ordinary experience. Labour is not the sole source of wealth. Nature,

ability, intelligence, and capital, to mention no others, are all at least co-partners, and not unfrequently they are predominant partners in the production of riches. The preponderating part performed by Nature in determining the priceless value of the diamond, or in producing the wealth of the fields and the mines, is unquestionable. Indisputable, also, is the superior effectiveness of the distinct ability and commercial genius of the modern captain of industry over the energy and efforts of the common labourer. Assured, too, is the power of capital which, scattered in many lands, supplies the fruitful seed of future golden harvests.

Another error of Social Democracy, much in vogue at the present time, is the "right to work" formula of Louis Blanc. "Every man has a right to live. But to live it is necessary to work. Therefore every man has a right to work." To answer this fallacy it is only necessary to distinguish its terms. It is true that every man has a right to live. But this right is relative and not absolute, as is discoverable in the corresponding duties which affect the individual and the society in which he lives. These duties exactly express the extent and quality of the right in question. They are as follows: In regard to his own life, each one may do nothing notably to shorten or destroy it. He should also take ordinary means to preserve it. Beyond this he has no strict obligation. In respect to his neighbour's life he is bound by the same negative obligation. Positively he is only obliged in justice to succour him in extreme necessity. The duty of

organized society or of the State evidently goes farther, but how far exactly the duty of social justice should be extended it would be hard to say. This much at least can be stated, that Governments are not only bound to prevent injury to life and to property, which is its support, but they are also obliged by just and beneficent laws to exert a generally helpful influence in promoting the health and chances of life of their subjects, and particularly of those who are poorer and weaker. These are roughly the duties of individuals and of society, and they indicate with sufficient clearness the nature and extent of the claims which comprise the right to live. In view of these principles, this right cannot be held to imply any claim on society or its members to make extraordinary sacrifices to preserve or promote individual lives.

The right to work corresponds generally with the right to live. Every man has a right to work, and a duty also, as far as work in his case may be a necessary means for the support of his life, or of the lives of those who are dependent on him. In the exercise of this right he ought not to be interfered with. Further, in the existing conditions of industrial society, the State should assist labour by facilitating, and, when necessary, even affording opportunities for work. In other words, "the right to work," properly understood, means that every man ought to be allowed to pursue a remunerative occupation by any means which do not injure his neighbour in his person or goods, and that he ought to receive reasonable encouragement to exert his efforts for his own and society's benefit. This is a

sound and true principle. But that every man who happens to be out of work can demand, as of right, from an individual employer, or from the State, labour and wages, is a manifest and dangerous error.

As an argument of last resort, Socialists are wont to support their teaching by citing the present unjust distribution of property. The actual distribution of wealth, they say truly enough, is clearly unjust. But this injustice, they assert, is due to existing economic methods and can only be remedied by Socialism. Therefore, the system of Socialism must be accepted. There is very little force in this argument. If the injustice referred to could be proved to be the general rule, it would yet have to be shown that it is necessarily connected with the present system. Only the patent fact of completely universal injustice could establish this. In fact, there is no support for either contention. The injustice that exists is admittedly not universal. It is not even the general rule, but only the exception. The connection between the existing methods and the cases of injustice is purely accidental, and the most that can be proved against the present economic system is that, like many other good things, it is liable to, and has suffered, abuse.

A further general basis of the Socialist theory, not yet altogether relinquished, is the material conception of history which Marx developed from the doctrine of Comte and Herbert Spencer. According to this conception, the production and exchange of wealth are held to be the sole determining factors of the evolution of social life and of the growth of the whole of civiliza-

tion. Society, laws, politics, morals, and religion, are simply the outgrowth of economic conditions. The doctrine is flagrantly untrue, and clearly has no value except from the standpoint of downright materialism. If man has a purely material being, and is without any spiritual faculty, it might then be claimed that civilization depended on material causes. But granted that man is endowed with a spiritual soul, then it at once becomes evident that economic conditions, which are the chance circumstances of barter and exchange, cannot be the ultimate cause of all social development. Religion and moral ideas are an immensely more powerful cause in shaping social development than all the forces of industrial and economic conditions.

This criticism of some of the chief arguments urged in support of Socialism is a partial refutation of its theory. But the complete answer to this system must be sought in the exposure of its essential economic ideal, and of the consequences of that ideal to religion and morality.

CHAPTER X

ECONOMIC INDICTMENT OF SOCIALISM

THE case against modern Socialism may be summed up in two indictments—the one economic, the other religious or moral. They may be expressed thus:

1. The scheme proposed by Socialism for the regulation of commerce and industry is not only impracticable, it is also economically unsound.

2. The ethical principles of Socialism militate against the fundamental ideas of religion and justice. Its aim and method likewise conflict with Christianity.

Reserving to the next chapter the religious and moral considerations, we shall confine our attention for the present to the economic indictment.

A more attractive picture of Socialism from the standpoint of the economic order could scarcely be found than that contained in the Manifesto of the Socialist League which was adopted at the General Conference held in London in 1885. The picture has the further advantage of being an exact representation, as far as this is possible, of modern Socialism—a circumstance that justifies us in taking it as the basis of the present criticism.

The Manifesto goes to show that when “the land, the capital, the machinery, mines, banking, and all

means of production and distribution of wealth " shall have been declared and treated as the common property of all, then "every man shall receive the full value of his labour, without deduction for the profit of a master, and the waste now incurred by the pursuit of profit will be at an end ; the amount of labour necessary for every individual to perform in order to carry out the essential work of the world will be reduced to something like two or three hours daily, so that everyone will have abundant leisure for following intellectual or other pursuits congenial to his nature." Under so dazzling and tempting an image does the theory of Socialism present itself. Yet this is wholly a fancy picture, an unsubstantial day-dream which, despite its attractiveness, must be rejected as resting on fallacious first principles, and as being in practice impossible.

The errors first requiring to be exposed, as being the principal weapons of the Socialist propaganda, are certain speculative statements with which the Manifesto concludes. The first of these is that under Socialism "every man will receive the full value for his labour." Now, this is clearly untenable. Taken literally, it is in open contradiction to the whole spirit of Socialist production, which requires that all should produce socially, one for another, and not individually, or each for himself. Still, notwithstanding this objection, the statement, as being primarily a decoy to allure working men to Socialism, might yet be allowed to pass if it fulfilled the essential promise it implies of rewarding each in proportion to his individual contribution to the total results of the social labour. But even this con-

dition is wanting, and not only is it wanting, but it is absolutely precluded by the Socialist system. For, in the first place, that system, by prohibiting the possession of private capital and all hope of acquiring a durable fortune, prevents any proper remuneration of the better class of labour; and, secondly, by the theory of "exchange value," to which it is committed, this system offers a further check to the just recompense of labour, inasmuch as the theory of "exchange value" imposes upon it the obligation of measuring and rewarding all forms of work by the false standard of "labour time."

The next error is implied by the words in the clause immediately succeeding—"without deduction for the profit of a master." The false impression hereby conveyed is simply refuted by the logic of facts. Though under Socialism there would be no master's profits as such, yet a large proportion of the products of productive labour would have to be set aside as well for the formation of collective capital as for the conduct of public business, and for the use and enjoyment of the community as a whole. The deduction implied by this tax on the common property would be at least equal to, and probably a far larger amount than, that which is now consumed by the capitalist as profit. Their other assumptions of the prevention of waste, of the lessening of the time of labour to "something like two or three hours daily," and "the provision of abundant leisure," are wholly gratuitous. As either vain prognostications or mere assertions resting on no basis of fact, they require no special answer. Their

refutation is contained in the arguments which will be advanced later against the efficiency of socialistic production.

Let us now proceed to refute the idea with which the Manifesto opens, and which is always taken for granted by Socialists in their discussions of the subject—viz., the supposition that Collectivism is feasible, and that it is destined to take shape and be the permanent economic order of the future.

The general ground alleged in support of the supposition in question is that society is already by a natural growth developing into Collectivism. For proof, Socialists point to the multiplication of limited liability and joint-stock companies, the growth and extension of municipal trading, and generally to the enlargement of commercial and industrial enterprises through the absorption of smaller businesses and the amalgamation and association of capital. In this process they see the complete destruction of private capitalistic production, and its replacement by Collectivist production. The fallacy of the argument lies in its false inference. That commerce and industry are developing, and are likely for some time to continue to develop, on co-operative and associative lines, is indisputable. But what ground is this for concluding that all private businesses will be eventually destroyed, or, which amounts to the same thing, converted into public ones? Are large businesses of their nature less permanent than small ones? On the contrary, they are more so. For, on the one hand, they are at least equally tenacious of their rights, and, on the other, they have more power to preserve

and defend them. The assertion is both false and gratuitous.

Concerning the ways and means of establishing the new order there is much divergence of opinion. To begin with, there is the general line of cleavage separating the advocates of a peaceful solution, who are known as evolutionary Socialists, from those who profess their ultimate reliance on violence, and who openly proclaim Socialism to be a revolutionary system.

Let us turn our attention first to the evolutionary scheme. The problem it sets itself is how to bring about peacefully the collectivization of capital; or how to induce private capitalists willingly to forego their rights, and transfer their wealth with good grace to the State. The idea of fair purchase may be dismissed quickly. On the face of it, the suggestion of a new Socialist democracy of proletarians being able to buy up the capital of a rich country is absurd. Yet, supposing, for argument's sake, the purchase to be effected, one or other of these consequences would necessarily ensue. Either the Socialist State would have to allow the vendors, after realizing their capital, to remain and reinvest their money in productive industries, in which case, contrary to its principles, it would be re-establishing capitalism and admitting a rival system to exist in its area; or else it would be compelled to drive from its shores the whole body of its wealthiest and probably its ablest citizens—an alternative which, whether on the grounds of economics or sanity, is hardly open to serious discussion.

So clearly impracticable is this purchase system that

in its crude form it is now almost completely abandoned and replaced by a new scheme of moderate compensation. According to this expedient, expropriated capitalists are to receive regular instalments of commodities for the maintenance of themselves and their children during such length of time as may be judged to be necessary for them to accustom themselves to the new conditions and state of affairs. But as this proposal, to say the least, would scarcely be immediately acceptable to capitalist proprietors, the ground must be prepared beforehand. Accordingly a number of preliminary measures are proposed.

One of these measures, which meets with considerable favour at the hands of Socialists who are not mere theorists, is that of gradual instalments of social reform. But this method is rejected by others who rightly argue that, as a matter of experience, remedial legislation, in the form of palliatives, is found to be far from conducive to Socialism. Their objection is well founded. By undermining the groundwork of discontent on which Socialist agitation rests, reforms of this kind tend to be subversive of its whole claim and system.

The particular evolutionary reform project, which seems to find most favour at present with the advocates of Socialism, is to tax properties gradually until they become so deteriorated in value that their owners will be glad to surrender them for a nominal price. This plan, which at first sight may appear more plausible, is, however, in reality, as a peaceful solution, no less futile. Men would not be found ready to acquiesce in a scheme clearly involving their own dispossession and eventual

downfall. They would at once revolt against it, and fight for their rights to the last. To meet this objection Socialists invoke the omnipotence of Parliaments and the sovereign rights of majorities. They maintain that if once they secured a preponderating Socialist vote in the country or in the Legislature the desired transformation of society would then constitutionally and peacefully follow. But they forget that minorities have rights which neither votes nor laws can destroy; and they lose sight of the fact that the bloodiest insurrections of modern history have not infrequently arisen out of revolutionary legislation sanctioned by Parliaments. Though Socialism, it is true, might be constitutionally decreed by any nation if the majority of its members were sufficiently infatuated to agree to vote for it, yet this would not prevent its having to be effected at the point of the bayonet.

In the same way all the other mediate and immediate methods, and suggestions of methods, for a peaceful solution of the problem of the collectivization or socialization of capital could be shown to be equally vain. The fact is that any such solution is, in the nature of things, impossible. Society and Socialism are conflicting and irreconcilable terms. Wherefore, the only possible way of realizing the Socialist ideal—and the result could only be temporary—would be by means of revolutionary force, a method which is now coming to be more openly admitted, and which was previously recognized by Marx to be the only outcome of Socialism: “An increasing mass of ‘misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, and exploitation’ gathering in the wake of

the private capitalist system will lead to 'the revolt of the working classes.' . . . Then the knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." To what else but revolutionary violence do these words of the founder of Social Democracy point ?

On the morality of recourse to such violence there is no need here to remark. The point to be insisted on is its futility and mischief. Evidently the attempt to wrest private capital by force from individuals and transfer it to the State, would be not only unsuccessful, but even disastrous. The vehemence and fierceness of passion which a life-and-death struggle of this sort would provoke must involve rich and poor alike in a common welter of blood and in deadly destruction. And even if the proletariat triumphed for the moment, what would be the result ? Capital in all likelihood would be destroyed, but Socialism would not be established, and the cause of democracy would certainly suffer. In the confusion and disruption of society, men would, as they have always done, fall back on military despotism for support and protection ; and once again anarchy would beget reaction, and freedom would disappear.

So far we have considered the exterior hindrances to Socialism, and seen it to be impracticable because men would not allow or tolerate it. We have next to turn our attention to the intrinsic obstacles which render it unworkable in itself. The first of these is an excessive centralization. This arises from the nature and requirements of the system. The economic scheme of

Socialism consists in the unification and organization of commerce and industry on a social basis. Such an organization must be unified in the sense of being under one management. The management must also be social. That is, it must be regulated by the State, and directed to serve the common advantage, to the exclusion of private or particular interests. It is also essential that the unit of administration be commensurate with the entire nation. In other words, the community whose affairs are controlled must be the nation or country as a whole. Any less perfect society, such as a city or a province, would be incapable of exercising the sovereign rights which the system demands. Now, a scheme of organization fulfilling these conditions, and answering to this description, is necessarily over-centralized, ineffective, and hurtful. It is true that up to a certain point, which is fixed by competition, centralization in commercial and industrial enterprises is practical and useful; but beyond that point its advantages cease, and it becomes, like vast and cumbersome machinery, unmanageable and dangerous. This is precisely the case with Socialism.

The above argument receives the support of present-day public opinion, which is tending more and more to approve the principle of reasonable competition, and to distrust alike protective methods in favour of producers, "trusts," and all corporate monopolies.

The outcries raised a few years back in England against the attempts of certain manufacturers of soap and tobacco to amalgamate and form "trusts" are instances in proof of what has been said. The whole

ground of the agitations at the time was the widespread conviction that the establishment of the Trusts would check the pendulum of competition, and so prevent it from fulfilling its proper function of regulating prices, and maintaining the equilibrium of justice as between producers and consumers. The Trusts answered as the Socialists do to-day: "We are saving the waste of competition; we are economizing in production." Likely enough they were. But the people would not be appeased. "We prefer," they said, "to dispense with the economy of production. We can do without increased dividends and larger manufacturers' profits. What we want are good and cheap articles, and to get them we rely on the immediate advantages to ourselves of a free and open market." And the people were right in their choice. A little waste is better than complete ruin. The same verdict of public opinion holds likewise in America, where the protected Combines of the United States are regarded as a curse to the country, and are known to be a crushing burden on the poor. Still, those monopolies have some check in competition. The National State Trust of Socialism would have none. It would be an infinitely worse and an altogether insupportable evil.

Let us next assume, for argument's sake, an impossible hypothesis—namely, the actual introduction of Socialism—and endeavour to consider the subject from the standpoint of its actual working. Supposing, then, Socialism to be in existence, we shall ask ourselves how it would meet the problem of supply and demand, and some other economic difficulties which its operation would necessarily involve.

At present the work of supply and demand, including all production, distribution and exchange, is effected by the voluntary co-operation of individuals who freely determine their own needs, and conduct their business as they judge best. In so doing they ordinarily seek their own interest, to which they are chiefly guided by the indications derived from the rise and fall of prices. Thus, workmen and manufacturers offer their services and commodities when and where a rise in wages or prices indicates an understocked market, and the chance of a favourable bargain ; and when these circumstances are reversed, they withhold them. Purchasers and employers, on the contrary, look out for an overstocked market in order to obtain for themselves the most favourable terms. By this process of individual choice and effort, social supply and demand are automatically determined, whilst at the same time labour and distribution are naturally adjusted and organized. Further, in actual working, the system gives rise to a class of capitalists who make it their special pursuit to forward and facilitate economic business. In every large country this class is represented by several millions of the inhabitants, from merchant princes and captains of industry to small shopkeepers and trade employers, who, under the stimulus of personal gain, devote their energy and talent to the public service. And it is by the combined efforts of these men that the gigantic business of the world and of individual countries is carried on.

Now, under Socialism, the natural system of supply and demand, and the public services involved therein,

would immediately cease. Further, the entire work of calculating and determining social supply and demand—hitherto the result of more or less automatic action—would now have to be effected by a rational or reasoned process alone; and—most important to remember—the burden of discharging all this would henceforth devolve on the single administration of the Socialist State. Is it reasonable to suppose that the new executive would be at all able to carry out so vast an undertaking? Is it conceivable that any State Council or State Board of Management, even though it were invested with the most absolute and exclusive authority and were composed of men wise and far-seeing, endowed with exceptional capacity, possessing the confidence of their fellow citizens, “the choice and master spirits of the age,” is it conceivable that even such a Council as this could calculate and supply, by reason and administration alone, the multifarious demands of a nation? Evidently it is not. The issue, arising as it does out of the totality of the wills and desires of the whole body of the citizens, transcends the reasoning and legislation of any administration. It can only be settled, as it is now, by all freely consenting, co-operating, and uniting in the rational pursuit of their individual interests, which are ultimately, and necessarily the interests of all.

Let us look a little more closely at the practical difficulties, which have already been indicated. The first is in connection with the question of social supply. To determine this, and to decide everywhere upon the quantity and quality of objects to be produced, so as

to avoid over or under production, the Socialist State must acquire a previous and accurate knowledge of social demand. It must possess information in detail of the number of individuals and families, and of their exact requirements in the way of food, clothing, and a hundred and one other necessities, conveniences, and luxuries. Now, this knowledge could only be procured with an incredible amount of labour and expense, and by means of inquisitorial methods of the most vexatious description. The State would have to pursue its inquiry through an army of officials authorized and empowered to invade the sacred privacy of every home in the land. And as social supply is constantly fluctuating, and the demands of individuals and families vary from day to day, this oppressive investigation would have to be repeated with corresponding frequency.

Then there are the difficulties of organizing labour. In the first place, before attempting any sort of equitable distribution of labour, the State would have to be accurately acquainted with the number of available workers, their individual capacities and talents. This would, of course, involve further public inquiry, and vexatious intrusion into private affairs. Then, supposing this preliminary knowledge acquired, insuperable difficulties must still follow in the actual allotment of labour to individual workers. Some must be appointed to the army and navy, others to the administration of justice; some to the civil service, others to scavenging and sewer work; some to the mines, others to the fields; some, again, to education, others

to the supervision of labour, and all manner of divers employments. Is it humanly possible that these appointments could be made without exciting rancour and even violence, thus creating the necessity for coercion and the employment of physical force on the part of the Socialist State ?

Further difficulties arise from the rewarding of labour, whatever valuation of work be adopted. If the amount of time actually given to the work is taken as the standard of value, then injustice is done to the more ingenious, rapid, and industrious workers. If the quality and quantity of the work are the determining factors, then the Socialist theory of equality falls to the ground. If the necessity of individuals is alone regarded, injustice again is done to the more capable and better-to-do workers. Whichever of these methods be adopted, the result can only be the creation of fresh sources of envy, contention, and discord.

Lastly, perhaps the greatest difficulty of all in the Socialist organization of labour is the entire absence of any moral coercive and directive power. As a rule, men will not apply themselves to a particular work—or, indeed, to work at all—without the incitement of some form of compulsion. Especially is this the case in regard to the most necessary of all work—manual labour. At present a sufficient directive and constraining power, which yet leaves individual liberty intact, is provided by the capital and wages system. But this moral power is wholly wanting in Socialism, which can only offer as a substitute inquisitorial methods and physical coercion amounting to slavery.

Notwithstanding, this very system of Socialism, strangely enough, is being pressed forward as the remedy for the industrial servitude which, it is alleged, attaches to the present system. The complaint is that under Capitalism workmen are deprived of the means and materials of their labour, and are thus reduced to a state of servile dependence on their capitalist employers. But what does the proposed remedy effect? Only the increase and universalization of the evil. If Socialism aimed at extending ownership of the means of production, so as to transform the worker into a combined capitalist and labourer, it might have some claim to be considered as a social therapeutic. But when, as a matter of fact, Socialism in no sense fulfils these conditions, but, on the contrary, by abolishing all private capital, still further robs the worker and deprives him of even the remote hope of owning the means and materials of his labour, then the suggestion of it as a remedy by Socialists can only be regarded either as unconscious charlatanry, or as wilful hypocrisy and effrontery.

In defence of its own artificial system Socialism inveighs against the mistakes of the natural method of freedom which it seeks to supplant. That numerous errors and blunders, resulting from short-sighted policy, do occur under the present system is undeniable. But these mistakes are slight in comparison with those which Socialism would engender. Errors under the present system receive considerable checks in its actual working, the mistakes of one set of men being in the long run generally counterbalanced by the opposite

mistakes of others. The worst social results are also averted by the united intelligent efforts of the whole body, stimulated by their own interest to advance the general good. But the Collectivist organization, through the exclusion of the correctives which nature provides, and because of the other reasons indicated, opens the door to incalculably greater, and altogether irremediable, evils. So true is this that it is no exaggeration to say that if the Collectivist organization of society were tried even for a brief period of days, it would immediately result in extreme poverty and unimaginable suffering. So that the last state of Socialism would be far worse than the first state of individual freedom with all its drawbacks.

An argument constantly advanced by Socialists in favour of universal Collectivism is gathered from the management by Governments of the Post Office, the Army and Navy, and other large public businesses. But the inference of the argument is unwarranted. The fact is that in economic matters, owing to the changes of circumstances involved, no effective comparison can be allowed between a partial and a complete use of any single or isolated principle. The truth of this is conspicuous in the point at issue. At present, for instance, the State is evidently dependent, as regards its administrative works, on private capital, from which, by means of taxation, it derives its main source of income. Without the support of these supplies public works could not be maintained on their present scale. The efficiency of State administration is further promoted, and its worst evils are guarded against, by

competition, which virtually exists under present circumstances, and exerts its influence, through the knowledge which Governments have that their work, in certain profitable departments, is liable, if grossly mismanaged, to be taken from their administration and privately conducted. These circumstances, with their attendant advantages, would have no place under universal Collectivism. Hence the disparity, and the failure of the Socialist argument.

A further note of protest against the underlying assumption of the general superiority of public over private management of business may opportunely be entered here. Clearly some works, by reason of their nature and object, require to be publicly conducted. But beyond this necessary sphere, and even within it, State administration is open to serious objections on the ground of its inherent dangers. Chief amongst these are waste and extortion. It will be readily admitted that there is a constant and natural tendency on the part of public bodies, such as Governments or Municipalities, to run their own enterprises at a maximum expenditure, and even at the cost of the other industries of the country. Moreover, they can do this covertly, and with a show of success, so long as the drain on private capital is not conspicuously excessive, and the number of enterprises undertaken is kept within limits. Thus, a Government railway or steamboat service, as Mr. Mallock shows, may be continued for a long and even an indefinite period at an economic disadvantage without the public becoming aware of their loss. The reason is, that it is in the

power of the public authority either to overcharge its customers, or else to undercharge them, and supply the deficit by taxing others who do not need to avail themselves at all, or at least to the same extent, of the services offered. In either case there is waste or extortion—from which the system of competition amongst individuals is comparatively or wholly free.

An incidental conclusion, with which we will draw this chapter to a close, is that if society needs to be reconstructed, as would seem to be the case, the work of restoration must be carried out on the natural basis of private property and liberty, and in such a way as to utilize the personal interests and motives of individuals. And while these principles admit of modification, they can never be ignored or abolished. And though they may be supplemented by Socialist theory, they can never be wholly supplanted.

CHAPTER XI

RELIGIOUS INDICTMENT OF SOCIALISM

No economic theory or organization of society can afford to neglect or ignore the relations of morality and religion to the principles and proposals on which it rests. The cause is not far to seek. These relations are essential and arise immediately out of the life of society, which, like the life of an individual, is one and indivisible. In this respect the analogy between corporate and individual life is the closest. There is the same reciprocal influence of activities, the same subordination of inferior to superior organs and functions, and the same need in practice of no one of these being considered altogether separately and independently of the rest. The inference from this, in regard to the Socialist doctrine and scheme for the reorganization of society, is direct and apparent. As there can be no socialization without moralization, so there can be no Socialism without moral and religious harmony. Socialists are beginning to realize this; and hence it is characteristic of the latest phase of Socialist propaganda to represent the new system as either identical, or in harmony with, or, at least, as not opposed to moral and religious truth.

In reality, there is no ground for any one of these

claims. And this is virtually admitted by the Belgian Socialist leader, Emile Vandervelde, in his essay on Socialism and Religion, as quoted by Miss Stoddart in her book on "The New Socialism." In this essay, after referring to the incoherences and contradictions of Socialists in different countries, Mr. Vandervelde proceeds to disentangle certain salient factors which, notwithstanding these incoherences and contradictions, do, according to him, really govern the thought and action of international Socialism in regard to religion.

The first of these is the general acceptance by Socialism of the principle of non-interference with personal beliefs. The acceptance of this principle he proves from the fact that, "In every country, Social Democracy numbers thousands of adherents who continue to practise one or other form of worship, whether from obedience to custom or from genuine conviction."

Mr. Vandervelde's second point is the estrangement of Socialists for the most part from positive religion. "On the other hand," he continues, "there can be no question that the immense majority of the Socialist parties are absolute strangers to all positive religion. Even those who consider that anti-clericalism is only a matter of secondary importance, and who preach the strictest neutrality as regards religion, are often themselves entirely emancipated from all religious beliefs."

In his third point he calls attention to the open hostility of orthodox Christianity to Socialism in all countries, including those in which the system in question claims to have no concern with religious disputes. He writes: "Whether the fact pleases or

distresses us, it is certain that, notwithstanding all the Socialist declarations as to the privacy of religious beliefs, the great mass, and above all the directing nucleus of the workers' parties, is composed almost exclusively of Freethinkers, and that, on the other hand, the heads of the Catholic Church, and of all Churches which resemble it, inculcate upon their members a horror of 'atheistic, materialist, anti-religious Socialism!' " (*cf.* pp. 11-20).

Many British and American Socialists will dissent from these views; but, notwithstanding, as we shall see, they give a true account of the real state of affairs. Incidentally, also, they prepare the ground for the indictment which we are about to make against Socialism that it is in inherent antagonism with religion and morality. And here by religion and morality we understand the doctrinal and ethical tenets of Christianity, since that religious and moral system is the only one which has ever come in practical contact with Socialism. To this religious and moral system is opposed, not so much the abstract economic principle of Collectivism, as the actual concrete movement of Social Democracy—a movement involving, as has been said, a number of other ethical ideals and presuppositions indirectly at least connected with its main doctrine, and freely expressed in the writings and speeches of its accredited exponents. The significance of this concrete movement in its religious aspect we shall now discuss, leaving the question of morality to the next chapters.

The antagonism of contemporary Socialism and

religion will be found to be many-sided and serious. The first source of conflict is discoverable in the theory that there is no essential relation, and therefore no possible antagonism, between the two. This doctrine, which is identical with the decision of the Erfurt Congress, "that religion is a private concern of the individual with which Socialism, in its corporate capacity, has nothing to do," has undoubtedly had the fewest adherents in the past, but at the present time it is not without a large number of supporters, and promises in the future to be held by an increasing number of Socialists. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, for instance, a follower of Bernstein's Revisionary Socialism, gives the view in question his support. "Socialism," he writes, "has no more to do with a man's religion than it has with the colour of his hair. Socialism deals with secular things, not with ultimate beliefs. In short, there is nothing in the Socialist theory, nothing in the Socialist method, antagonistic to religion" ("Socialism," p. 101). And Mr. Blatchford, who is known to have no love for the Christian religion, and who as an individual Socialist bitterly attacks its creed, yet writes: "A charge against Socialists is that they are Atheists, whose aim is to destroy all religion and morality. This is not true. It is true that many Socialists are Agnostics, and some are Atheists. But Atheism is no more a part of Socialism than it is a part of Toryism, or of Radicalism, or of Liberalism" ("Real Socialism," p. 4).

According to this teaching, religion is a purely spiritual and private matter. It may affect individual

life, but it has nothing to do with the collective life of society. It has no place either in politics or in economics, and it is altogether separate from the affairs of the State and of the nation. That this doctrine is contrary to reason has been already suggested by the opening remarks of this chapter. Its antagonism to the teaching of Christianity is equally plain. Religion, according to the Gospel, is the Kingdom of God upon earth. It is a supreme and all-dominating power. It is a spiritual force entering into and regulating the lives of individuals and of society. It is the leaven of the whole mass of mankind. Religion is the expression of the relation of the individual to God; it also determines his relation to his fellow-men. Indeed, since the life of the individual is essentially a social life, the control of the relations of individuals one to another must be a primary function of religion. The State also claims to regulate these relations. It follows that religion and the State have a certain common sphere, from which the authority of neither can be wholly excluded. Consequently, in no scheme or theory of the body politic should there be a divorce between religion and civil authority. The assertion of this position is a fundamental necessity of Christian politics. The contrary assertion of Socialism that religion is a private matter, entirely apart from the State, is therefore in direct opposition to a vital claim of Christianity. The opinion supporting this assertion, notwithstanding its declared purpose, affords, therefore, in reality, only another proof of the antagonism necessarily existing between Socialism and religion.

The next point of conflict is a doctrine exactly opposite to that which we have been discussing. It is the view, now quite commonly held amongst Socialists, that the relation between Socialism and religion is really one of identity, that the two terms are substantially one and the same thing, and that "Socialism in its perfection is religion at its best." This attempt to identify Socialism and religion commenced in France as far back as the early part of the nineteenth century, and is closely connected with the St. Simon school of Socialist thought. In Germany it has in recent times received the support of Feuerbach, Dietzgen, Dr. Stamm, Julius Stern, and others. In England its principal exponent is Mr. Ernest Belfort Bax. The aim of this school is undoubtedly to impart some sort of a spiritual character to the radically materialistic movement of Socialism, and to inspire it, as far as possible, with that force and life which the motive of faith and religion alone can give. But with what small measure of success the effort has been, or is likely to be, crowned can readily be judged from the following explicit statement of the British philosopher of the religion of Socialism. Mr. Bax writes :

"In what Socialism is not religious will now be clear. It utterly despises the 'other world,' with all its stage properties—that is, the present objects of religion. In what sense it is not irreligious will be also, I think, tolerably clear. It brings back religion from heaven to earth, which, as we have sought to show, was its original sphere. It looks beyond the present moment or the present individual life, indeed, though not to another

world, but to another and a higher social life in this world. It is in the hope and struggle for this higher social life, ever widening, ever intensifying, whose ultimate possibilities are beyond the power of language to express or of thought to conceive, that the Socialist finds his ideal, his religion. He sees in the reconstruction of society in the interest of all, in the rehabilitation in a higher form, and without its limitations, of the old communal life—the proximate end of all our present endeavour. . . .

“In Socialism the current antagonisms are abolished, the separation between politics and religion has ceased to be, since their matter is the same. The highest feelings of devotion to the ideal are not conceived as different in kind, much less as belonging to a different sphere, to the commoner human emotions, but merely as diverse aspects of the same fact. The stimulus of personal interest no longer able to poison at its source all beauty, all affection, all heroism—in short, all that is highest in us, the sphere of government merged in that of industrial direction; the limit of the purely industrial itself ever receding as the applied powers of Nature lessen the amount of drudgery required; Art and the pursuit of beauty and of truth ever covering the ground left free by the ‘necessary work of the world’—such is the goal lying immediately before us, such the unity of human life which Socialism would evolve out of the clashing antagonism, the anarchical individualism, religious and irreligious, exhibited in the rotting world of to-day—and what current religion can offer a higher ideal or a nobler incentive than this essentially human one?” (“The Religion of Socialism,” pp. 52, 53).

A little farther on the same writer proceeds : " Socialism has been well described as a new conception of the world presenting itself in industry as co-operative Communism, in politics as international Republicanism, in religion as Atheistic Humanism, by which is meant the recognition of social progress as our being's highest end and aim. The establishment of society on a Socialistic basis would imply the definitive abandonment of all theological cults, since the notion of a transcendent God or semi-divine prophet is but the counterpart and analogue of the transcendent governing class. So soon as we are rid of the desire of one section of society to enslave another, the dogmas of an effete creed will lose their interest. As the religion of slave industry was Paganism ; as the religion of serfage was Catholic Christianity, or Sacerdotalism ; as the religion of Capitalism is Protestant Christianity, or Biblical dogma ; so the religion of collective and co-operative industry is Humanism, which is only another name for Socialism.

" There is a party who think to overthrow the current theology by disputation and ridicule. They fail to see that the theology they detest is so closely entwined with the current mode of production that the two things must stand or fall together " (" The Religion of Socialism," p. 81). In face of internal evidence of this sort, of which much more could be produced, lengthy criticism is superfluous. The view tells its own tale, and is its own condemnation. By attempting to identify Socialism and Religion it reduces both to Humanism and Atheism. In this way it proves itself

to be the direct denial and emphatic contradiction as well of the specific conception of Christian faith, as of the whole idea and character of spiritual religion.

Another school of thought attempts to combine Socialism and Religion in the express form of Christianity. To this end it endeavours to establish a harmony between the aim and teaching of the two systems, and to set them forth as supplementary one to another. This is the view of "Christian Socialism," and it is noteworthy that it provides the only common ground of agreement between the two classes of advanced and moderate thinkers who compose the movement. In every other respect of method, aim, and object, these differ widely, and are even radically opposed to each other. The line of cleavage between them consists in their respective misconceptions of Christianity and Socialism. While the moderate Christian Socialist misunderstands Socialism and correctly understands Christianity, the extreme Christian Socialist understands Socialism, but misunderstands Christianity. The former type errs by mistaking Socialism for Christian social reform, the latter by identifying the spiritual teaching of the Gospel with economic Collectivism. The former does violence to the idea of Socialism, the latter to that of Christianity. Both equally belie their title of "Christian Socialist," and fail to make good the claim it implies to combine in a single system the ethics of Socialism with the religion of Christianity.

We shall now consider more in detail these two parties in "Christian Socialism." The movement

represented by the moderate party is historic, and is associated in the past with such influential Church of England leaders in their day as Maurice, Kingsley, and Bishop Westcott. In the present, it is closely connected with the names of Bishop Gore, Canon Scott Holland, Mr. C. F. G. Masterman, M.P., and with the work of the Christian Social Union, originally founded by the Rev. W. Richmond. The earlier movement was notorious for condemning selfishness, and inveighing against the abuses of competition which undoubtedly existed then as they do now. To remedy these evils it preached social justice, love, and brotherhood. And further, as a counterpoise to selfish competition, it advanced voluntary co-operation. Again, to ameliorate the conditions of the poor, it emphasized the need of self-help and education. In none of these suggestions of reform is there the least trace, or even suspicion, of genuine Socialism; and there are other aspects of the movement which show it to have been even in marked contrast to that system. It largely discounted, for instance, the exaggerated advantages of State aid and legislation, and laid the utmost stress on self-help, individual reformation, and moral regeneration starting from within. Moreover, by constantly preaching and insisting on the Divine obligation of stewardship, it effectually contradicted the distinctively Socialist doctrine that private property in land and capital is theft, and, in consequence, opposed to the Gospel. Thus the Christian Socialism of those days was not only non-socialistic, but it was even anti-socialistic. It struck at the very roots of Socialism. Much the same

may be said of its modern representative, the moderate Christian Socialism which is substantially the earlier teaching adapted to meet the requirements of altered circumstances and recent conditions. Mr. Woodward, summing up its theories, offers the following definition, which he declares that he derives from the authorized publications of the Christian Social Union.

“Socialism is the opposite of Individualism, and is merely a general assertion that ‘the goal of human endeavour is the common well-being of all alike, sought through conditions which provide for the fullest culture of each man, as opposed to the special development of a race or a class.’ This, however, is nothing more than the assertion of the widest Christian principle, and even those who quarrel with the right to call this Socialism would probably admit the value of the ethical principle.

“It is, however, in the method of applying the principle to human society that the Christian Social Union finds its distinctive work—a work which it sums up in its fundamental principle, ‘the claim for Christian law to be the ultimate authority to rule social practice’” (“Christian Socialism in England,” p. 150). Herein, again, there is nothing distinctive of Socialism. But the following is more significant. In answer to the question, “Would Christianity abolish private property?” Mr. Woodward writes: “This question is one of the first which is asked of any system which calls itself Socialistic. In connection with the Christian Social Union it is rendered especially difficult to deal with, because Mr. Headlam has confused

many people by his assertion that land nationalization is a necessary corollary of Christian Socialism. It is useless to discuss what Maurice would have said if he could have read Henry George, and have seen the problem under its present-day conditions. The fact remains that Maurice never questioned the right of private property so long as the owner realized his social responsibility, and the majority of the members of the Church Social Union would undoubtedly agree with this view to-day. The Union has given no official utterance on the subject of property, but a sermon and notes from a lecture on the subject have been printed, and from these it seems fair to infer that the Union would sanction the sacredness of property, while placing it under stern limitations" (*ibid.*, pp. 160, 161). Moreover, in a pamphlet entitled "The Church and Socialism," and published by *The Church Family Newspaper* in 1907, the writer states: "The Christian Social Union, if we may judge from the utterances of the Bishop of Birmingham and the Rev. R. L. Ottley, has not the slightest sympathy with confiscation."

By this official reticence on a cardinal point of divergence between Socialists and non-Socialists, even more than by the semi-official utterances referred to, the position of the leaders of the Christian Social Union is made clear. It is a position which commits them to oppose the most important item in the Socialist programme—to wit, the virtual confiscation of property. The real attitude of the movement in relation to genuine Socialism should, therefore, be described as one of direct opposition. If, notwithstanding these evidences,

moderate Christian Socialists of the Christian Social Union type persist in asserting that they are true Socialists, we can only reply to them in the words in which Lord Hartington is reported to have answered Mr. Gladstone at the close of a discussion on Home Rule, "We do not mean the same thing."

We have next to consider the position of the advanced section of Christian Socialists, whose error is of a quite different kind from that which we have discussed. This section of opinion is principally represented at present in England by "The Guild of St. Mathew," founded in 1877, and by the more recently established "Christian Socialist Society." Both these societies, unlike the previous organization of Kingsley and Maurice, are characterized by their advocacy of State interference on an excessive scale, and also by their acceptance of the doctrine of confiscation. They both reflect Marxian economic teaching. The recognized leader of this advanced section is the Rev. Stewart D. Headlam, who is described by Mr. Sidney Webb as "a prominent worker in the Socialist cause." Amongst his supporters are the Hon. and Rev. J. G. Adderley and the Rev. Conrad Noel, an able and zealous lecturer, the author of "The Labour Party: What it is, What it wants." There is no reason to doubt, and much reason to assume, that these persons, and many of those who follow them, share a devout belief in Christianity with an entire conviction of the truth of Socialism. But the conclusion commonly drawn from this assumption, that Christianity and Socialism are, therefore, mutually compatible, is none the less without

logical warrant. The mere fact of the co-existence of two beliefs in the minds of a number of persons, however sane or sincere, is no proof in itself that the combination is rational and the ideas compatible. At best it affords a presumption to that effect. When, however, the beliefs themselves are shown to be mutually contradictory, such presumption not only ceases, but gives place to positive proof of logical inconsistency on the part of those who still hold these beliefs. This is precisely the case in regard to the alleged agreement of Christianity and Socialism. Actually, and when properly understood, Christianity and Socialism stand out as irreconcilable antitheses, and any combination of their respective ideals is clearly impossible.

But why labour this point further? The mass of Socialists glory in the ultra-Materialism and Atheism which they openly proclaim to be the basis of their doctrine. Mr. Thomas Kirkup, the English Socialist historian, for example, writes: "A great deal of the historic Socialism has been regarded as a necessary implicate of Idealism. The prevailing Socialism of the day is in large part based on the frankest and most outspoken Materialism" ("History of Socialism," third edition, 1906, p. 10). This prevailing Socialism he goes on to describe as being "most powerfully represented at the present day by the school of Marx" (*ibid.*, p. 15). Concerning this school and its founder he subsequently makes the following explicit statement: "It will have been seen that what Marx and his school contemplate is an economic evolution brought about in accordance

with the natural laws of historic evolution. But in order to understand the full import of this revolution in the mind of Marx we must remember that he regards the economic order as the groundwork of society, and as determining all the other forms of social order. The entire legal and political structure, as well as philosophy and literature and religion, are constituted and controlled in accordance with the economic basis. This is in harmony with his method and his conception of the world, which is the Hegelian reversed: 'For Hegel the thought-process, which he transforms into an independent subject under the name "idea," is the creator of the real, which forms only its external manifestation. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material transformed and translated in the human brain.' His conception of the world is a frank and avowed Materialism" (*ibid.*, p. 151).

As a consequence of the influence of Marx, and of his life-long friend and interpreter Engels, Socialism assumed a materialistic and atheistic position, which has since been constantly upheld by the repeated irreligious assertions of almost all the greatest leaders of the international movement in the different countries. Thus in Germany Bebel, who, in the words of the poet Heine, leaves "Heaven to the angels and to the sparrows" ("Unsere Ziele," p. 38), has summed up the chief aims of Socialists in these words: "We aim in the domain of politics at Republicanism; in the domain of economics at Socialism; and in the domain of what is to-day called religion at Atheism" (Speech in the Reichstag, December 31, 1881). And Liebnicht

confessed at the Halle Convention: "As regards my own self, I had done with religion at an early age. I am an Atheist. I do not believe in God. Science is hostile to religion." Concluding, he expressed the opinion that the dependence of the forms of religion on economic conditions was such as to render actual conflict with religion unnecessary. "We may peacefully take our stand," he said, "upon the ground of Socialism, and thus conquer the stupidity of the masses in so far as this stupidity reveals itself in religious forms and dogmas" (*Berlin Volksblatt*, 1890, No. 261).

Dietzgen thus expresses himself in one of his blasphemous sermons on "Religion and Socialism": "If religion is to be understood as a belief in supersensible, immaterial substances and forces, if it consists in a belief in higher Gods and spirits, [social] democracy has no religion. . . . A cultured human society is the supreme good in which we believe. Our hope rests upon the organization of social democracy" ("Religion and Socialism," fifth edition, Berlin, 1891, pp. 16, 17). And Karl Kautsky, in the preface to a pamphlet he published in 1906 on "Social Democracy and the Catholic Church," writes: "The belief in a personal God ('impersonal' as applied is an empty word) and a personal immortality is irreconcilable with the present position of scientific knowledge in general, of which scientific Socialism forms a part which cannot be arbitrarily separated from the whole."

Some of the most uncompromising assertions of the hostility of Socialism to religion come from French and

Italian source. The French Socialist Paul Lafargue, for instance, in an article appearing in the *International Socialist Review* of November, 1903, writes in the following characteristic strain : " The victory of the proletariat will deliver humanity from the nightmare of religion. The belief in superior beings to explain the natural world and the social inequalities, and to prolong the dominion of the ruling class, and the belief in the posthumous existence of the soul to recompense the inequalities of Fate, will have no more justification when once a man . . . shall live in a Communist society from whence shall have disappeared the inequalities and injustice of Capitalist societies." The late distinguished Italian Socialist, Professor Ferri, at the close of a passage in his book on " Socialism and Positive Science," in which he expressed his conviction that the tolerance of Christianity by Socialism as proclaimed at Erfurt, was based on confidence in a final victory, wrote : " It has taken this attitude even though it knows that the absence or lessening of the belief in God is one of the most powerful factors in its extension, because the priests of all religions have been, in all phases of history, the powerful allies of the governing classes, in keeping the masses under the yoke, thanks to religious fascination, as the tamer keeps the wild beasts under his whip."

In America and in Great Britain also there is ample evidence of the same anti-religious and atheistic attitude on the part of Socialism. Thus the *New Yorker Volkzeitung*, the representative organ of scientific Socialism in New York State, under date of October 9,

1901, declares: "Socialism and belief in God, as it is taught by Christianity and its adherents, are incompatible. Socialism has no meaning unless it is atheistic." And this is borne out by assertions of a like nature constantly repeated in other Socialist pamphlets and periodicals published in the United States. In England the great majority of Socialist leaders and writers maintain the same position. At a meeting at Nottingham on October 23, 1907, Mr. Harry Quelch, one of the leading members of the Social Democratic Federation of Great Britain, is reported by the *Nottingham Daily Express* of the next day's issue to have stated that "whatever might be said on the question, it seemed to him that Christianity and Socialism were absolutely incompatible." And Mr. J. Bruce Glasier, another prominent English Socialist, by an admission he makes in an article in the *Labour Leader* of October, 1907, that political campaigning had been used to promote the spread of Atheism and to subvert the Christian religion, adds his testimony to the practical connection existing between Socialism and infidelity. Referring to the Parliamentary by-election which took place in the Kirkdale division of Liverpool on September 27, 1907, he writes:

"We could not deny that a special edition of the *Clarion*—an edition containing Mr. Hill's address and filled chiefly with articles on Socialism from Mr. Blatchford's writings—had been distributed from the Labour Committee Rooms; and this was the paper, and Mr. Blatchford was the writer, who had been engaged for months attacking Christianity. We could not deny

that leaflets on Socialism bearing advertisements of that paper were being circulated at our meetings. We could not, I say, deny these things, and therefore we could not well declare that our Socialist propaganda was in no sense responsible for circulating Mr. Blatchford's anti-religious *credo*." And referring in the same article to an open-air address he delivered for an I.L.P. branch in Scotland, Mr. Bruce Glasier admits that he was obliged to "acknowledge that the assertion that Socialism and Atheism even were in some instances associated could not be denied. 'I cannot deny that, even if I would,' I said; 'for what do I see here, and what does my audience see? Look at the bookstall there, which my comrades have kindly honoured me by erecting under my platform, and you will find a display of "God and my Neighbour," as well as Haeckel's "Riddle of the Universe," and other Rationalist Press publications, attacking God and Christianity, whereas you will not find a single work attacking Atheism and Agnosticism.'"

The executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Great Britain, in a recently-published pamphlet entitled "Socialism and Religion" corroborate the irreligious propaganda of Socialism. The "publication is a challenge. It meets those professed Socialists who claim that religion and Socialism are in harmony, and those rabid opponents who rave of the 'Socialist menace' to religion, with a plain statement of the facts. . . . It is issued not as the view of an individual, but as the accepted manifesto of the Socialist party on the subject; and agreement with it, and the general position of the party, entails upon every member of the

working class the duty of joining the Socialist party of Great Britain and helping forward its work." The pamphlet asks the questions: "Is Socialism antagonistic to religion? Can a Socialist be a Christian?" and frankly replies: "These questions are repeatedly being asked, and are being answered in many different ways. Yet Socialism has an unequivocal answer to them. . . . Unfortunately for the political trickster, however, that answer runs counter to popular prejudice—it will not win votes from those who are not Socialists—and therefore his tribe deprecate the free discussion of the implications of Socialism in regard to religion on the ground of 'political expediency.'"

Describing the genesis of religion, the pamphlet asserts: "As a belief, therefore, religion was the outcome of man's ignorance of Nature's working, and of the mastery which awful and uncomprehended natural forces had over him, while as rites and ceremonies it reflected the forms, customs, and changing nature of primitive society. Thus the obscurity of material conditions is the source of religion; God did not create man, man created God in his own image." Further on it describes Socialism as "the natural enemy of religion. Through Socialism alone will the relations between men in society, and their relations to Nature, become reasonable, orderly, and completely intelligible, leaving no nook or cranny for superstition. The entry of Socialism is, consequently, the exodus of religion." The pamphlet goes on to consider the subject from the view-point of Socialist philosophy:

"Our brief outline of the natural history of religion

has shown that Socialism, as a system of society, means the end of supernatural beliefs. But that is only half our present task. What is the relation of Socialism as a propagandist movement towards modern Christian teaching? Or, since general principles should here be first considered, is Socialism, as a working philosophy, also opposed to modern religious ideas?

“In the first place, all religious teaching is directly opposed to the scientific materialism, or monism, which is an integral part of Socialist philosophy. . . . Socialism does not—as does Christianity—mock the wage-slave by telling him that he has a free will, and that environment does not count. It points out the overwhelming influence of environment on the individual, and insists that to remove the poverty, unhappiness, and degradation of the many, it is necessary to depose the few and *change material conditions*. Socialism relies on an alteration in political and economic conditions for human improvement. It attributes to capitalist exploitation, and the social conditions this engenders, the general poverty, crime, drunkenness, and degeneracy. Thus it is entirely antagonistic to the Christian teaching that not social change, but a ‘new heart’ is all that is required. In contrast with the Idealist metaphysics of the Churches, the Socialist movement is materialist in philosophy, object, and method.”

After some further explanation, there occurs the following comment on Christian Socialism, which should prove instructive to those who insist on attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable :

"But the contradiction in terms known as the Christian Socialist is inevitably antagonistic to working-class interests and the waging of the class struggle. His policy is the conciliation of classes, the fraternity of robber and robbed, not the end of classes. His avowed object, indeed, is usually to purge the Socialist movement of its materialism, and this, as we have seen, means to purge it of its Socialism and to divert it from its material aims to the fruitless chasing of spiritual Will-o'-the-wisps. A *Christian Socialist* is, in fact, an anti-Socialist.

"Clearly, then, the basis of Socialist philosophy is utterly incompatible with religious ideas."

In summing up, the pamphlet again definitely and clearly lays down the relation of opposition which must exist between Socialism and Christianity:

"Under all its multifarious forms, the modern mission of religion is to cloak the hideousness and injustice of social conditions and keep the exploited meek and submissive. But Socialism is the possibility of social conditions that are rational and humane and need no mask. Therefore, to tear the veil of hypocrisy and mysticism from modern society is to urge the workers to end its misery and inequality. Nevertheless, the importance of the religious question must not be overestimated; it is important, but yet secondary, to the great economic and political movement itself, for the supreme aim of the workers must be their emancipation from wage-slavery, and the war on superstition is but a phase of this great struggle. But it must never be forgotten that, since religion is ever used as

a weapon by the ruling class against the wealth producers, no working man in the struggle for the emancipation of his class can honestly avoid the religious conflict. Our question is therefore answered. Socialism, both as a philosophy and as a form of society, is the antithesis of religion."

Finally, Professor Karl Pearson, a representative English Socialist writer, in an essay on the "Moral Basis of Socialism," replying to the question, "Can a greater gulf be imagined than really exists between Christianity and the Socialist code?" says: "Socialism arises from the recognition that the sole aim of mankind is happiness in this life; current Christianity is not a vivifying political force; current Christianity is the outcome of a pessimistic superstition, and can never be legitimately wedded to a Hellenic rationalism." ("The Ethic of Free Thought," pp. 318, 319.)

Of themselves these quotations go far to show the impossibility of establishing any harmony in theory or practice between Socialism and the Christian religion. But when they are taken in conjunction with the arguments adduced from internal evidences, which afford direct and conclusive proof of the inherent antagonism of Socialism to Christianity, then we have overwhelming proof of the complete contrariety of the two systems.

Our indictment so far, therefore, stands. Socialism and religion are fundamentally opposed. Between them there can be no peace, no reconciliation, no compromise.

CHAPTER XII

MORAL INDICTMENT OF SOCIALISM

I.—PERSONAL MORALITY

WE have now to consider the opposition of Socialism to Christian ethics. This constitutes the moral, as distinct from the religious, aspect of the case. At the same time, it must be remembered that the religious and moral aspects are in reality inseparable. Religion and ethics, in the Christian sense, rest on the same motive and ultimate sanction. The difference between them is that, whereas religion consists more immediately in the fulfilment by man of his duty of worshipping God, morality comprises other practices of virtue involved in the discharge of the various obligations and responsibilities of life. The moral indictment is, therefore, not altogether a new issue, but rather a continuation and development, under fresh counts and with additional evidence, of the original indictment. Accordingly, though some of the arguments may appear redundant, they really serve a useful purpose, since they elucidate the general truth by setting it in the different lights of its particular bearings and relations.

The moral case can be best considered under the three separate heads of personal, social, and domestic morality.

Personal morality, for the present purpose, may be defined as the virtue whereby man, in his character of a rational and responsible person, restrains and controls his passions, and exerts himself to assert his personal freedom in his own interest, and in order to realize himself to the utmost. Social morality is the same virtue applicable to man in his social capacity, according to which he is able to influence for good or for evil the other members of the society in which he lives. Domestic morality consists in the due fulfilment of the relations which a man has to the members of his family, and which arise immediately out of the obligations of marriage.

Our first proof of the opposition of Socialism to personal morality is derived from the fact that the system of the so-called Socialist morality is entirely based on anti-religious doctrines of utility and pleasure. That this is so, the following quotations establish beyond doubt.

Professor Karl Pearson writes: "I have spoken of Socialism as a recognized movement, but it is essentially necessary to mark the characteristics which distinguish it from other political movements of this century. The difference lies in the fact that the new policy is based upon a conception of morality differing *in toto* from the old or the current Christian ideal, which it does not hesitate to call anti-social and immoral. It is, however, this very fact that Socialism is a morality in the first place, and a polity only in the second, that has led to the introduction of the absurd misnomer 'Christian Socialist' for a section of the

Church party which vaguely recognizes the moral aspect of Socialism. As the old religious faith disappears, a new basis of morals is required, more consonant with the reasoning spirit of the age. That view of life which, seeing in this world only sorrow and tribulation, finds it a field of preparation for a future existence, is more and more widely acknowledged to be a superstition invented and accepted by the prevailing pessimism of a decadent period of human development. Harmful as the superstition has been, the commonsense of mankind has saved us from the logical consequences of its full acceptance. At the very best, however, it has justified poverty, misery, and asceticism of all kinds. The modern Socialistic theory of morality is based upon the agnostic treatment of the supersensuous. Man, in judging of conduct, is concerned only with the present life; he has to make it as full and as joyous as he is able, and to do this consciously and scientifically with all the knowledge of the present, and all the experience of the past, pressed into his service. Not from fear of hell, not from hope of heaven, from no love of a tortured man-God, but solely for the sake of the society of which we are members, and the welfare of which is our welfare—for the sake of our fellow-men—we act morally, that is, socially. . . . Socialism arises from the recognition (1) that the sole aim of mankind is happiness in this life, and (2) that the course of evolution, and the struggle of group against group, have produced a strong social instinct in mankind, so that, directly and indirectly, the pleasure of the individual lies in forward-

ing the prosperity of the society of which he is a member" ("The Ethic of Free Thought," pp. 302, 303, second edition, 1901).

This opinion of one of the ablest English writers on Socialism is confirmed by the American author, Morris Hillquit, who also clearly indicates the essential connection of the Socialist standard of ethics with the Darwinian theory of evolution.

He writes: "Finally, the school of social thought which goes to biology for the discovery of rules of human conduct, has introduced another and more realistic standard of right and wrong in human conduct. According to Darwinian conceptions, the strongest motives in all organic life are the instincts of self-preservation and preservation of the species. Applied to man in a social state that theory means that the main concern of human beings is the preservation of life, and that such conduct of the individual will be regarded as good or right as tends to preserve and enhance the life of his fellow-men, while conduct which tends to curtail or impair such life will be considered bad or wrong" ("Socialism in Theory and Practice," p. 45, 1909).

Again, replying to the question, "What, then, are the factors determining the degree and distinction of moral development?" this same writer emphasizes the application of the Darwinian theory in the system of Socialism as follows: "The answer to the momentous question will be found in the philosophy of the school of Karl Marx, who alone consistently introduced the spirit of Darwinism into the study of social phenomena by substituting the economic interpretation

of history, and the resulting doctrine of the class-struggle in the more modern stages of social development for the instinct of self-preservation and the resulting doctrine of the struggle for existence in its lower stages " ("Socialism in Theory and Practice," p. 52).

Mr. Lawrence Gronlund, another modern American Socialist, who would probably entirely reject the materialistic view of the subject, completely accepts its utilitarian basis. In reply to the question, "What is morality?" he writes: "I answer, just as a physical law is the expression of the relation of the order of the world to things, so morality is the expression of its relation to men. As a preliminary definition we can say that Morality is the force that binds men in societies as the force of gravitation binds men to earth. To be 'moral' can thus be said to be synonymous with being 'social' in a profound sense" ("Our Destiny: the Influences of Socialism on Morals and Religion," pp. 28, 29, 1890).

Now, what does this utilitarian doctrine lead to? Evidently to the extinction of personal morality, which it sacrifices in the supposed interests of public morals. If the individual happiness of men be identical with the collective happiness of society, and if this last be the sole object of existence, then virtue is what furthers, and vice what hinders, social enjoyment. Consequently "right" and "wrong" cease to have their proper subjective meaning; they become convertible with the objective expressions "social" and "anti-social." But this would be the death-knell of Christian virtue.

The same tendency is witnessed in the materialistic

conception of history which continues to dominate scientific Socialism. The doctrine of its main features is a result of the evolutionary idea of society which has come down from Comte through Darwin and Spencer. The genesis and nature of the Spencerian theory, as well as its monopoly of modern thought, is clearly stated by Mr. F. H. Giddings. He writes: "Since Comte, sociology has been developed mainly by men who have felt the full force of an impulse that has revolutionized scientific thinking for all time to come. The evolutionist explanation of the natural world has made its way into every department of knowledge. The law of natural selection and the conception of life as a process of adjustment of the organism to its environment have become the core of the biology and the psychology of to-day. It was inevitable that the evolutionary philosophy should be extended to embrace the social phenomena of human life. The science that had traced life from protoplasm to man could not stop with explanations of his internal constitution. It must take cognizance of his manifold external relations, of the ethnical groups, of the natural societies of men, and of all the phenomena that they exhibit, and inquire whether these things also are not products of the universal evolution. On evolutionary lines, then, and through the labours of evolutionist thinkers, modern sociology has taken shape. It is an interpretation of human society in terms of natural causation. It refuses to look upon humanity as outside of the cosmic process, and as a law unto itself. Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities

of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution" ("The Principles of Sociology," p. 7, 1909).

We must not be deceived by the apparent distinction set up between physical, vital, and psychical causes, which being fundamentally physical are really identical. In the words of the same writer: "Social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution. All social energy is inevitable, and it necessarily occasions those orderly changes in groupings and relationships that constitute development" (*ibid.*, p. 363). This mechanical theory of society, of course, implies the denial of free will, and consequently of all moral responsibility.

But how far does the specific Socialist doctrine of the "materialistic conception of history" commit Socialists to it? The materialistic conception of history is briefly this: The whole history of man, with its social, religious, and moral phenomena, is one constant process of evolution, in which the sole stable and immutable element is the single law of perpetual change, and in which all progress is accomplished through the production and exchange of material goods, and by the formation of economic contracts, and the class-wars resulting therefrom. These are the determining and decisive factors in the social relations and institutions of man. That this is a fundamental tenet of Marxian scientific Socialism is now generally admitted. As Bernstein, a foremost critic of Marx, says: "It is incontrovertible that the most important part in the foundation of Marxism, so to say the fundamental law which permeates the whole system, is his specific theory of history

which goes by the name of the materialistic conception of history. With this theory stands or falls the principle of the whole system ; its every modification involves a corresponding change in the other parts of the system " (quoted in Cathrein's " Socialism," p. 120, Note).

Sombart, another critic, writes also as follows : " The Marxian line of argument also gave due recognition to another aspect of the new conception of society and of history—the conception that regarded the organization of society as it is (or as it should be), not as being the well-planned scheme of any one individual, no matter how much in accordance with reason, but rather as the result of a long chain of historic causes. That was precisely what Karl Marx taught. He held that Capitalism as it developed would itself produce the conditions which were necessary for the establishment of a Socialist community. When that Social organization comes about, it will do so not because it is ideally the best, or because it is most reasonable, but because it is most suitable to the slowly developing conditions of life. By making the Social movement the resultant of historic development, Marx showed what the real factors were which brought it about ; showed how the movement was based on the economic conditions of a particular time at a particular place, and on the personal characteristics of the men and women living in those conditions. In other words, he proved that on economic and psychological grounds it was inevitable, and he thus became the founder of historical (as opposed to rationalistic) or realistic (as opposed to Utopian) Socialism " (" Som-

bart's Socialism and the Socialist Movement," pp. 62, 63. Translated by Epstein).

From these statements it is clear (1) that Marxian Socialism is broadly based on evolutionism; and (2) that the modern Socialist movement, which is its manifest outcome, if it expects to be recognized, must generally embody this teaching and in large measure express it. But in the measure in which it does so it is hostile to free will, and the responsibilities, rights, and duties which, taken together, constitute personal morality. Beyond these statements we are not entitled to go. For although it is true that modern Socialists must accept the Marxian theory, it does not follow that they will draw from it all its logical conclusions, or consistently apply it in practice. Even Marx, who is reported on one occasion to have confessed, 'I myself am not really a Marxist,' failed to do this, and in building up his system borrowed many idealistic elements from a school of thought radically opposed to that which provided him with his basic theory. As Mr. Kirkup reminds us: "Marx and Lassalle were both trained in the school of Hegel, and naturally applied to the problems of society the Hegelian theory of development" ("History of Socialism," p. 294).

Mr. Belfort Bax, one of the most intelligent leaders of British Socialism, is also said to derive much of his inspiration from the same school. And as a general rule, practical Socialists to-day endeavour to blend idealistic with realistic components in the philosophy of their system. Indeed, to the newest Socialism the materialistic or historic element is becoming increasingly

distasteful, and every effort is being made to conceal or deny it. Thus, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, the leader of the Labour party in England, and an ardent advocate of Bernstein's "Revisionist Socialism," in a recent work in which he makes a plausible endeavour to vindicate present-day Socialism from many unpleasant imputations, writes on this subject as follows: "Socialism to-day suffers because it has received an inheritance of scientific materialism from the middle of the nineteenth century, when the intellect of the West was occupied and entranced by the discoveries of biological science, by the rude shaking which biological evolution gave to spiritual expressions and phenomena, by the systematic orderliness in which economic expressions set many historical events, and by the enthusiasm for materialist solutions which was natural to the time. This gave rise to the shibboleth of the materialist conception of history which a section of Socialist thought still tries to impose on the Socialist movement. . . . But the materialist conception of history is, after all, one-sided and inadequate. . . . It did not satisfy every need. It did not meet every emergency. Its assumptions can never be displaced from the motives in history, but they cannot explain events when considered absolutely and alone. We now see all this, and in marshalling the motives which make for change and which accomplished what change has hitherto taken place, we give due place to those that are intellectual, as well as to those that are materialist and economic" ("The Socialist Movement," pp. 142-146).

The evidences against the assumptions contained in this special pleading have been already adduced, and there is, therefore, no need to criticize Mr. Macdonald's statement in detail. It is sufficient to say that the argument is wide of the mark, and that the writer fails to attack the real problem. This, according to his own admission in the same context, really resolves itself into the relative value of the various creative forces, as well spiritual as material, which, in the words of Engel, act and re-act on one another and on the economic basis. This point he has not touched, and it is here precisely, as we have pointed out, that the conflict between Christian and Socialist ethics arises. Whereas Socialism, in virtue of its dogma of determinism, attributes a preponderating influence to the operation of the physical forces in the life and history of mankind, Christianity, by reason of the opposite conviction, that the spiritual energies of life are stronger than the physical, exactly reverses this order, and sets forth religious and moral motives as the predominant factors in the promotion of civilization, and the development of man in society.

Hence the contrast between Christian and Socialist ethics is specially marked in the method which each adopts to put its programme into practice. While the Socialist method, relying on economic changes and the enforcement of reforms by law, is frankly and aggressively external, the Christian method is essentially internal, since it seeks the well-being of society through the personal regeneration of the individuals who constitute it. In the words of Mr. Belfort

Bax: "According to Christianity and the Ethics, or religion of Introspection generally, regeneration must come from within, must begin in the mind and heart of the individual. The ethics and religion of modern Socialism, on the contrary, look for regeneration from without, from material conditions and a higher social life. The ethics and religion of Socialism seek not the ideal society through the ideal individual, but conversely the ideal individual through the ideal society. It finds in an adequate, a free and harmonious social life, at once the primary condition, and the end and completion of individuality" ("The Ethics of Socialism," p. 19).

A further contrast between these systems is observable in the rigidity which characterizes the one, and the flexibility and reasonableness of the other. Socialism is absolute and doctrinaire. Christianity is relative and practical. Thus, while Socialism relies on external, to the exclusion of internal means, Christianity in practice employs both, without resorting to extremes in either, thereby accommodating itself to the needs and realities of life. In so doing Christianity merely adheres to its own traditional teaching, which is consistently moderate. It is true that according to Christian teaching society is essentially founded on character, and that character creates conditions rather than is created by them. But the same teaching equally admits the considerable and undoubted effects which material influences exert upon moral and intellectual development. In the same way Christianity recognizes legislation as a necessary factor in safeguard-

ing and directing society, but it is careful to point out the limits of this agency, and to assert the supreme claim of the higher force of a properly educated public opinion. The most that legislation is able to effect is the modification of external conditions; and even to achieve this it requires the support of public opinion.

The whole question, in fact, resolves itself into the old problem as to whether the pig made the sty or the sty made the pig; and the only satisfactory solution is unmistakably the rational compromise of the Christian social scheme which secures, as we have seen, the improvement of society through the individual, and creates social reforms by spiritual reformation from within.

Yet another ground of variance between Christian and Socialist ethics may be noted. It arises out of the Socialist theory that the people as a whole, the collectivity, and not individuals, should own all the means of production. At first sight this principle may appear to be purely economic and in nowise moral. But this is not so in reality. Though the primary purpose of capital is undoubtedly the production of wealth, that is by no means its final object. Wealth itself, though open to abuse, is intended as an agent in the promotion of life—moral as well as physical. Hence capital, the producer of wealth, shares the same purpose, and should be directed to the same end. And practical experience of the conditions which govern the development of life among the various classes of society teaches that the possession of some measure of wealth in the form of capital is an aid in the cultivation, at least, of the moral

qualities of responsibility and freedom, self-control, foresight and thrift.

Therefore, the Socialist doctrine of the collectivization of capital, in so far as it removes this aid, tends to check the moral and spiritual growth of the individual conscience, and to that extent is opposed once more to personal morality.

CHAPTER XIII

MORAL INDICTMENT OF SOCIALISM

II.—SOCIAL MORALITY

OUR next consideration is the opposition of Socialism to social morality, or to moral conduct in its relation to others. And here the chief source of disagreement between the principles of Christianity and of Socialism will be found to consist in the fundamental Socialist doctrine of extreme Collectivism. From all that has been previously said it will be evident that Socialism ultimately resolves itself into a State Collectivism in which the unqualified conception of a social organism is the prevalent idea. Society or the State, according to Socialism, is nothing more or less than a collective organization of men who are associated together as the various elements of a chemical compound are combined, or as the cells and members of a vegetable or animal body are united in the single organism in which and by which they live.

Such a conception implies an erroneous idea of the whole relation of individuals to society and of society to individuals. By it the individual is completely merged in society—society being regarded as the absolute authority to which the individual is wholly subordinated. He has no independent rights; and society is the sole

master of his person and faculties, of his conscience and possessions, thus relieving him completely of all moral responsibilities and of the means of fulfilling them.

From the standpoint of social morality, or, indeed, of any morality, this doctrine is clearly untenable. Man is essentially a person, a free moral agent. Unlike other creatures, his end is in himself, yet with ultimate responsibility to his Maker. Being neither a thing nor a chattel, he cannot therefore be wholly subordinated to society for the purpose only of fulfilling its aims. We admit that man by his nature, and not by chance or accident, is compelled to live in society, and has natural duties to fulfil in its regard. But this is not inconsistent with the social teaching of Christianity. On the contrary, it is in perfect harmony with its express declaration that though the primary obligation of the individual is to God, he has real yet secondary obligations to society and to his fellow-men. Such a doctrine recognizes the dignity of manhood and the spiritual centre of his personality. The Socialist theory, on the other hand, would degrade human beings into mere tools or instruments—cogs, in fact, in the wheels of the machinery of the State.

The true doctrine is that of Christianity. The individual end of man is higher than the collective end of society. Society is for man, not man for society. The State is temporal, man is eternal. Civil law is only binding in so far as it expresses the divine and eternal law, which is the sole primary obligation equally of the individual and of society.

The Socialist conception of society, and of the relation of the individual to the State, is the reverse of the foregoing. It is therefore fundamentally wrong and immoral. By its opposition to Christian teaching it strikes directly at the root of personality, thus rendering inoperative the free activity of the individual. In this way the essential factor of man's influence on his fellow-man is eliminated, and his power to exercise any social morality or public virtue is effectually precluded. The only conceivable public "morality" is a debased form of "herd morality," and it is this "morality" precisely which, at the present day, finds most favour with Socialist writers.

Describing the "Ethic of Socialism," Mr. Belfort Bax declares its substance to be "the identification of self with, or identification of self in, society, which, in the first instance, can only be brought about by the identification of the material conditions of individual well-being with those of social well-being" ("Ethics of Socialism," p. 28).

The full significance of this conclusion is made still clearer by the following explanation of moral consciousness which immediately precedes it:

"First, then, we find that the meaning of the 'ought' of 'conscience,' of the moral impulse, moral sense, moral consciousness, or by whatever other name it may be called, is nothing more nor less than the implicit or explicit consciousness of the inadequacy of the individual and his interests as an end to himself. This consciousness is presupposed in the existence of human society at all. But although conscience or the moral conscious-

ness is ultimate, the forms of its manifestations no less than its object are determined by the conditions of social economic evolution.

“At first the ‘society of kinship’ is the end of all duty; the individual implicitly conscious of his own inadequacy is sunk in the society, knows and cares for no existence outside the society. This is, from the Socialist point of view, the highest morality which up to now has been generally prevalent in the world. But with the dissolution of early tribal society with its kinship basis, with the rise of political society, with its property basis, and the leisure thence resulting, the old ethical object of the individual gradually lost its power” (*ibid.*, p. 26).

And in a later work, collaborated by the same author with Mr. William Morris, there occurs the following prediction of the new social morality: “As regards the future form of the moral consciousness, we may safely predict that it will be a return on a higher level to the ethics of the older world, with the difference that the limitation of scope to the kinship group in its narrower sense, which was one of the causes of the dissolution of ancient society, will disappear, and the identification of individual with social interests will be so complete that any divorce between the two will be inconceivable to the average man” (“Socialism: Its Growth and Outcome,” by William Morris and E. Belfort Bax, p. 298, 1893). Such teaching is clearly destructive of the initiative, free activity, and self-consciousness of human life, without which personality cannot be conceived to exist.

We can now leave the more general indictment of Socialism and the consideration of certain of its effects in order to set in a correct light the specific charge brought against Socialism, that its system is of its very nature bound up with injustice and tyranny. The importance of the issue involved will at once appear when it is stated that Socialism depends for its true moral value, and its ultimate acceptance by public opinion, on its conformity with these very virtues of justice and liberty. Hence, these allegations of injustice and tyranny are indignantly repudiated by the Socialist body. Socialism, it is declared, is the living expression of an ardent desire for justice and freedom for all. Because the rich possess more than their fair share of wealth and power, and because capital is trampling on labour, Socialism makes its demand for State interference, for expropriation of capitalists, and for equal opportunities for all. But the argument fails to convince. The passion for justice and liberty is not infrequently accompanied by blindness to the true nature of these virtues and by the existence of grave injustice. It was so at the time of the "Terror," and it is so in regard to modern France and the new Constitution of Portugal.

That the danger indicated is inherent in Socialism is proved by the Socialist plan for the legal seizure and acquirement by the State of all the land and of all the capital of its subjects. Such a scheme would have two results—the confiscation of present private possessions, and the prevention of all future acquisition of property in the commodities referred to. In respect of either of

these results, both of which equally violate individual right, the project is manifestly unjust. The right to possess private property, as well in land and capital as in other things, comes from nature, not from the State. It is therefore a personal, not a civil right, and the State has no power to abolish it. Consequently, the Socialist policy of confiscation and prevention, which aims at such abolition, is unjust and tyrannical.

Nor can any plea of justification on behalf of Socialism be admitted, either on the ground that compensation is promised or that State interference is limited to land and capital. The idea of compensation under a Socialist régime is self-contradictory. Capital can only be indemnified by its own equivalent. But such indemnification is not feasible in a system which forbids the use of private property as a source of income. At best Socialism can only attempt to pay off its debts by means of consumable goods, a mode of compensation which, as the following example will show, would be altogether inadequate.

Mr. John D. Rockefeller, who is reported to be the richest man on earth, has an estimated yearly income of £15,000,000, representing a capital value of £375,000,000. Now suppose that the American Republic becomes a Socialistic State, and that having possessed itself of the Rockefeller estate it is honestly desirous of compensating the family. Two courses are open. The one is for the Government to return at once the estimated value of the property in consumable goods. The only effect of this would be to inundate the family with a surfeit of riches which, under the

circumstances, could have no proportionate usefulness or value. The other course is to distribute the whole of the compensation in instalments over a number of years. This method would have the palpable advantage of enabling the dispossessed family to live on a rich annuity for perhaps a few generations. But since the fortune may not be capitalized it will eventually be dissipated, and cease to exist. Thus the erstwhile immensely rich family would be ultimately reduced to the condition of labour—a result highly satisfactory, no doubt, from the point of view of social and economic equality, but utterly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of just compensation. The hardship entailed would, of course, be more accentuated in the case of an individual or a family possessing less wealth.

The other extenuation of Socialism, founded on the limitation of State interference to land and capital, is likewise inadmissible. For since the right of ownership of all material things comes direct from the law of nature, the law of the State is not at liberty to make artificial distinctions as to the objects to which it will allow the right of ownership granted by the law of nature to apply. Such discrimination is purely arbitrary. The plea of limitation to land and capital is therefore futile.

In addition to the injustice resulting from the infringement of the right to hold private property, Socialism involves a further and more galling tyranny in the subordination of the individual to society. In the Collectivist State the individual is absolutely merged in society as well in regard to himself as his

property. He ceases to be an individual, and becomes a purely dependent part of the social mechanism. As a result the State monopolizes all the functions of the individual, not only controlling and managing his economic possessions, but assuming the direction of his personal and domestic affairs as well. This is despotism, not freedom; absolutism, not democracy.

Moreover, since the Collectivist State would be the exclusive proprietor of the means of production, it would necessarily be the sole director of labour and industry, deciding who shall work and in what employment, and for what recompense. Thus Socialism precludes free competition in labour, and substitutes therefor a system of enforced co-operation with an inseparable inquisitorial policy.

Of its nature Socialism is a bureaucratic monopoly involving a degrading despotism. It is a form of coercion that destroys liberty and creates slavery. And this tyranny is the more dangerous because it is founded on deception and error. The error, which is characteristic of every political tyranny recorded in history, manifests itself in the undue exaltation of the State over the individual—a condition which renders the State omnipotent and the people powerless. The deception is the old illusion that the State is all the people, and that governments are better fitted than individuals to control private as well as public affairs. Swayed by this illusion, Socialists to-day are endeavouring to enthrone tyranny not only at Westminster or Whitehall, but in the homes of the people, and in the innermost sanctuaries of their lives.

Against these arguments certain objections have been raised. It is asserted, for instance, that as the State has the right to tax, or to take a part of the property of an individual, it cannot be immoral for it to confiscate or to take the whole of it. The answer to this plausible objection is that the right of every organization is defined and regulated by the object or purpose for which the organization exists. The State is the organization of the community for the prosperity of the people—an object which it promotes by protecting their lives and property. To discharge this purpose the State establishes a common fund to which it has the right to compel each of its members to contribute a proportionate part of his means. But this right to take a part in no way justifies the taking of the whole. For in taking the whole the State would necessarily be destroying the property it exists to protect. By so doing it would evidently frustrate one of its primary functions.

Nor is any argument deducible from a further right of the State in particular emergencies to compel owners to part with their possessions. Cases of the exercise of this right of "high dominion," as it is called, occur from time to time, as when supplies of wheat or corn are seized in time of war, or when land is required for public utilities, such as railways. But in all such cases, though for the common good the right of expropriation is asserted, the corresponding right of adequate compensation is at the same time always admitted.

Again it is argued. No one questions the right of the State to insist upon its subjects risking their lives by

becoming soldiers, nor does anyone deny the right of the State to take human life directly when the good of the nation requires it. And if the State can risk or even take a man's life when it is for the country's good, surely it has also the right to take his property for the same object. This objection is answered by a direct denial of the supposition that the State has an absolute right over the lives of its subjects. The State has no such right. It is true that it can call upon its subjects to risk their lives for an adequate object, such as that of a just war. But this is far from implying an unqualified right to take human life, even when it might be for the good of the nation to do so. As a matter of fact the State can only take a man's life directly, when, by committing crime, he has already forfeited his right to live, and the general good requires that the forfeit be paid. This right of the State is a relative and strictly defined right, and any infringement of it is grossly immoral. Thus there is no parallelism; and so the argument for confiscation fails, whilst the charges of injustice and tyranny remain.

CHAPTER XIV

MORAL INDICTMENT OF SOCIALISM

III.—DOMESTIC MORALITY

FINALLY we come to domestic morality, or the relation of Socialism to marriage and the family. On this subject modern Socialists, who insist on attributing the bulk of hostile criticism either to misconception or to wilful misinterpretation of their system, are especially sensitive. In discussing the question, therefore, it is necessary to avoid even the appearance of attaching undue importance to the views of extremists. And for this reason we shall confine our attention to the opinions expressed by moderate modern Socialists, and to the logical consequences which the system of Socialism itself implies.

The question comes to this : Would Socialism destroy marriage and home life ? The majority of modern Socialists answer this question with a direct denial, and make eloquent protest against the free love and complex union doctrines of such leaders as *Enfantin* and *Fourier* in the past, and *Bebel*, *William Morris*, *Bax*, and *Professor Ferri* in the present. At the same time these upholders of the institution of marriage and family life do not conceal their dissatisfaction with its existing con-

ditions, and do not hesitate to advocate drastic reforms which would practically abolish the domestic relation.

Most of these "reforms" are in favour of increased facilities for divorce, the economic independence and equality of women, and the over-parentage of the State.

Discussing the question of sex relationship, Dr. Anton Menger writes: "Could free love or complex marriage be put in place of our present system of marriage? We are certainly wrong in rejecting this reform, as is often done, from the standpoint of morality. A condition like free love or complex marriage, through which most peoples have passed in the course of their development, cannot possibly be regarded as immoral. If the social movement were to lead men back towards these arrangements, and if they were gradually to win the support of the majority of the people, the fanatical upholders of the actual would regard them as the only moral organization of sexual life." He then goes on to reject such "reforms," but solely on the grounds of expediency, and sets forth the prevalent moderate ideas on the subject in the following passage: "But even if the general conditions for such a reform existed, the nations would certainly reject free love or complex unions, and firmly maintain the present form of marriage, which, however, must not be indissoluble as with Roman Catholics, but terminable as in the Protestant marriage law, on important grounds. . . . There are so many defects associated with free love that the masses of the people would themselves refuse to permit it, even if in the course of events all those political and ecclesiastical forces which buttress the present monogamic

system had been condemned to silence" ("Neue Staatslehre," pp. 131, 132. Quoted in "The New Socialism," by Stoddart, p. 105).

And Mr. Renard, writing expressly on the attitude of Socialism towards divorce, puts the matter clearly: "Socialism desires, in the first place, that the union of man and woman should become more and more a free marriage between two persons who respect and love each other, a voluntary association of the spouses who, without requiring the consent of any outsider, set up house together by a private contract. Society has only to register this contract in the simplest form, but it cannot dispense with it, because of the difficulties which might arise on questions connected either with their children or with their common property. It is certainly desirable, for the good of individuals as well as of society that this contract should last as long as possible; but this is no reason why we should declare it eternal. It may therefore be broken by the wish of both parties, or even of one of them, provided that this wish be clearly and (if this be thought desirable) repeatedly expressed; and after legal delays, which will serve as precautions against too hasty action. The attempt to maintain the union, when one of the parties has definitely decided to break it, leads to the worst quarrels or the worst hypocrisies. In the name of liberty, as of good order, we must allow two beings who do not wish to live together any longer to go their own way after a peaceable separation. Divorce is in such cases the only right and honourable solution; and society, when certain reservations have been made, has merely the task of register-

ing the dissolution of the conjugal bond, as it registered its formation" ("Le Socialisme à l'Œuvre," p. 422. Quoted by Stoddart, "The New Socialism," p. 116).

On the subject of the economic independence and equality of woman, and the over-parentage of the State, Mr. H. G. Wells writes :

"So far as the family is a name for a private property, a group of related human beings vested in one of them, the head of the family, Socialism repudiates it altogether as unjust and uncivilized ; but so far as the family is a grouping of children with their parents, with the support and consent and approval of the whole community, Socialism advocates it, and would make it for the first time, as far as a very large moiety of our population is concerned, a possible and efficient thing. Moreover, as the present writer has pointed out elsewhere, this putting of the home upon a public basis destroys its autonomy. Just as the Socialist and all who have the cause of civilization at heart would substitute for the inefficient, wasteful, irresponsible, unqualified 'private adventure school,' that did such injury to middle-class education in Great Britain during the Victorian period, a public school, publicly and richly endowed, and responsible and controlled, so the Socialist would put an end to the uncivilized go-as-you-please of the private adventure family. Socialism, in fact, is the State family. The old family of the private individual must vanish before it just as the old water-works of private enterprise, or as the old gas company" ("New Worlds for Old," p. 132).

Amongst other significant utterances by the same

author are the following: "Our existing sexual order is a system in decay" ("Socialism and the Family," p. 52). "Essentially the Socialist position is a denial of property in human beings; not only must land and the means of production be liberated from the multitude of little monarchs among whom they are distributed, to the general injury and inconvenience, but women and children, just as men and things, must cease to be owned. Socialism, indeed, proposes to abolish altogether the patriarchal family, amidst whose disintegrating ruins we live, and to raise women to an equal citizenship with men. It proposes to give a man no more property in a woman than a woman has in a man. To stupid people who cannot see the difference between a woman and a thing, the abolition of the private ownership of women takes the form of having 'wives in common,' and suggests the Corroboree. It is obviously nothing of the sort. It is the recognition in theory of what in many classes is already the fact—the practical equality of men and women in a civilized state. It is quite compatible with a marriage contract of far greater stringency than that recognized throughout Christendom to-day.

"Now, what sort of contract will the Socialist State require for marriage? Here, again, there are perfectly clear and simple principles. Socialism states definitely what almost everybody recognizes nowadays with greater or less clearness, and that is the concern of the State for children. The children people bring into the world can be no more their private concern entirely than the disease-germs they disseminate or the noises

a man makes in a thin-floored flat. Socialism says boldly the State is the over-parent, the outer-parent. People rear children for the State and the future ; if they do that well, they do the whole world a service, and deserve payment just as much as if they built a bridge or raised a crop of wheat ; if they do it unpropitiously and ill, they have done the world an injury. Socialism denies altogether the right of anyone to beget children carelessly and promiscuously ; and for the prevention of disease and evil births alike the Socialist is prepared for an insistence upon intelligence and self-restraint quite beyond the current practice. . . .

“ It follows that motherhood, which we still in a muddle-headed way seem to regard as partly self-indulgence and partly a service paid to a man by a woman, is regarded by the Socialists as a benefit to society, a public duty done. The State will pay for children born legitimately in the marriage it will sanction. A woman with healthy and successful offspring will draw a wage for each one of them from the State. Under the State she will control her child's upbringing. How far her husband will share in the power of direction is a matter of detail, upon which opinion may vary widely amongst Socialists. I suppose for the most part they incline to a joint control. So the monstrous injustice of the present time which makes a mother dependent upon the economic accidents of her man, which plunges the best of wives and the most admirable of children into abject poverty if he happens to die, which visits his sins of waste and carelessness upon them far more than upon himself, will

disappear. So, too, the still more monstrous absurdity of women discharging their supreme social function, bearing and rearing children in their spare time, as it were, while they 'earn their living' by contributing some half-mechanical element to some trivial industrial product, will disappear" ("Socialism and the Family," pp. 56-59).

How completely are these ideas at variance with the Christian view of marriage and the family! In the first place, in accordance with them the family is regarded as wholly dependent on the State, and as a thing in itself of little or no account. The child is not the child of its parents, but the child of the State. In all essentials its rearing and training are referred to the State. Its education is a public, not a private concern. Though some measure of authority over their children may be allowed to parents, the authority of the State is predominant and supreme. Contrast this with the Christian idea. According to it the family is an independent organism with a life of its own. It is the true social unit—the basis on which the State and society rest. The family does not depend on the State, but the State on the family. It is true that the State has a duty to protect the life of the family, and to assist in its free and wider development, but this right of intervention is a subordinate right which is strictly limited, and should not encroach on the prior natural claims of the family.

Their second assumption is even more serious. They assume that marriage is a purely temporal function, an ordinary civil and free contract, a partnership dissoluble

at the wish of individuals, subject only to social law. Again contrast this idea with the Christian conception of marriage as a spiritual and Divine institution. Marriage, according to Christian tradition and teaching, is no ordinary contract which the contracting parties, with the consent of society, are free to dissolve. It is essentially a Divine institution, compulsory and indissoluble, a contract into which God enters as the principal factor.

Husband and wife are united together not by the mere power of their own wills, but by the hand of God. At the beginning, the Author of Life gave to the conjugal union a religious and binding character, which it has ever since retained. Quoting from the Book of Genesis, Christ declared: "He who made man from the beginning made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they two shall be in one flesh." The unity thus established is absolute, as Christ explained to those who tempted Him: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together let no man put asunder" (Matt. xix. 4-6).

This religious character which has always applied to marriage, distinguishing it from all other human contracts, was still further strengthened and intensified by Christ when in the New Law He exalted the natural contract to the supernatural order, conferring upon matrimony the dignity of a sacrament. Thenceforth the union of husband and wife became the mysterious symbol of the indissoluble union in perfect love of Christ and His Church. Hence the Apostle: "For this

cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament ; but I speak in Christ and in the Church " (Eph. v. 31, 32).

The fact that the Socialist opinions which we have cited, represent the views of moderate Socialists who profess allegiance to the institution of marriage, at least in substance, is a weighty argument against Socialism. Our proof, however, does not rest wholly or even mainly on the expressions of opinion of Socialists, whether moderate or extreme. Our essential arguments are derived from the very nature of the Socialist system itself.

In the first place the idea of a "solidaric commonwealth," which is an integral part of Socialism, by making the State the social unit, and assigning to it absolute authority, abolishes at once both home and family. For this imaginary commonwealth, this gigantic public family of the State, since it is all-embracing, precludes the possibility of the separate existence of private families. Like Aaron's rod, which devoured all the rods of Pharaoh's magicians, the conception of a solidaric commonwealth destroys the supremacy of all private families.

This Socialist idea of a solidaric commonwealth is suggested by the notion of solidarity contained in Plato's Republic, where it is pushed to its extreme limit. Perfect solidarity, according to Plato, exists when whatever affects any member of the State equally affects every other member. This is the ideal of individual unity. But since the philosopher recognized such

unification to be impossible, he had to accept for his ideal the collective unity of the State family. Through community of wives and property the barrier of the private association and exclusive relation of the family was to be set aside, and the State was to be made one family; all the children were to be "the children of the State," and publicly reared and educated at the expense of the community. Aristotle justly condemned this scheme as an excessive unification which would destroy the association of the State at the same time that it destroyed that of the family. And the same consequences attach to the modern system. Socialism by its fundamental idea of solidarity would destroy the family and destroy the State. It thus deserves the condemnation passed on the similar doctrinaire philosophy of more than two thousand years ago. Such is the advance of our modern progress!

And, under this solidaric scheme of Socialism, what becomes of marriage? Could it continue? We are convinced that it could not, and for the following amongst other reasons. To most parents, including those least happily circumstanced in worldly goods, the responsible task of caring and providing for children adds a fresh sacredness and delight to marriage. By withdrawing husband and wife from worldly desires and stimulating unselfish love between them, it provides an important safeguard against infidelity, and a strong incentive to happiness. In this way children are the palladium of marriage:

"Talk not of pain!

The childless cherubs well might envy thee
The pleasures of a parent" (Byron).

In considering this whole subject it is important to bear in mind that marriage is not alone for the procreation of children, but is still more for their proper upbringing, and complete development in the physical, moral, and spiritual order. The formation of the child's character, and its final destiny, are largely in the hands of its parents. And it is the consciousness of this ultimate responsibility of parents towards their own little ones which urges them to close personal union and co-operation for the sake of their offspring, and to unselfish affection; it is this which fires them to heroic fidelity and devoted self-sacrifice. Love, like life, without sacrifice, knows no resurrection. "Every noble crown," as Carlyle wrote, "is, and on earth will for ever be, a crown of thorns." It is to this responsibility, too, that we must look for true domestic morality, for happy homes, for brave and honourable men—above all, for virtuous women. Socialism, by undermining this fundamental idea, shatters the entire fabric of Christian marriage, and prepares to erect upon its ruins a new relation of the sexes, which becomes in practice organized debauchery and chartered libertinage, the introduction of the seraglio and the harem, the cult of the new phenomena of "free love" and promiscuity.

The principle of the Collectivization of capital is yet another source of at least indirect danger to the home and domestic morality. For in the first place it is evident that, when capital is owned collectively, the right to control and regulate the incomes of individuals must be vested in the State. But if the State has the right to control and regulate the private incomes of its

members, it must also have the right of control and regulation over the number of its population. As Aristotle, criticizing the Socialism of Plato over two thousand years ago, wrote: "Those who make such laws (regulating property) should remember what they are apt to forget, that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the number of children, for if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions" (Aristotle's "Politics," Bk. ii., Chap. vii.). Aristophanes at the same time drew the attention of the Athenians to the dangerous absurdities of community of property and its logical connection with a community of wives, the following words amongst others occurring in Praxagola's speech in favour of Communism:

"All women and men will be common and free,
No marriage or other restraint there will be."

These moral evils the Socialist State could only attempt to meet by the external and temporary remedies of increased legislation. The disproportion of such means to effect the generation and regeneration of society needs no proof. Only the spiritual regeneration from within, which is contained in the Christian ideal of marriage, can cope with these problems.

Another argument in confirmation of our contention that Socialism reacts against marriage and the family, is derived from the Socialist doctrine that equal rights and opportunities should be provided for all. This

principle evidently conflicts with the Christian theory of the home and married life. The argument may be thus briefly expressed: Marriage and the family essentially constitute a hierarchy of order in which the wife is subject to her husband and the children to their parents. Inequality and subordination amongst its members is therefore an indispensable condition of the domestic relation. Further, in the family hereditary capacities and weaknesses are handed on from parent to child, and so inequalities of opportunity must be propagated.

Viewed from whatever standpoint, Socialism evidently conflicts with marriage and the family. Hence the charge of antagonism to domestic morality is clearly sustained. The system, therefore, is shown to be economically impracticable and morally and religiously indefensible.

CHAPTER XV

THE CHURCH'S ATTITUDE TO THE SOCIAL
QUESTION

THE crisis in political and economic life, known as the social question, which is threatening to become the opening phase of a fierce and protracted class warfare, is the outcome of a long standing conflict of ideas. For three hundred years and more, as we have seen, the principle of Individualism, standing for initiative and for personal freedom, was the dominant factor in the progress and civilization of the world. In the sixteenth century that principle first found favour under the dogma of "private judgment." Later, it gained a general ascendancy in the civil and industrial order which it succeeded in maintaining through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During this period it revolutionized and emancipated society, sweeping away artificial differences of privilege and power, and creating freedom of contract and equality of opportunity for all.

But equality of opportunity, owing to unequal talent, is incapable of producing equality of success. Where almost unlimited freedom prevails some will succeed, others will fail. Some will come to the top, while others will sink to the bottom; and this, in fact, was one of the results of the application of the principle of

liberty and free competition in those times. To the excessive independence of the individual succeeded the excessive dependence of the general body; and to the excessive good fortune of the few succeeded the failure and degradation of the many. A further result was the reaction from Liberalism to Protectionism, which has been already described. The stream of Individualist tendencies was met at its height by a counter current of Collectivist thought. The sequel was the fierce struggle of ideas which is still going on.

Towards this struggle what should be the attitude of the Church? Has she any duty to discharge? If so, what is its nature? It is denied by some that the Church has any right of interference or guidance, on the ground that she has no immediate mission to society as such, and no educational function with respect to secular governments. They argue that Christ, during His life on earth, was only concerned with the spiritual interests of individual men. Hence the religion which He taught and bequeathed to His Church was a purely spiritual and individualistic doctrine, and one which throws no light on social problems. Consequently the sphere of the Church is not only distinct, but entirely separate from that of organized society, and religious dogma and moral teaching have no place in political or social economy. This unsocial view of Christianity and of the Church's position is the capital stock-in-trade of secularist unbelievers, who use it to endeavour to defeat Christianity and to secularize the institutions of the State.

Mr. James Cotter Morrison, writing from the Positivist

standpoint as far back as the year 1887, gave expression to the above view in "The Service of Man," a plausible book which attracted much attention at the time, and has since been reprinted by the Rationalist Press Association. The plea is cleverly set forth in the following analogue :

"An eternal future must, in minds capable of even remotely realizing such an idea, overwhelm and crush into insignificance a minute, temporal present. Even a long temporal future suffices to do this. The inconveniences, for instance, of a sea-voyage which is going to land us in an abiding home in the Colonies or India, are borne with equanimity or indifference on the ground that they will soon be over, that it does not very much matter, as the real object is not to live happily at sea, but to prepare for happiness and prosperity in the distant land for which we are bound. A colonist does not prepare the outfit of a seaman, does not look upon the ship which carries him as his permanent dwelling-place. He no doubt secures what comfort he can at sea, but, if he is a wise man, his meditations are directed to his future life on land beyond the ocean. It would be very questionable prudence in him to learn seamanship or navigation, to study charts, and make himself master of the position of shoals and rocks. He would say that such matters concerned persons who intended to pass their working lives on the sea, whereas he had wholly different objects in view; the soil, the climate, and the crops proper to the country he intended to inhabit, were the things that concerned him" ("The Service of Man," pp. 90, 91).

M. Georges Sorel, the French Syndicalist writer of the present day, emphasizes the same point. He says:

"The teaching of Christianity is only for the perfect man, the anchorite, the saint. It offers no information for the regulation of modern civil society. If a theologian takes up economics, he must borrow his teaching from lay-schools and from purely secular considerations based on natural law. Otherwise his speech will be as that of a dreamer" (*"La Ruine du Monde Antique,"* p. 270).

Other writers go to still further lengths, pronouncing Christianity to be not only unsocial, but even anti-social. M. Zola, for instance, luridly describes Christian teaching as "an anti-social, anti-human doctrine; a doctrine destructive of life in this world for the sake of supernatural existence" (*"Revu Blanche, Enquêt sur la Liberté d'Enseignement,"* 1902).

Nietzsche, the modern Individualist philosopher, endorses the same general indictment, attributing "slave morality" and other evils to the Christian religion. Professor Lichtenberger thus summarizes this writer's views on the subject: "What characterizes all Christianity, according to Nietzsche, is that as a religion it ends in Nihilism. It has created a whole world of pure fictions. It has invented causes, 'God,' 'soul,' 'the spirit,' 'free-will'; and imaginary effects, 'sin,' 'grace'; relations between imaginary beings, 'God,' 'Spirit,' 'souls.' It has invented an imaginary science founded upon its misapprehension of natural causes, an imaginary psychology based upon a false interpretation of phenomena (for example, suffering

explained as the consequence of sin); an imaginary teleology, the 'Kingdom of God,' 'eternal life.' At the same time as the Christian built up his imaginary world he anathematized the real universe, he opposed 'nature,' as the source of all evil, to 'God,' as the source of all good. The origin of the Christian illusion is thus clearly seen. It springs from the hatred of reality; it is the product of a degenerate humanity in which there is more grief than joy, of a weary and suffering humanity which is tending towards pessimism, towards the negation of life, and aspires to return to nothingness" ("The Gospel of Superman." Translation by J. M. Kennedy, pp. 134, 135).

Though such expressions of opinion are in reality a travesty of the Christian religion, they unfortunately receive apparent support from the views of some Christian writers. Many Protestant and certain Catholic commentators, without going to the same lengths as the Rationalists we have quoted, have put forward opinions derogatory to the social importance of Christ's teaching. Thus M. Loisy has written :

"Nothing is easier than to determine historically the attitude of Jesus towards the world, towards earthly possessions, towards human law, towards civilization. The vision of the approaching Kingdom must have inspired Him with a kind of disdain for all these things, and the texts leave no possible doubt as to His sentiments. But just as means have been found to bring back upon Himself and the present the regard that the Saviour directed towards the future, success is equally looked for, if not in showing Him as positively

interested in present life, social questions, political order, human progress, at least in attenuating His indifference towards them all. . . .

“The historical truth is that the idea of a society regularly constituted according to the principles of the Gospel does not exist apart from the vision of the approaching Kingdom, when there shall be no question of private property or collective property, and where divine happiness is the common property of all” (“The Gospel and the Church,” pp. 57 and 63, 2nd ed., 1903).

These writers and others of the same school, who have set forth the case from their point of view with remarkable power, combined in many instances with uncommon happiness of illustration and beauty of expression, notwithstanding, carry no conviction. With them, though man is certainly more than a mere “featherless biped,” yet their conception of him is painfully limited. Their outlook on life is inadequate, their view materialistic, their horizon narrow. Their argument is inconclusive, because based on unreal circumstances. They make an incomplete survey of the social being concerned. Man is many-sided; “he looks before and after,” as the poet Shelley says, “and pines for what is not.” They all rest their opinions on a common error, for they lose sight of man’s spiritual nature. In their estimate the ideals of the world’s greatest thinkers count for nothing. What becomes of the conceptions of our own poet, “the great poet of mankind,” in the lines :

“What a piece of work is a man! how noble
in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form

and moving how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a God!"

Surely man's spiritual nature is not here lost sight of! And yet in the economy of these modern social writers this transcendent quality is totally ignored.

The fundamental assumption of this school—that social life consists exclusively of political and economic elements—is, as is almost needless to say, in complete contradiction to the theory and practice of the Church, which has ever set herself against the divorce of morality and spiritual religion from the social order as unnatural and dangerous. On this subject Pope Leo XIII., in his Encyclical, "Graves de Communi," says: "We remarked just now advisedly of virtue and religion. For it is the opinion of some, which is caught up by the masses, that the 'social question,' as they call it, is merely economic. The precise opposite is the truth, that it is first of all moral and religious, and for that reason its solution is to be expected mainly from the moral law and the pronouncements of religion" ("The Pope and the People," p. 274, C.T.S.). The danger of the error which the Pope thus combats arises from the fact that religion is as much intended for nations as it is for individuals, and that it is no more lawful for States than it is for private persons to withdraw from the proper sphere of influence of the Church and the Gospel. Whilst this setting up of barriers between religion and morality on the one side, and politics and sociology on the other, is prejudicial to the Church, it is more prejudicial, and even posi-

tively disastrous, to the State. To the Church it means a diminishing of her temporal activity; but it does not imply any necessary weakening of her spiritual life. The Church can continue to exist and maintain a vigorous spiritual life without the help of the State. But the case of the State is different. In the conditions of a prevailing Christian civilization the State cannot normally exist for any length of time if completely severed from religion and the Church. The reason is that religion is a necessary condition of civil government. It is required by rulers and subjects alike. Without it authority and obedience fail, and government is reduced to anarchy. Hence to the State separation from all religious influence signifies disaster. The secularization of society is the prelude to its death.

Another set of opinions, mainly associated with the growing school of Liberal Christian thought, claims, on the contrary, that the Church has everything to do with the Social Question, and that the solution of economic problems is her chief concern. According to the average opinion of this school, neither Christ nor His mission was divine. He was an eminently good man, but essentially human; and the work He set before Himself as the chief object of His life was to effect a moral and economic reformation, as opposed to a religious and spiritual regeneration of society. He was above all a social reformer. The Rev. R. J. Campbell, one of the most popular exponents of the view in question, thus writes: "The one outstanding fact, upon which there cannot be two opinions, is the fact that Jesus preached

an ideal social order on earth when He preached the Kingdom of God, and that He was driven to do so by His clear perception of the ills under which His countrymen suffered in a time when justice for the oppressed was seldom to be had " ("Christianity and the Social Order," p. 85). And further, the same writer, treating of Primitive Christianity, says: "The all-important thing in primitive Christian teaching was its intense belief in the coming of an ideal social order in which men would no longer feel any desire to strive against or injure one another. The superstitions about the dramatic second coming, the general resurrection, and the catastrophic nature of the changes which would then take place, need not deceive us in the least. The worst of it is that these over-beliefs have become substituted in the course of time for the original Christianity; the non-essential has crushed out the essential; other worldism has gradually replaced the glad tidings of the Kingdom of God with which Jesus began His mission to the world " (*ibid.*, p. 120).

Finally, describing the true objective of present-day Christianity, Mr. Campbell asserts: "We cannot too strongly insist that the work of Christianity is to realize the Kingdom of God on earth and nothing else. Christianity has not, and never has had, any other Divine commission. Everything added to this has been a hindrance rather than a help; everything antagonistic to it is something quite different from Christianity, even though it may assume the name. The Kingdom of God as Jesus understood it could never have been anything less than a universal brotherhood, a social

order in which every individual unit would find his highest happiness in being and doing the utmost for the whole " ("Christianity and the Social Order," p. 149).

In suchwise the President of the Liberal Christian League claims Christianity to be Socialistic in tendency, and Christ to have been a democrat in advance of His age.

Other modernizers of the Gospel have gone to still further lengths, depicting Christ as a revolutionary demagogue and a violent partisan who directed His attacks on the one hand against the Government and on the other against the richer and more prosperous classes. Renan's "Life of Jesus" is a notorious example of this extravagant form of exegesis which has this significance at least, that it serves to indicate the new importance attaching to Christian ethics, a science hitherto on the circumference, but now at the centre of social study.

Notwithstanding the evident improbability of the extreme views we have just cited, the fact that they are being widely disseminated and openly taught by an increasing number of authorized ministers of Christian sects constitutes them a danger, and makes it necessary in the interests of true religion that they should be directly combated by an explicit denial.

Christ was neither a revolutionary nor a partisan. He was above all parties and classes. And while He sympathized with the poor rather than with the rich, His love was for all. Accordingly He was no demagogue, no stirrer up of the passions of the people; neither was He a redresser of particular wrongs, nor an

adjuster of private or social rights. Least of all is it permissible to assume that He was a merely human preacher of natural philanthropy.

What, then, was Christ? What was His mission? and what, according to Catholic tradition, is the true relation of the Christian Church to the social question? Was Christ a social reformer? Undoubtedly. It is impossible to study the teaching and parables of our Saviour without coming to this conclusion. Primarily, He was the great spiritual regenerator, but He was in addition the political and social restorer of mankind. And in this latter capacity while being neither a politician, nor a statesman, nor a legislator, nor a judge, and least of all a revolutionist, He yet combined the highest qualities of each of these offices. He was the coryphæus of political strategists, the super-statesman, the supreme law-giver, the sovereign arbiter of His own and every age, the remodeller of society, the builder of nations and empires.

He was not a politician or a statesman, because the province of the rulers and directors of States is earthly and temporal, and the predestined office of Christ was to rule over a heavenly and eternal kingdom: "The Kingdom of this world is become our Lord's and His Christ's, and He shall reign for ever and ever" (Apocalypse, or Book of Revelation, xi. 15). He was not a legislator, because the office of a legislator is to make laws, and the purpose of His coming was not to make new laws, but to fulfil those that already existed. He was not a judge, "I came not to judge the world" (John xii. 47). Therefore He would not fulfil the func-

tion of a judge, which is to decide disputes and to determine rights. To one of the multitude who said to Him, "Master, speak to my brother that he divide the inheritance with me," He made the oft-quoted reply, "Man, who hath appointed me judge or divider over you?" and then He went on to lay down a general principle and to teach a universally needed lesson: "Take heed and beware of all covetousness; for a man's life does not consist in the abundance of things which he possesseth" (Luke xii. 14, 15). He was not a revolutionary, because all revolution implies catastrophic destruction, and He came "not to destroy but to save." He was above all the Saviour, and it is in this title of Divine Saviour that the fullest explanation of His mission is contained. He was Divine; His mission also was Divine. He was sent to found a supernatural religion, to establish the Kingdom of God.

In His social labours, therefore, Christ sought to remodel society—in fact, to renew the face of the earth—by instilling into men's hearts eternal and divine principles. Revolutionary methods and the spirit of ungentleness, accordingly, found no place in His system. "The bruised reed He would not break, burning flax He would not extinguish." In all things He looked to the gradual and peaceful working out of evolutionary processes. Faced with the grave social wrongs of His day He seemed almost to ignore them, and was content to sow the seeds of principles which would eventually bring about a fuller and more lasting harvest. Society in His eyes was a living organization, which, however diseased, could still be cured. Though moribund it still lived

with the essential life of humanity. Accordingly He set Himself to resuscitate the life which was. He re-kindled the dying flame. He fanned it into a new life. "I am come," He said, addressing society as well as individuals, "that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly." And faithfully He fulfilled His word. He sowed the seed of His own life in the body of social corruption. He gave it a new power of re-birth and development. Christ was the first and greatest evolutionary in the history of the social reformation of the world.

Moreover, in the mind of Christ the ultimate solution of the social question depended on the establishment of a fundamental moral and religious order of society. It was only on such a foundation, truly laid, that the superstructure of society could be securely erected. What was that order? Was it Socialistic or Individualistic? It was neither the one nor the other; it combined and blended both. The Kingdom of God as preached by Christ implied a transcendent and universal order. It excluded all narrowness, embracing the one and the many, and gave due place to the particular rights of the individual as well as those of society. To begin with, Christ's plan conspicuously recognized the personality of the individual. A man's personality—his particular will, conscience, thought, spirit—is his highest possession. It is the supreme treasure committed to each by God, and for which each is immediately responsible to God alone. In its fulfilment lies the primary obligation of human life. "What doth it profit a man," says Christ, "if he gain the whole world, and suffer the loss

of his own soul? or what exchange shall a man give for his soul?" (Matt. xvi. 26). The first relation of the social order is therefore that of the individual to God. This is the supreme and direct relation of mankind and the source of the unity of the race. "No man liveth to himself, but all live to God in Christ" (*cf.* Rom. viii. ; 2 Cor. v. 15).

After this Divine relation comes the relation of man to man in the human family. This unity of brotherhood is founded in the unity of man with God. Because we are one with God, therefore are we one each with the other. The Fatherhood of God is at once the necessary cause and the only adequate explanation of the social doctrine of the brotherhood of man. In the due co-ordination of these two relations is contained the whole of Christ's social order.

The method employed by our Saviour to carry out His scheme was correspondingly interior and spiritual. He worked from the inside outward, and He looked to the quickening by grace of individual souls to bring about social as well as individual redemption. Such in brief was Christ's attitude to social questions.

The attitude of the Church must necessarily be the same as that of her Founder. Hence the following guiding principles of her policy may be asserted with confidence :

1. The Church's mission is pre-eminently spiritual. In all her works, her aims and methods must therefore assume a spiritual direction. She exists for the purpose of teaching the religion of the soul, and bringing the salvation of God through Christ to men. Her para-

mount duty is to keep open the road to and from the unseen world. Consequently her first concern is with the individual soul in its relation to God.

2. The Church as a whole is non-political. She neither defines the forms nor directs the actions of temporal governments. She cannot identify herself with any political party in the State, or commit herself to any particular programme of legislation or social reform. No body of politicians or statesmen, whether they be Conservative, Liberal, or Labour, can claim to have a monopoly of her approval or patronage. She is the friend of all, accepting whatever is good, and rejecting whatever is evil in their various systems.

3. Especially the Church cannot identify herself with Socialism, nor with any doctrine of society implying the predominant importance of materialistic aims and methods, and inculcating the destruction of individual freedom and the abolition of private property. In whatever social condition she exists she must ever hold to the doctrine of the complete subordination of the material and temporal to the spiritual and eternal, and to the sacredness and inviolability of natural rights.

4. And as the Church cannot coalesce with the extreme Collectivism of the Socialist school, so also she is debarred from allying herself with the extreme Individualism of the opposite Liberal school. For while by her doctrine of the sacredness of personality she is pledged to support individual freedom, she is equally bound, by the metaphor of the "one body," and by the fact of the incorporation of all her members in Christ, to uphold the wider claims of social justice and

charity, and to denounce unsparingly every anti-social doctrine of political economy which is based on purely selfish motives.

5. There are also many particular questions of right and justice on which her members are divided, and from which the Church holds aloof. Types of these questions are—the exact fixing of the limits of State intervention, the arrangements of just wages as between masters and servants, the determination of the relative value of different kinds of labour, and the precise apportioning of the rewards of industry to the various agents who conjointly produce it. In regard to such questions the Church has no immediate message, and she refuses to arbitrate.

6. On the other hand, the Church recognizes that she has clear and imperative duties towards society in regard to the general moral bearing of political and economical questions. Thus she accepts the responsibility of considering the general relation of the State to the individual, of capital to labour, of masters to servants, and of making definite pronouncements on such subjects, whenever justice or charity or the good of society requires it. In these and in all other questions of human actions which entail an immediate moral issue, the Church claims to be the ultimate authority to decide what is right and what is wrong.

How, both in theory and in practice, she meets the social questions of the day will be seen in the course of the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER XVI

CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGY

I.—THE ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY

SOCIOLOGY, or the science of society, is concerned with the study of the facts and causes, which constitute or are connected with man's relations to his fellows in social life, its ultimate purpose being the benefit of the individual and society. It takes a broad view of its subject, and also takes cognizance of details. Catholic Sociology is the same science viewed from the standpoint of Catholic teaching, and interpreted in the light of revealed religion. Its scope embraces special as well as general issues. For our present purpose it will be sufficient to consider the Church's teaching only in reference to primary and general conclusions. In this chapter we confine ourselves to the cause and nature of society.

What, according to the tenets of Catholic teaching, is society? And what is its efficient cause? Before giving the Church's answer to these questions it will be well to examine briefly the solutions offered by other prevalent systems. These may be divided into objective and subjective. The former, which derive their descent through Herbert Spencer from Comte, and are much

more widely diffused than the latter, represent the materialistic and evolutionary theory of society.

"Only when it is seen," writes Spencer, "that the transformations passed through during the growth, maturity, and decay of a society conform to the same principles as do the transformations passed through by aggregates of all orders, inorganic and organic; only when it is seen that the process is in all cases similarly determined by forces, and is not scientifically interpreted until it is expressed in terms of those forces, only then is there reached the conception of sociology as a science, in the full meaning of the word" ("The Study of Sociology," p. 325). In the light of this fundamental postulate the position of the dominant modern school is unmistakable. Rejecting the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the Schoolmen as pre-scientific and unworthy of serious notice, and excluding as well the action of a Creator as the determining cause of free-will, it confidently attributes all the various forms which human society assumes to the intervention of purely natural and physical forces. The constitutions and laws under which men live, their political, social, and religious ideas, are all as truly the results of the evolution of matter and force as are the various rock formations of the earth's surface. As Mr. Lester F. Ward, one of the leading English exponents of the system, writes: "In general it may be said that society as a whole, including all its structures and institutions, both general and special, constitutes a mechanism. The structures are not chaotic and haphazard, but symmetrical and

systematic. They conform to the universal law of evolution, which creates the spheres of space, and the adapted forms of organic life" ("Outlines of Sociology," p. 170, 1909). Thus the objective system reduces man and society to a cleverly devised mechanism produced by the necessary evolution of physical forces.

The subjective systems are based on the idealist theory of development. This theory, unlike that which we have just discussed, professes respect for the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. It interprets them, however, in a pantheistic sense. Christian idealism it ignores. Yet is it the antithesis of the mechanical theory. While that theory sees nothing in the universe but matter and force, this sees nothing in it but mind. The system starts by recognizing the true beginning of social science in the writings of Rousseau. Then it proceeds to develop and interpret them in accordance with the principles of Hegelian philosophy. T. H. Green, Bradley, Wallace, and Mr. B. Bosanquet are amongst the chief English exponents of the system. Let us trace the connection of ideas. According to the French philosopher, whose theory remains embodied in modern self-governing democracies, men met together and voluntarily surrendered into the hands of representatives chosen by themselves as much of their liberty as was necessary for the purpose of government. Subsequently, in obeying their representatives they only obeyed themselves. The paradox is evident, and is not denied. How can persons give up their liberty and obey themselves? Does not the idea of self-government imply a contradiction? But how are these

questions to be answered? The idealists endeavour to reply to them by having recourse to the Hegelian doctrine of identity. Conformably to this doctrine, Idea or Mind is the one universal and absolute Being. This Being, moreover, developing by a logical process, and ever expressing itself in new and more perfect forms, is the cause of all things, society not excepted. For since the modern democratic State is a fuller expression of freedom, it is, therefore, a simple result or manifestation of the development of the absolute mind. In the words of Hegel: "The State is the reality of the ethical idea, the reality of the substantial Will, the absolute end in itself, in which liberty attains its highest Right, which has supreme dominion over its members, whose highest duty it is to be members of the State. The State is Mind existing in the world, and realizing itself as sleeping Mind. The State is divine Will, as present Mind unfolding itself into the real and organic forms of the world" (Hegel's "Philosophy of Rights," §§ 257, 258). More simply and in plainer terms society or the State is the most perfect expression of the absolute Being. It is the highest incarnation of infinite Mind. It is God become conscious of Himself in it and in men. This theory amounts to the deification of the State.

Though too far fetched and too remote from the truth and common experience ever to become popular or generally accepted, Hegel's theory of development has, notwithstanding, exercised, and is exercising, a powerful influence on many acute minds. Especially has it weighed with the leaders of scientific Socialism.

Marx, Lassalle, and Mr. Belfort Bax are, as we have previously had occasion to point out, amongst the number of those who have derived inspiration from its source. Part of this influence, no doubt, is owing to the fact that the doctrine in question readily adapts itself to evolutionary theories—a capacity which has led many recent writers of either school to attempt to combine the two philosophies in spite of the inherent antithesis between them.

The two doctrines which we have been considering of evolution and development, taken together, constitute the chief motive which leads Socialists, and certain other types of radical reformers, to the common conviction that the present order of society is bound, sooner or later, to give place to a higher and better. But in reality they afford no foundation for any such belief, neither doctrine being in any true sense concerned with man's welfare or happiness, and both only professing to secure a greater efficiency of society, and this even at the expense of the well-being of its individual members. As Mr. Ramsay Macdonald puts it, the individual citizen is but "a humble organ in society, seeking place in service and wealth in sharing. . . ." "In fact," he proceeds to say, "disguise it from ourselves as we may, in our so-called practical moments, every conception of what so-called morality is—except neurotic and erotic whims like those of Nietzsche, or antiquated pre-scientific notions like those of the Charity Organization Society—assumes that the individual is embedded organically in his social medium, and that, therefore, the individual end can be gained only by promoting the

social end, that the individual is primarily a cell in the organism of his society: that he is not an absolute being, but one who develops best in relation to other beings, and who discovers the true meaning of his Ego only when he has discovered the oneness of society" ("Socialism and Society," p. 28, 1907).

The reducing of the individual to the condition of a mere cell in the organism of society by the Evolutionists, and the deifying of the State by the Idealists can only lead logically to one result—the re-establishment of ancient slavery on a new basis. The trend of modern social science is directly towards the "servile State."

In striking contrast to both the mechanical and the idealist system stands the intermediate doctrine of the Church. Man is not a machine, nor is he God. He is not merely material, nor yet merely spiritual. He is a rational creature of God, composed of body and soul. He is a free moral agent. Moreover, he is naturally social, requiring and seeking the help of others. To this end, and with the view of promoting his self-realization, he has, without surrendering any essential liberty, united himself with others in co-operation and fellowship. Thus, by a rational and free process, various societies, and eventually the State, came into being. And these societies arising from nature, of which God is the author, have Him for their founder. God is, therefore, the ultimate efficient cause of the State and its source of authority.

These ideas also serve to distinguish the true from the false in Rousseau's theory of "the sovereignty of the people." This trite formula admits of two interpreta-

tions. The first is, that the sovereign will in the State is the general will of the citizens ruling by a majority of votes. And this is the meaning which Rousseau intended. It is also the root principle of modern Liberal sociology. Starting from the false premises that all men are equal—that all are born free, that none can be compelled to obey, that society is the result of arbitrary convention—the French philosopher reaches the only conclusion to be logically drawn from his premises, that the ultimate authority must abide with the majority, and cannot be alienated from them. The people collectively, therefore, are always sovereign, and the Government to whom, for purposes of expediency, the administration is entrusted is merely a ministerial agency removable at the will of the people, and obliged in all things to fulfil their mandate. As Rousseau says: “It follows that the depositories of the executive power are not the masters of the people, but its officers; that the people can appoint them and dismiss them at pleasure; that for them it is not a question of contracting, but of obeying; and that in undertaking the functions which the State imposes on them, they simply fulfil their duty as citizens, without having in any way a right to discuss the conditions (“The Social Contract,” Bk. iii., Chap. xviii.).

This arbitrary method of converting the people, who possess only sovereignty, or the right to legislate, into the actual rulers of the State, “the Prince, or the magistrates,” is clearly a mere clumsy expedient to cover a defective theory. According to this theory, the only admissible polity is pure democracy. Now, such a

polity is impossible; for a people cannot be sovereign over itself. The truth of this in practice is admitted by Rousseau :

“Taking the term in its strict sense,” he writes, “there never has existed, and never will exist, any true democracy. It is contrary to the natural order that the majority should govern and that the minority should be governed. It is impossible to imagine that the people should remain in perpetual assembly to attend to public affairs, and it is easily apparent that commissions could not be established for that purpose without the form of administration being changed ” (“The Social Contract,” Bk. iii., Chap. iv.).

Therefore to meet this difficulty a theory is devised in accordance with which a fiction of government is set up whereby rulers are to be without power or freedom, and subjects alone sovereign: “The difficulty is to understand how there can be an act of government before the government exists, and how the people who are only sovereign or subjects can, in certain circumstances, become the Prince or the magistrates.

“Here, however, is disclosed one of those astonishing properties of the body politic, by which it reconciles operations apparently contradictory; for this is effected by a sudden conversion of sovereignty into democracy in such a manner that, without any perceptible change, and merely by a new relation of all to all, the citizens, having become magistrates, pass from general acts to particular acts, and from the law to the execution of it ” (“The Social Contract,” Bk. iii., Chap. xvii.).

Such an inversion of established ideas, however

brilliant in conception, is in reality little less than a parody on reason, and an outrage on the intelligence of mankind.

Catholic sociology condemns the entire theory as an attempt to substitute for the true basis of society—namely, the unchangeable will of God—the unreal foundation of the changing wills of men. That this theory if reduced to practice would destroy the stability and permanence of States is evident, and requires no further discussion.

The second interpretation of the formula is that of the Church. It is that “the sovereignty of the people” is, in practice, a sovereignty not of right, but of fact. Its exercise begins and ends with the fact of their choice. God, the Author of Nature, having decreed organized society, yet without determining the particular form of government, or defining the persons in whom the power of the State should be vested, has left to the citizens a limited freedom of choice in regard to these matters. They may not retain the sovereignty; they are bound to transfer it, or, more correctly, to designate the subject or subjects upon whom God confers it. Yet they are free to select any suitable form of government. In fulfilling this function they exercise sovereignty. Further, it is within their competence to set up a democracy and to retain in their own hands a large measure of rule. And this form of popular sovereignty is not only legitimate, but it is also capable of becoming highly efficient. But whatever the form of government, and whether it be shared by the few or by the many, provided it represents an established order, its power

to compel obedience arises, not out of the consent of the wills of the citizens who previously formed it, and now represent or obey it, but out of the will of God—the sole origin and source of all authority.

As St. Thomas teaches, the natural law requires society, and requires society so to organize itself as to secure its common good in a sufficient degree. But this requires a ruling power, a sovereign in the full sense of the word, distinct from the multitude (*cf.* “*De Regimine Principum*,” Lib. I., Cap. i.).

And this teaching is borne out by history and experience. Only small and rude tribes can exist without a fixed government by means of recourse to emergency leaders, chosen just to tide over a difficulty and then to retire. Moreover, no collective body can govern itself. Travellers still tell of peoples existing without government, and of the old German tribes of his day, Cæsar’s report is that they federated only to meet a danger or to carry on aggression. Then, out of an inchoate polity, a full one was later developed. To quote Professor Sidgwick: “Cæsar tells us that in his time the German tribes (*civitates*) had common chiefs only in time of war: in peace the smaller divisions (*regiones, pagi*) had separate chiefs, who administered justice and composed differences. And for this condition of things analogies are easily found in all parts of the world” (“*The Development of Human Polity*,” p. 45; *cf.*, also, Spencer’s “*Political Institutions*,” p. 451). Tacitus, some years later, speaks of the Germans having a more permanent unity. These examples are only cited to indicate the need of settled governments in civilized States.

The rational doctrine of the Church which we have been considering is clearly and concisely summarized by Pope Leo XIII., in the words of the "Immortale Dei," thus:

"Man's natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties. Hence it is divinely ordained that he should have his life—be it family, social, or civil—with his fellow-men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied. But as no society can hold together unless some one be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in Nature, and has, consequently, God for its Author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God. For God alone is the true and supreme Lord of the world. Everything, without exception, must be subject to Him, and must serve Him, so that whosoever holds the right to govern, holds it from one sole and single source—namely, God, the Sovereign Ruler of all.

"The right to rule is not necessarily, however, bound up with any special mode of government. It may take up this or that form, provided only that it be of a nature to insure the general welfare. But whatever be the nature of the government, rulers must ever bear in mind that God is paramount ruler of the world, and must set Him before themselves as their exemplar and law in the administration of the State" ("The Pope and the People," C.T.S., pp. 67-68).

The binding force of society, therefore, consists, not in any material cohesion of independent atoms, nor in any compact or agreement amongst men, but in a separate, superior, and Divine principle, the eternal law revealed through man's nature. This supreme force, compelling men to combine in society for their own good, also imposes on them social obligations which it is the duty of organized society, or the State, to enforce.

CHAPTER XVII

CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGY

II.—RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE STATE

THE State is civil society in act, and its end that for which civil society exists. As the product of individual requirements, its destiny is to satisfy these as far as justice and human possibility allow. And since man's complete end in the Christian economy is supernatural as well as natural, the duty of the Christian State is to endeavour to meet both, directly promoting the natural and indirectly facilitating the supernatural. In developing its activities, accordingly, the State must take account of these two objects, and formulate its rights and duties on the basis of a due adjustment of the autonomy of its individual members with its own civil supremacy as the natural head of the whole organism.

Concerning the particular extent and limitations of the State's right of intervention in the political and economic matters which affect the individual, the principles of Catholic sociology are clear and explicit. They also follow logically from the preceding doctrine. Thus, since organized society, or the State, is the immediate result of its separate members instinctively seeking their own advantage, its direct purpose must

be to serve, not so much the collective interest of all taken together, but rather the individual interests of each. In other words, the object of the State is not to serve itself, but to help and protect the natural rights of the individuals, from whom and by whom alone it exists. For this reason its end is described as being the common, as opposed to the public, good. To understand the force of this discrimination or distinction of meaning, the following consideration should be borne in mind: Society, or the State, being a moral body, and existing only by its component parts, is incapable of having its end in itself or of enjoying any good independently of its members. Its only true end consists in the social good accruing to all its members. Now, this is precisely what is meant by the common good, for it represents the sum total of advantages arising from association, and consequently attaching to all members of society. This common good can never be opposed to the real good of individuals, nor can it differ from it in kind. It is properly its crowning perfection. The public good is something very different. It consists in the well-being of the collective body as a whole, and can exist even when the good of individuals is sacrificed. The public good is attained when the nation is prosperous; the common good, only when the people are happy. The public good can survive under oppression; the common good can exist only in an atmosphere of justice and freedom.

That the common good, as distinguished from the public good, is the object of society, is expressly stated by Leo XIII. The Pope writes: "Government should

moreover be administered for the well-being of the citizens, because they who govern others possess authority solely for the welfare of the State. Furthermore, the civil power must not be subservient to the advantage of any one individual or of some few persons, inasmuch as it was established for the common good of all" ("Immortale Dei"; "The Pope and the People," C.T.S., p. 68).

Therefore it follows that if the State, instead of helping, injures any single one of its individual members, or, disregarding the common good, seeks to promote the so-called public good—as by unduly assisting the wealthiest and most powerful for the benefit of the whole—it acts against its natural office and violates social justice. All social legislation, moreover, that attempts to seize for the community and administer independently of private owners the means of production, distribution, and exchange, under whatsoever pretext of philanthropy or humanity, is likewise condemned by this doctrine. At the same time, it should be stated that society has a special duty to protect and assist its poorer and weaker members, who are to be found for the most part in the wage-earning classes. This duty follows directly from the principle of the common good, which obliges Governments to make a greater effort where the need is greater. As the Pope says in the Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*": "Rights must be religiously respected wherever they exist; and it is the duty of the public authority to prevent and punish injury, and to protect everyone in the possession of his own. Still, when there is question

of defending the rights of individuals, the poor and helpless have a claim to especial consideration. The richer class have many ways of shielding themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State ; whereas those who are badly off have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance of the State. And it is for this reason that wage-earners, who are undoubtedly among the weak and necessitous, should be specially cared for and protected by the Government " (" The Pope and the People," C.T.S., p. 29).

The teaching of Catholic sociology, so far as it is concerned with adjusting individual liberty to the rights of the State, and fixing the limits of legislation, may, accordingly, be summarized as follows :

1. Civil society, existing only for its individual members, has for its single purpose to help and protect them in the free exercise of their natural activities.

2. The civil power ought, therefore, to remove and guard against obstacles calculated to hinder such freedom of action as hostile invasion, internal dissensions, private wrongs, and the like. In so doing, it must be careful not to replace these by other impediments of its own creation, such as excessive military burdens or over-taxation.

3. The civil power shall further positively promote the common good by assisting and encouraging useful individual effort, whether isolated or combined. In discharging this function it must take care to supplement, not to supplant, personal enterprise.

4. In the interest of the common welfare the State is therefore obliged :

(a) To initiate or carry on public works which private enterprise is incapable, either of starting, or of conducting in a satisfactory manner. Examples of works which might come within this category are: The making of wars and treaties with foreign countries; the construction or improvement of ports and canals; the promotion of public instruction; the creation of official organizations; the establishment on a large scale of the means of transport, and the working of railways, mines, and important factories.

(b) To subsidize individual and associated enterprises redounding to the general welfare, and to stimulate personal effort by suitable rewards and distinctions.

(c) Consequently to determine the natural rights and duties of the citizens, and to distribute equitably amongst them the financial and other burdens which are necessary for the public service.

Such is a simple statement of the Catholic theory of State intervention in general. In applying it, however, various circumstances require to be taken into account. In particular due regard must be given to the natural character and the kind and degree of civilization of each nation, and to the quality and political form of its government. Thus, a country possessed of great industrial enterprise, rich in internal resources, and having a highly developed civilization, requires less protective legislation, and should be given freer scope for its activities than a backward and poor country with little power of initiative. To less skilful and upright rulers also a less measure of intervention should be allowed. In the same way the more or less stable political form

of government, monarchical or democratical, and its degree of independence of party and popular passions, are factors in determining the amount of influence which should be allotted to the public authority.

Furthermore, the doctrine we have just considered has a special application to private associations and to the family.

As the State represents the association of citizens in the things and aims which are common to all the men who compose it, so private associations exhibit the ends and aims which do not embrace all the citizens, but are common to some of them. Consequently, within the larger public organization of the State, there always exists a number of smaller societies for the attainment of private objects. And as far as such societies correspond to certain human needs, they are, like public society, natural to man, and he has a natural right to form them. Accordingly:

1. The State has no authority to forbid or oppose the formation of private associations for private advantage so long as these associations are nowise contrary to the common good, and are blameless in their objects and methods. As the Pope says in the Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*": "Private societies, then, although they exist within the State, and are severally part of the State, cannot, nevertheless, be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by the State. For to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State is bound to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and if it forbid its citizens to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence, for both

they and it exist in virtue of the like principle—namely, the natural tendency of man to dwell in society” (“The Pope and the People,” pp. 39-40).

2. Besides these negative duties in regard to private associations, the State has the positive obligation of facilitating their formation and of respecting and protecting their rights. In the words of the same Encyclical: “Let the State watch over these societies of citizens banded together for the exercise of their rights, but let it not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their organization, for things move and live by the spirit inspiring them, and may be killed by the rough grasp of a hand from without” (*ibid.*, p. 43).

Trades Unions, or organizations of workmen, to secure mutual insurance and better conditions of employment, are examples of associations which the State may rightly be called upon to tolerate and approve. These societies, as a rule, are wholly unobjectionable in their aims and constitutions. They have, moreover, long since justified their existence by their economic results.

There are, however, certain methods and practices of Trades Unionism which are open to question on moral grounds. Of these the “strike” is the most important. The exercise of this method is sometimes associated with breaking of contracts, acts of violence, terrorism, and various attempts against public and private security. As far as the strike adopts these abuses, it ceases to have moral justification. But apart from such excesses, strikes, however deplorable in themselves, and in many of their consequences, cannot be wholly condemned or

repressed. For in the existing conditions of free contract between employers and employed, and the absence of all Government power of compulsory arbitration, the strike or combined cessation from work of the workers is not unfrequently their only effective means of urging their claims to fair treatment. In these circumstances, the right to strike after due notice cannot be denied to organized labour. Yet in every case the strike should be regarded as an extreme method only to be resorted to when all other methods have failed. In brief, the conditions rendering a strike morally lawful are: first, a real industrial grievance which cannot be redressed by peaceful means; secondly, a reasonable hope of success; and, finally, the benefit aimed at must be calculated to outweigh the harm likely to result from the strike.

The "sympathetic" strike, which consists in workers who have no personal grievance ceasing from work in order to assist others who have a grievance, is of far more doubtful morality. This form of strike may be set in motion by a body of workers either against a common employer, who is responsible for the dispute in question, or it may be used by workmen against an employer not their own, who has no direct concern in the quarrel. In the first case, the sympathetic action taken by the unaggrieved workers, if it conduces to compel the employer to desist from injuring their fellows, is not necessarily unjust or unreasonable. It may even be demanded by justice and charity. In the second case, when the strike is against another employer who has no connection with the original dispute, the

action of such strikers rarely, and then only in flagrant and extreme cases, admits of serious justification.

The extension of the principle of the sympathetic strike to the boycott of all employers is even less permissible. And though speculative arguments may be adduced in favour of the general strike, in practice it is indefensible. The possible benefits to labour from such a strike are wholly disproportionate to the social disorder and anarchy which it involves. The interests and rights of the community are above the interests and rights of a class, and war against society by a section of society can never be tolerated.

On the cause of strikes and their remedy the Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*" appositely declares:

"When workpeople have recourse to a strike, it is frequently because the hours of labour are too long, or the work too hard, or because they consider their wages insufficient. The grave inconvenience of this not uncommon occurrence should be obviated by public remedial measures; for such paralyzing of labour not only affects the masters and their workpeople alike, but is extremely injurious to trade and to the general interests of the public; moreover, on such occasions violence and disorder are generally not far distant, and thus it frequently happens that the public peace is imperilled. The laws should forestall and prevent such troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed" ("*The Pope and the People*," pp. 30-31).

Concerning the autonomy of the family, and the

special consideration due to the domestic relation, the Pope goes on to speak in his letter as follows: "A family, no less than a State, is, as we have said, a true society, governed by a power within its sphere—that is to say, by the father. Provided, therefore, the limits which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists be not transgressed, the family has at least equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of the things needful to its preservation and its just liberty.

"We say at least equal rights; for inasmuch as the domestic household is antecedent, as well in idea as in fact, to the gathering of men into community, the family must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the community, and founded more immediately on nature.

"The contention, then, that the civil Government should at its option intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family and the household is a great and pernicious error. True, if a family finds itself in exceeding distress, utterly deprived of the counsel of friends and without any prospect of extricating itself, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid, since each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the precincts of the household there occurs great disturbance of mutual rights, public authority should intervene to force each party to yield to the other its proper due; for this is not to deprive citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the State must go no further; here nature bids them stop" ("The Pope and the People," pp. 9, 10).

This doctrine strikes at the roots of the doctrine of the absolute and sole right of the State as taught by Liberals and Socialists.

Side by side with the temporal State, and ruling over the same subjects, is the spiritual society of the Catholic Church. The two societies are complete in themselves, and within their own spheres sovereignly independent. These spheres or regions of direct action are clearly defined for them by their proper objects. The immediate object of the State is to help man to attain happiness in this life; the object of the Church is to enable him, by subordinating the present to the future, to secure it everlastingly in the next. The two objects, far from opposing, should serve to support and complete each other, and taken together, open out a large field of influence for both the Church and the State. But, to prevent misunderstandings in practice, the mutual relations between these two powers must be carefully and accurately understood and defined.

A clear statement of the general doctrine is set forth in the "Immortale Dei" thus: "The Almighty, therefore, has appointed the charge of the human race between two powers—the ecclesiastical and the civil—the one being set over Divine, and the other over human, things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits within which it is contained—limits which are defined by the nature and special object of the province of each, so that there is, we may say, an orbit traced out within which the action of each is brought into play by its own native right. But inasmuch as each of these two powers has authority over the same

subjects, and as it might come to pass that one and the same thing—related differently, but still remaining one and the same thing—might belong to the jurisdiction and determination of both, therefore God, Who foresees all things, and Who is the Author of these two powers, has marked out the course of each in right correlation to the other. . . . There must exist, therefore, between these powers a certain orderly connection, which may be compared to the union of the soul and body in man. The nature and scope of that connection can be determined only, as we have laid down, by having regard to the nature of each power, and by taking into account the relative excellence and nobleness of its purpose. One of the two has for its proximate and chief object the well-being of this mortal life ; the other, the everlasting joys of heaven. Whatever, therefore, in things human is of a sacred character, whatever belongs, either of its own nature or by reason of the end to which it is referred, to the salvation of souls or to the worship of God, is subject to the power and judgment of the Church. Whatever is to be ranged under the civil and political order is rightly subject to the civil authority” (“The Pope and the People,” pp. 74-76).

These are the chief principles on which the Church relies for maintaining the true balance between the essential civil and religious liberty of the subject, and the integrity and stability of the governing authority.

For the securing of economic freedom, also, the Church is not without definite guiding principles, as her doctrine on the subject of Capital and Labour will show.

CHAPTER XVIII

CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGY

III.—LAND, CAPITAL, AND LABOUR

ALL economic theory is concerned, either directly or indirectly, with the laws which regulate wealth, its production, and distribution. And since some portion of wealth is necessary for the preservation, as well as for the development of man's life in society, it is easy to gauge the social importance of these laws and their bearing on civilization and freedom. The study of wealth clearly cannot be confined to the narrow circle of material well-being. Its scope necessarily embraces wider interests. The end of economics is, in fact, eminently practical and far-reaching. It is to secure for men, who live together in society, an abundance of riches, yet in such measure and by such means that these riches may not prejudice, but rather promote their moral and spiritual welfare.

What, then, is meant by wealth? The common idea of wealth is so simple that it is rarely submitted to analysis or definition. But its conception by economists is, on the contrary, complex and various. Some authorities place its foundation in exchange value, asserting that only those things which have the capacity of being exchanged for other useful things are

wealth. Adam Smith, J. B. Say, and Ricardo taught this doctrine. Other writers, as we think with more reason, identify wealth with utility, and define it as "all that which serves to satisfy human needs." Others, again, stipulate that material and appropriable goods alone constitute wealth, and these only when they are found in considerable quantity. Without discussing the merits of these various opinions, it will be sufficient for our purpose to understand wealth in the general sense of "an abundance of useful material commodities."

So understood, wealth is produced by three principal factors—Land, Capital, and Labour. By land, in this sense, is understood the material forces of Nature and the subject in which these forces reside. By capital we mean that portion of wealth which is set aside for the production of further wealth. It may also be described as the means or instruments of production. Labour is human energy applied to the material world for the purpose of transforming it into a condition in which it will subserve man's needs, and so supply him with wealth.

The great weakness of modern capitalism is that it has divided society into two antagonist classes—the class of the independent few who possess capital and in whose hands riches are increasingly concentrating, and the large and growing class of the proletariat, politically free, but dispossessed of the means of production, and dependent on capitalist employment and the labour of their hands for a living. The political equality of these economically unequal classes only

tends to emphasize the disparity between them. As a necessary consequence, we have the existing state of unstable equilibrium of modern society which threatens our civilization with dire catastrophe.

To remedy the danger alluded to is the most important and most urgent of industrial problems. The solution which Socialism offers is that of doing away with private ownership and investing all property as a trust in the hands of the State, to be used by political officers for the good of the community. The principle underlying this solution is that the possession of private capital is wrong in itself, and a robbery of wages. As we have shown, the Collectivist scheme necessarily leads in the end to compulsory labour and to economic slavery. The other schemes of social reform, while resting on a general basis of a wider distribution of wealth, recognize the necessity and advantages of private property. These schemes have in common the object of securing a sufficiency for all through a more equitable distribution of wealth. But apart from this, they differ widely in their plans and principles. A danger involved in many of them is, that while they relieve the immediate needs of the proletarian, and lessen his insecurity, they do this at the cost of curtailing his liberty, and increasing his dependence on the capitalist master. The Employers' Liability Act, and the recent Insurance Act, though bringing undoubted benefits to the workers, are not without these dangers.

The aim of Catholic sociology is to combine sufficiency and security with the fullest possible liberty. And as the best means of attaining this desirable end,

it advocates a system of moderate but extensive ownership of capital, especially of land. Of the social functions and advantages of such ownership Pope Leo XIII., in his Encyclical "Rerum Novarum," on the Condition of the Working Classes, writes as follows :

"We have seen that this great Labour Question cannot be solved unless we assume as a principle that private ownership must be held sacred and inviolable. The laws, therefore, ought to favour this right and to encourage as many as possible to become owners.

"Many advantages will follow from this; and first of all, a more equal division of national wealth. Revolutions have divided society into two castes, differing widely from each other. On the one side there is the party which holds power because it holds wealth, which has in its grasp the whole of production and trade, exhausts all the sources of wealth, and exercises great influence on the affairs of the State. On the other side, there is the needy and powerless multitude, depressed and suffering, and ever ready for disturbance. Now, if this multitude were encouraged to industry by the hope of obtaining some share in the land, the consequence would be that the gulf between enormous wealth and extreme poverty would be bridged over, and the respective classes would be brought nearer to one another.

"Moreover, there would be a more abundant supply of the fruits of the earth. Men always work harder and more willingly when they are conscious of working on their own ground; and they learn to love the soil

which yields in response to the labour of their hands, not only food, but an abundance of good things for themselves and their families. That such a spirit of willing labour would tend to increase the produce of the land and the wealth of the nation is easily understood.

“Another advantage would also follow—increased patriotism and love of country. Men would not change their native country for a foreign one, if their own enabled them to live a tolerable life.”

Pope Leo XIII. in proclaiming these principles has only reaffirmed six hundred years later the doctrine established by St. Thomas, in accordance with which sovereign and exclusive ownership of all things belongs alone to the Creator. But since Divine Providence has ordained that these things were made for man's support, man has been granted a natural right to use them. This natural right does not constitute a true and complete proprietorship, but only a limited usufructuary right in the exercise of which man is strictly bound to respect the Divine order and plan.

Man's right of ownership is, therefore, nothing but a right conceded to him by God to use the goods of the earth according to the purpose assigned to them by their Creator.

Now, this Divine arrangement can conceivably be followed out in one or other of the two following ways. Either men can exercise their usufructuary right as a common liberty collectively administering and dividing all goods and profits in common; or they can manage and possess them privately, each having separate

property rights over a particular portion. The question arises which of these two plans is in reality more advantageous for the human race? In examining and deciding this question St. Thomas distinguishes two elements in the usufructuary right of property. The first is the right of its administration or management; the second is the right of the enjoyment of profits. In regard to the first, St. Thomas favours individual proprietary right, justifying it by the economic theory based on the natural law, as outlined by Aristotle (*cf.* "Politics," II., chap. ii.).

Private property, according to St. Thomas, is necessary to human life for three reasons: "First, because every one is more careful to look after what belongs to himself alone than after what is common to all or to many, since all men shun labour, and leave to others what is matter of joint concern, as happens when there are too many servants; secondly, because human affairs are more orderly handled if on each individual there rests his own care of managing something, whereas there would be nothing but confusion if everyone without distinction were to have the disposal of anything he chose to take in hand; thirdly, because by this means society is the rather kept at peace, every member being content with his own possession: whence we see that among those who hold anything in common and undivided ownership, strifes not unfrequently arise" ("Summa Theologica," 2^a 2^æ, Quæst. 66, Art. 2).

With such irrefragable arguments St. Thomas upholds the right of private property against Communists and Socialists as far as the care and management of goods

is concerned. But in regard to the enjoyment of the fruits or profits of such administration he lays down a quite opposite principle, which combats the false doctrine of individual right that "each can do as he likes with his own." "Man," he declares, "can never look on the fruits of wealth as his exclusive property, but as the common property of all, and should therefore be ready to share them with others in their need." (*ibid.*, Quæst. 66, Arts. 1, 2).

God created natural wealth for the support and nourishment of all. Hence to assist in reaching this end each should put the fruits of his property, as far as possible, at the disposition of all.

Let us now pass on to wages, which are directly connected with capital and labour, being, in fact, the ordinary mode of union between them. Wages are the workman's share in the fruits of production, to which he has contributed by his labour. Workmen are not in a position to be able to wait for the sale of their produce nor to run the risks which the uncertainty of the market involves. It is, therefore, to their advantage to bargain with a master or capitalist for a specified recompense for their work. This remuneration, usually in money, is known as wages, and the contract by which the worker acquires a full right to his work is known as the "contract of labour," or the "wages contract." Socialists maintain that the workman has a further right to a share in the profits. But this claim is readily refuted. The workman, in exchange for wages, transfers to the master the full dominion of the labour energy that he has to dispose of. Consequently, he renounces all the useful

results of his labour, and all share in its profits. These, henceforth, belong exclusively to the employer. Moreover, if the Socialist contention be granted, then justice demands that a right in respect of the workman's wages, similar to that claimed for the workman in respect of the employer's profits, should be allowed to the employer ; and, therefore, should a loss be incurred on an enterprise, the employer would be entitled to obtain compensation by way of deduction of wages.

It is unnecessary to state that no opinion adverse to the system of profit-sharing by agreement, which, in certain industries, is said to produce highly satisfactory results for employers and employed, is here expressed.

The real problem with which we are concerned is to ascertain the actual amount of payment which, in accordance with a just wages system, ought to be made to the workman ; and this question can only be solved by a proper understanding of the true idea of labour and of the essence of the wages contract.

The crying error of the classical economic school was to regard labour as an ordinary mercantile commodity, the price of which was determined solely by free competition according to the law of supply and demand.

"Labour," wrote Ricardo, "like all other things that are bought and sold, and whose quantity may increase or diminish, has its natural price and its current price. The natural price of labour is that which is indispensable to the workmen generally for their subsistence and for the perpetuation of the species. The current price is the price really paid, as the natural effect of the relation between demand and supply, labour being dearer when

there are few workmen, and cheaper when there are many." Then, without questioning the injustice of the falling of the current price below the natural price, he is content simply to state that a readjustment will be brought about in the end on account of the tendency of the value of all prices to return to the normal (*cf.* "Principles of Political Economy," Chap. v.). The natural price is therefore not a rule which should govern the contract of labour, but only a centre about which pendulum-like it moves to and fro. Ricardo's view was shared by Malthus, J. B. Say, and most of the writers of the "classical school," with the exception, however, of its founder, Adam Smith, whose doctrine of wages, as we shall see, is in full harmony with Catholic teaching. Further, the common view of this school, which has, to a greater or less extent, continued to prevail in practice, is still supported by a not unimportant section of modern Liberal economists, amongst whom may be mentioned Joseph Garnier, Léon Say, Maurice Block, and Yves Guyot.

Directly opposed to the extravagant theory we have just described, is the economic doctrine of the Catholic Church. This teaching does not attempt to deny that the law of supply and demand reacts on the wages rate. It admits the truth of Cobden's statement that "when two masters require a workman, wages rise; when two workmen require a master, they fall." But it denies that this is the absolute modifying law of wages. It avers that other factors, such as the productivity of labour, custom, and, above all, natural justice, must be considered.

The basis of the Catholic theory of wages is the principle that labour is not to be regarded as an ordinary commodity, or as merchandise in the proper sense of the word. Thus merchandise for the most part is simply considered in itself and without any reference to the producer, purchasers ordinarily buying articles and paying a certain price for them, because of their desirability or usefulness, and without feeling under any obligation to consider the persons or needs of those who produced them. But the case of labour is different. Labour is the exercise of moral and intelligent muscular effort. It is the immediate result of human action. Therefore it bears the stamp of personality, and can never be likened to the merely material values of ordinary mercantile commodities. And for these reasons the wages contract differs essentially from every other form of contract of sale or hire of a thing. The contract of labour in reality resolves itself into a loan of personal service, in return for which wages are given, not as a price, but as remuneration or recompense. It is true that the workman provides the employer with an economic good ; but this material element is inseparable from the personal and moral element involved in the human force which the workman exerts. It is by reason of the combination of these two elements that, though the contract of labour is a virtual exchange, and as such is subject to the rules of commercial justice, it is yet raised immensely above ordinary commercial bargains, and necessitates that the fullest recognition be given to the personal rights and requirements of the individual workman. On this subject the Pope speaks with admirable clearness in

the Encyclical "Rerum Novarum." After referring to the opinion which abandons everything to free competition between the labourer and the capitalist, he says :

"This mode of reasoning, to a fair-minded man, is by no means convincing, for there are important considerations which it altogether leaves out of account. To labour is to exert oneself in order to provide for the wants of life, and especially for its preservation. 'In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread.' Human labour has, therefore, two characteristics impressed on it by Nature. First, it is *personal*, because the active power belongs to him by whom it is exercised, and for whose advantage it has been given. Secondly, such labour is *necessary*, for without the result of labour a man cannot live ; and self-preservation is an indispensable duty imposed by Nature. Now, if we consider labour only inasmuch as it is personal, there is no doubt that the workman can agree to a payment lower than is just, for, as he is free to work or not, so is he free to accept small wages or even none at all. But far differently must we judge when account is made not only of *personality*, but also of *necessity* : two things separable in thought, but not in reality. The preservation of life is a duty, in which no one can fail without crime. Hence follows, as a necessary consequence, the right of procuring what is required in order to live, which poor people can procure in no other way than through work and wages.

"Let it be granted that a workman and employer should, as a rule, make free arrangements, and in

particular should agree freely as to the amount of wages; nevertheless, there always underlies the contract an element of natural justice, anterior and superior to the will of the parties, and it is that the remuneration should not be less than is required for the support of the workman in frugal and decent comfort. If, through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman agrees to harder conditions, which, being imposed by the employer or contractor, must willingly or unwillingly be accepted, this is to suffer violence, against which justice protests."

The Pope elsewhere shows that since the labourer is a man, his wages ought to be sufficient to support, not merely the animal life of a beast, but the rational life of a human being, who has duties of improvement towards himself, and of worship towards his Creator. Thus, in the Encyclical "Graves de Communi," in which the Pope explains the object of Christian Democracy, he says of workmen: "That at home and in public they may be able freely to comply with their moral and religious duties; that they may feel themselves not to be beasts of burden, but men; not pagans, but Christians; and that they may thus more easily and earnestly devote themselves to the attainment of the *one thing necessary*—the final good for which we came into the world."

The minimum of wages which is required for the support of a frugal and well-conducted workman, and below which neither the labourer nor the employer can go without offending natural justice, is known as the "personal living wage." The "family living wage" is

that which is sufficient for the support of the workman's family as well. And here the question arises: "Ought the consideration of the family to enter into the determination of wages?" Nearly all Catholic economists agree that it should, but they are not united in assigning the grounds of their decision. Liberatore, Steccanella, Pottier, Vermeersche, Lehmkuhl, Verhaegen, and others of great weight, maintain that family wages are due by strict natural justice, just in the same way as we have seen personal subsistence wages to be due. Others, with Antoine, De Gryse, and Talanes, attribute the right to such wages to social or legal justice. And some few even maintain that they are only a matter of charity. The question is also left undecided by the Encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*," which only once, and then incidentally in connection with thrift, makes mention of "family wages." Accordingly it may be regarded speculatively, as an open question on which Catholics are free to hold different opinions. In practice, however, Christian Democracy has adopted the view that "family wages" are due in justice, the Catholic Congress of Social Studies held in 1891 having solemnly proclaimed the natural right of the workman to them.

Adam Smith's view, as we have just said, is in accordance with the foregoing. He writes:

"There is, however, a certain rate, below which it seems impossible to reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages even of the lowest species of labour. . . . A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be sufficient to maintain

him. They must even, upon occasions, be somewhat more: otherwise it would be impossible for him to bring up a family. . . ." And farther on he adds: "Thus far at least seems certain, that, in order to bring up a family, the labour of the husband and wife together must, even in the lowest species of common labour, be able to earn something more than what is precisely necessary for their own maintenance" ("Wealth of Nations," Bk. i., Chap. viii.).

In connection with the question of the living wage a difficulty has been raised in the following form: A master employs a hundred men in his factory at a fair wage, but owing to circumstances he finds himself unable, except at a loss, to continue their services at a living wage. What ought he to do? Should he dismiss the men against their will, and send them to swell the ranks of the unemployed, or keep them from starvation by allowing them to continue to work at a considerably reduced rate? The answer is clear. No one is bound to the impossible, and half a loaf is better than no bread. Moreover, all abstract rights, as well as duties, are conditioned by circumstances; and between necessary evils arising from conflicting claims, the lesser should be preferred to the greater. In fine, cases of this sort are quite exceptional, and coming under charity rather than justice, serve only to prove, and by no means contradict, the rule.

These are some guiding principles of Christian Democracy. We have next to see how they are being applied by the Church in the actual movement of to-day.

CHAPTER XIX

THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN THE CHURCH

IN the growing struggle between Capital and Labour which marked the beginning of the nineteenth century, duty and interest combined to compel the Catholic Church to intervene. For though the immediate issues were economic, they really involved religion. Moral principles were contested. The authority of the Church was challenged. The life of the people was at stake. The claim of the Church to be the living teacher of vital Christianity was put to the test. Silence on her part could only have been construed as a neglect of duty and a confession of weakness. Accordingly she replied. Her answer to the challenge of the times was the modern Catholic social movement, voicing her ancient teaching, and applying old remedies to the new conditions of modern industrialism.

As we saw in the opening chapter of this book, the new movement began tentatively in France by an early but unsuccessful attempt on the part of the de Lamennais and *L'Avenir* school to harmonize Catholic and Labour ideas. Notwithstanding the condemnation of this school, its work was continued for a time by the Democratic party that sprang from it, and which strove hard to reorganize France on a basis at once economic

and Christian. The party, whose organ was *L'Ère Nouvelle*, and whose membership comprised Lacordaire, Ozanam, Maret, de Caux, and other prominent ecclesiastics and laymen, did much to prepare the way for a better understanding between the Church and Democracy. But owing to the alarming spread of Socialism in France, and to the Collectivist tendencies of some members of the party, its efforts failed to achieve any immediate success, and the movement as a whole came to an abortive conclusion. For some time a suspicion existed of an alliance in some form between it and Socialism. Consequently, when Socialism was condemned by Pius IX. in 1848, this first attempt at agitation in France quickly succumbed.

But though the national movement perished, its principles survived and reappeared in the wider international movement which shortly replaced it. It is this latest development of democratic activity in the Church which, growing in importance through the second half of the nineteenth century, and attaining towards its close, through the publication of the encyclical "*Rerum Novarum*" (1891), to a strong and permanent position—it is this which properly deserves to be known as the Catholic Social movement. The practical influence of the new movement was secured from the first by the favourable circumstances under which it came into existence. Liberalism had created the social crisis in all its gravity, and Socialism presented itself as the cure. But to all who valued religion and liberty, the remedy appeared even worse than the disease. The Catholic Church then came forward and proclaimed herself

what she had always been, the protector of the weak and the down-trodden, the champion of right and the upholder of justice. From the commencement the cause gathered round it illustrious leaders in the different countries, who spared no pains in studying the industrial problems of the time, and in endeavouring to meet them with suitable schemes of Christian social reform. It also attracted an increasing number of loyal and enthusiastic adherents. Amongst them, however, two distinct schools of opinion developed, which at one time threatened the movement with disaster, and which are still a source of danger.

The two schools agreed in basing their deductions on the truths of supernatural revelation and natural philosophy as taught by the Church. They further agreed in maintaining an intermediate position between economic Liberalism on the one hand, and Socialism on the other. They concurred in rejecting the errors of both systems. But beyond this sphere of agreement in essentials there was little or no common ground between them. The technical position hence arising may be resumed thus: As against the Liberals who excluded authority, and the Socialists who excluded liberty, the Catholics agreed in accepting both, and blending therewith the Christian virtues of justice and charity. But as amongst themselves, there was a distinct cleavage of tendencies, some inclining to give the larger place to freedom and individual initiative, others to collective authority and State intervention. In this way the movement practically resolved itself into two sections, which came to be known respectively as the Conserva-

tive and the Reforming or Democratic group. The Conservative group, favouring the display of free initiative, was so named because its members were tenacious of maintaining the existing order of things. The Reforming or Democratic group, approving rather the intervention of social authority, owed its title, on the contrary, to the fact that its members opposed the present social and economic system, which they judged ought to be reformed and re-established on a new and popular basis.

Consistently with their names and principles these two groups also differed widely in the causes and remedies they assigned to the many and grave social evils which both alike recognized, and seriously desired to combat. According to the Conservatives, the causes in question were not immediately bound up with the present system. That system, as being the outcome and visible expression of personal and economic liberty, was good in itself. Any evils associated with it were, therefore, wholly adventitious, and were due to external, and, for the most part, moral causes. In the contrary opinion of the Democrats, the causes of these evils lay precisely in the present system, which they held to be radically defective. This view might at first appear to approximate to that of the Socialists. But in reality it does not, since the grounds of the two theories are radically opposed. The basis of the Catholic objection is, in fact, the excessive Liberalism of the existing system, whilst that of the Socialist objection is the principle of private ownership therein involved. This in itself indicates what an immense gulf separates the two positions.

The remedies suggested by the schools into which Catholics are divided differ correspondingly. Those proposed by the Conservatives are generally individualist, slow, and indirect—those by the Democrats collectivist, rapid, and aiming directly at the root of the economic system. Thus the Conservatives in practice attach particular importance to charity, and the moral virtues of thrift, obedience, and sobriety. They also favour, amongst other specific aids, the voluntary association of workmen and masters in free and Christian corporations. The Democrats, on the other hand, emphasize the need of justice, and place legislative reforms in favour of the working classes in the forefront of their programme. Like the Conservatives, the Democrats also rely much on professional unions representing the moral and material interests of labour, but they differ from them in this, that they would allow the unions to be composed of working men only, and would eventually make them compulsory on all.

Underlying these divergencies of theory and practice is a different idea of the mission of the State. According to the Conservatives, the State's principal duty is to protect rights and suppress abuses; according to the Democrats it is to promote the public welfare. Thus, whilst any but the most limited intervention of the State appears to the Conservatives to be an unjust invasion of personal right and a menace of Socialism, the Democrats, on the other hand, whose dread is the danger of an exaggerated Liberalism, welcome even advanced social legislation as the best security for freedom, and the surest preventive of the Socialist peril.

The great precursor of the advanced movement in Germany was Wilhelm Emmanuel Baron von Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz. Born at Münster, in Westphalia, in 1811, he received his early education from the Jesuits in Switzerland, and afterwards studied at the Universities of Göttingen, Berlin, Heidelberg, and Munich. In 1834, at the age of twenty-three, he accepted a post under the Prussian Government, which he resigned three years later as a protest against the arrest and imprisonment of the Archbishop of Cologne. Then, after some hesitation, he entered upon a course of theological study, and was ordained priest in 1844. Six years later he was appointed to the See of Mainz, and consecrated Bishop in 1850. The new and energetic Bishop, who had long felt the necessity of opposing the dangerous influence of the Socialism of Marx and Lassalle by a counter Catholic scheme, at once threw the weight of his position and authority into the work of constructing a Catholic programme of social reform, and of organizing Catholic action to carry it into effect. To this end he lent his support to the forming of Catholic Congresses and Labour Societies, at whose annual conferences he delivered many important speeches and addresses on social topics. In 1864 he published his great work on "The Labour Question and Christianity," to which Lassalle, at the time, paid homage in a Socialist gathering at Ronsdorf. Twenty-five years later, Windthorst referred to it as "marking a new epoch in Germany." In 1869, at the Conference of the German Bishops at Fulda, he clearly showed the necessity of the intervention of the Church for the

removal of economic evils, and urged that in every diocese some priests should be selected to make a study of economic questions. In the same Conference he also made clear the right of working men to legal protection. Even the most conservative amongst the Bishops approved of his pronouncements, and the Conference did much to bring the Church into closer relations with the new social activities. Again, in 1873, he reverted to the subject of the protection of labour, and published a pamphlet on "Catholics in the German Empire," which gave the newly-formed Centre party the basis of their social and industrial programme.

Bishop Ketteler's views ranged over a large variety of subjects, including the questions of proprietary right, industrial grievances, and the division of the results of production between Capital and Labour. On the question of property he asserted, against the modern theories of Socialists and Liberals, the old Catholic idea of limited individual ownership. Conformably to this idea, it is desirable that property, as well in capital as in other objects of possession, should not be held in common, nor confined to a few, but should rather be distributed amongst many individual owners. At the same time the holding of property ought to be regarded as subject to the common good, and consequently the right is reserved to the State of interfering and imposing limitations when necessity requires.

In reference to Labour grievances he concurred with Lassalle, and fully admitted the wrongs of the workers. To correct them, he insisted on certain legislative reforms, such as the increase of wages in proportion to

the value of the work done, shorter hours of labour, regular holidays, sanitary conditions of workshops, and the prohibition of the employment of mothers and young children in factories.

Concerning the respective shares of capital and labour in the fruits of their joint production, Ketteler pleaded for a more equitable distribution, which, he held, could be best promoted by the formation of labour associations. In connection with this method, he was prepared to accept the idea of co-operative unions, which, however, were to be established, not by State subvention, as Lassalle wished, but by voluntary contributions. It was his benevolent idea that these contributions should come mainly from the Capitalists acting from the motive of Christian charity.

The movement, thus inaugurated by Bishop Ketteler, was well seconded in Germany by the party of the Christian Democrats, who, in the main, adopted his programme, and, in conjunction with the Centre in the Reichstag, were successful in securing legal effect for many of its measures. Amongst the names of prominent men connected with the German Catholic party are those of Dean Lennig, Canon Moufang, Herr Lüdwig Windthorst, and Professors Schultze, Jäger, Winterer, and Weiss.

From Germany the movement immediately spread into Austria, where a Catholic Democratic party, on the same method and general lines as the German, was early organized. The party was established with the view of fighting both the Socialists and the Jewish Capitalists, who were the chief supporters of the dom-

inant Liberal party, and who were equally hostile to the claims of religion and labour. Its principal leaders were Rudolph Meyer, Baron von Vogelsang, the Prince von Lichtenstein, Count Blöme, and the group of writers who contributed to the Catholic Democratic organ, *Das Vaterland*. In 1891 Dr. Lueger formed a more advanced wing of the Catholic body, and united his forces under the Anti-Semitic party, who, though distinct from the Christian Democrats, obviously had many aims in common with them. The object of the alliance was to break the excessive power exercised by the Capitalists in the municipality of Vienna. Lueger's efforts met with success in 1895, but, later, an opposition from the Court and the more conservative section of the Catholics considerably impaired and retarded them. In the course of the agitation, a petition was addressed to Rome to condemn the new movement, but the Pope refused to intervene, and the quarrel later adjusted itself. Since that time the Catholic Democratic party has increased in unity and strength, and can now boast of having the largest representation in the Austrian Parliament.

In Switzerland Bishop Mermillod, afterwards Cardinal, an eloquent preacher and capable administrator, was the first to advocate a programme of Christian Democracy, the outlines of which he sketched in a sermon delivered at St. Clothilde's in 1886. But the real organizer of the scheme was Gaspard Decurtins, one of Ketteler's most eminent disciples, and a thoroughly loyal and devoted Catholic. His devotion to the Church, however, did not prevent him from seeking external assistance,

and he gladly welcomed the co-operation of men of all creeds, and even those of no creed, to advance the common cause. In 1886 his efforts, and those of his party, were mainly instrumental in establishing the great non-sectarian working men's association known as the *Arbeitsbund*. This association subsequently succeeded in affiliating to itself the existing Catholic societies throughout Switzerland, and thus became an effective barrier against Socialism. Moreover, as a result of the Lucerne Conference in 1894, a further organization of the Swiss Catholics into a popular Catholic party, similar to those of Germany and Austria, was effected. In this enterprise also Decurtins took a prominent part. The Democratic movement in Switzerland has since made steady progress, and has been productive of excellent results, as well in the religious as in the social sphere.

In France the old division of opinion amongst Catholics, which existed everywhere, including the countries just described, has been even a more marked feature of the development of social ideas. The dissent manifested itself in relation to the questions of State intervention, of wages, and the organization of purely labour syndicates, or of mixed societies representing employers and employed. But it concentrated on the question of the intervention of the State in the quarrel between Capital and Labour. Mgr. Freppel, Bishop of Angers, speaking as the leader of the Conservative party in 1890 at the Congress of Angers, declared: "Individual liberty, liberty of association with all its legitimate results, limited intervention of

the State, for the protection of rights and the suppression of abuses—such, gentlemen, is my creed on the labour question. Let me hope that it will be yours also.” To this declaration of modified economic Liberalism all the French Catholic Conservatives assented. Other leaders of the party were Père Ludovic de Besse, M. Charles Périn, Professor in Louvain University, and M. Claudio Janet. The Democratic school, on the other hand, adopting in great measure the principles of the German Catholic party, demanded a far wider scope for legislative intervention between employers and employed. Its principal leader was the Comte de Mun, who, as founder of the “Œuvre des Cercles Catholiques d’Ouvriers,” strove hard to revive in modern form the corporation or Guild system. He also did much to promote the passing of the law of 1884 which guaranteed the legal existence of the syndicates of production. Other prominent men in the party were the Marquis de la Tour du Pin, and MM. Montalembert, Grandmaison, de Poncheville, and de Ramel. M. Léon Harmel, who agreed with many of de Mun’s ideas, disagreed, however, with his scheme of compulsory State Guilds; and in opposition to it he proposed a system of purely voluntary Guilds, the practical value of which he demonstrated at his industrial establishment at Val de Bois. His suggestions have since been made use of to a great extent by the Association of Catholic Employers of the North of France.

Recently a new attempt was made by the party of M. Marc Sangnier and *Le Sillon* newspaper to push

democratic and labour claims still further. The aim of this latest agitation, known from its organ as the Sillonist movement, was to restore to society the equilibrium of order and justice. The endeavours of its promoters were, at first, unexceptionable and entirely praiseworthy. But their later efforts caused grave anxiety to the French hierarchy, and finally led to their condemnation. Pius X., in a kindly and sympathetic letter addressed to the French Archbishops and Bishops in September, 1910, pointed out the errors of principle and method contained in the doctrines and acts of the Sillonists, and concluded by condemning the movement as being contrary to ecclesiastical authority, and to social, economic, and historical facts. M. Marc Sangnier, founder of the *Sillon*, promptly replied by a loyal and filial letter in which he made submission in his own name and on behalf of the party. In this way the danger which threatened the advanced Catholic movement in France was timely and happily averted.

In Belgium, as early as 1884, the Catholic party in the Chambers, which both in numbers and ability, fully equalled the Liberal party, gained an ascendancy which it has never since relinquished. But the strengthening of the Socialist forces in recent years has called for a further consolidation of the party's powers, and, more especially, for a comprehensive programme of Catholic social reform. Accordingly a Labour movement was formed, to which Mgr. Doutreloux, as well as other eminent ecclesiastics and laymen, gave a ready and valuable support. Thus, in 1891, the Democratic League of Belgium was started by Helleputte and

Verhaegen, and in the following year the Abbé Pottier founded the Democratic Union of Liège. The object of both societies was, by amalgamation, to nationalize, and thereby strengthen, the power of the different local societies already existing throughout the country. But here, as in France, difficulties soon sprang up between the Conservative and Democratic sections. The main cause of discord was the question whether the Catholic Trades Association should be composed exclusively of workmen, or of both employers and employed. Mgr. Doutreloux at the Pope's suggestion took steps to bring about a reconciliation, and Pope Leo XIII. himself intervened later. Ultimately a joint conference of the parties was held at Mechlin in March, 1896. As a result, a settlement of the difficulties was arrived at, and a programme adopted. From that time onward the Democratic policy of the Catholic party has prevailed, and has met with striking success. One of its latest and most signal triumphs was the return to power, with an increased majority, of M. de Broqueville's Catholic Ministry in the recent elections of May, 1912. This victory of the Catholic party, achieved in spite of the hostile coalition of Liberals and Socialists specially formed to secure its defeat, is a splendid testimony to the power of Christian Democracy in a Catholic country.

In Italy, notwithstanding the writings of Talamo, Toniolo, Liberatore, Cuzzi, and a series of brilliant articles in the *Civiltà Catholica*, the social question, until recently, has received comparatively little attention. In 1874 Count Aquaderni succeeded in establishing the

first general Catholic Labour organization at Venice ; and in 1877 the Bishop of Perugia, afterwards Pope Leo XIII., issued a pastoral letter in which, after strongly condemning Liberal economic principles, he pleaded earnestly for social justice, and a more humane and Christian treatment of the poor and the working classes. Later, as Pope, he addressed similar messages to the world at large. Pius X. reiterated the same warnings and advice, and repeatedly exhorted Catholics to united action. But only partial success has followed these efforts, and the old divisions continue to weaken the ranks of the Catholic party in Italy. In Spain and Portugal, and the Catholic countries of South America, the principles of Christian Democracy have met only with partial acceptance.

In the English-speaking countries the Catholic forward movement received strong support from Cardinal Manning, who, in the later years of his life, devoted much attention to the cause of the poor and the outcast. By his public speeches, magazine articles, and letters to the *Times*, he proved himself a strenuous advocate of the legal protection of labour, and of the right of the working classes to employment at a minimum wage. Besides founding the "League of the Cross" for the promotion of temperance, he served on the "Commission for the Better Housing of the Working Classes," and his action throughout showed that everything calculated to benefit the working man found in him a sympathetic and powerful advocate. The "Cardinal's Peace," recalling his successful intervention between the masters and men in the great

London Dock Strike of 1889, is an abiding testimony to the respect in which he was held by all classes, and to the influence and authority which his social views secured amongst the workers and their leaders.

Archbishop Bagshawe and Charles Stanton Devas also contributed to the advance of the movement of Catholic Democracy, the latter rendering valuable assistance by clearly formulating the principles of political economy in their relation to Catholic social teaching.

The Catholic Social Guild founded in 1909, with Mgr. Parkinson for its first President, has likewise helped to give expression to Catholic social and economic science, and to promote popular interest in the various phases of the subject. It has received encouragement and support from Cardinal Bourne, from Bishops Casartelli and Keating, as well as from the other members of the hierarchy in England and Scotland.

The question as to whether a common social policy, as distinct from obedience to general Catholic principles, is possible or desirable in England, has been raised in recent years. At present evidently no such policy exists. Only in regard to such fundamental matters as religious education, liberty of conscience, and the laws of marriage and morality, can Catholics be said to make common cause. In all other matters—as, for instance, Poor Law Reform, the Land Question, the Minimum Wage, and State Intervention between employers and employed—Catholic opinion is sharply divided. The divergence is further increased by purely

political questions, and especially by the question of Home Rule for Ireland. Thus circumstances seem to point to the impossibility for the present, at least, of forming any specific social programme to unite all Catholics in Great Britain.

Happily the need of such a programme is not urgent. Liberalism and Freemasonry are not the dangers in England that they are on the Continent; and the two great political parties, as well as the Labour party, apart from its extreme Socialist wing, are open to all Catholics. Moreover, the social policy of the so-called Liberal or Radical party, modelled as it is on German and Belgian legislation, is, if we except education, in substantial agreement with the bulk of Catholic principles. The German legislators, as we know, derived their inspiration through the Centre party, from Bishop Ketteler, and the government of Belgium has long been Catholic. It is clear, therefore, that in England Catholics can ally themselves with the existing parties and co-operate with them. The circumstances of the case further go to show the advisability of such a course. So small a minority as the Catholic body is in England cannot afford, apart from the compulsion of necessity, to stand entirely alone; and any attempt on its part to do so would, in all probability, result in considerable loss to its social and religious influence. By throwing in their lot, however, with existing organizations, and by co-operating actively with whatever is good in the forces of national politics, Catholics will at the same time most surely strengthen their own cause, and most effectually promote the

country's welfare. The expediency of this course, therefore, for English Catholics would seem to be obvious.

In the United States of America, where the interests of the Church are identified with the prevailing Democracy, the sympathy of the Catholic hierarchy with the cause of Labour was recently manifested in connection with the question of the Knights of Labour. On their behalf a strong memorial, which also received the support of Cardinal Manning, was presented to the Pope in 1887 by Cardinal Gibbons.

In Ireland, too, the agrarian difficulties, calling for State interference in the contracts between landlords and tenants, afforded the Irish episcopate the opportunity, which they used to the full, of showing their practical sympathy with the workers by promoting legislation for their benefit.

A characteristic feature of the Catholic Democratic movement that should not pass unnoticed is that it has not been isolated or confined to any particular country. The Bishops and leaders have endeavoured to widen the sphere of the movement, and, as far as possible, to make it international. And with this view they have organized from time to time great Catholic Congresses, at which all countries might be represented. Examples of such Congresses in the past are those which were held at Coblenz, Lucca, Lodi, Vicenza, Mechlin, Freiburg, Paris, Angers, and Liège. The influence of these Congresses in promoting unity and common action has been remarkably efficacious.

But nothing hitherto has so greatly contributed to

strengthen the influence of the Catholic Democratic movement as the personal intervention of Pope Leo XIII. in 1891, through his encyclical, "Rerum Novarum." Of the impression produced by this document upon non-Catholics mention has already been made. Its effects on Catholics were immediate and abiding. To those already in the movement for some years, it came as a reward for their past efforts and as an encouragement and guide for the future. To their successors it has been an inspiration; and in regard to the future it is the surest guarantee that Catholic social action will live, spread, and become universal.

EPILOGUE

MAN'S systems, it has been well said, are the shadows on the hillside. Christ is the everlasting mountain itself. Only by building on that foundation can society be safely reconstructed and raised to the higher ground of true freedom and brotherhood. In order to build a solid and durable social structure moral forces are required. The chief of these is the Christian religion. Hence, if the present scheme of Democracy is to prove a lasting success, it must cease to be irreligious, and conform to the spirit and methods of Christ. By so doing it will not lose its independence, but, on the contrary, will increase its freedom.

The need of society to-day is not law but power, not outward organization, but inward regeneration. The source of such life is the supernatural grace and religion of Jesus Christ. Banish Christian faith and practice, and social reform will inevitably lead to social disaster. Unguided popular impulse can destroy, but it cannot construct; it can overthrow an ancient civilization, it cannot rebuild a city of justice and liberty.

Before the fall of the Roman Empire there were materialists and utilitarians. The cry was "Panem

et circenses" (Bread and amusements). And Rome rotted and perished with the gangrene of selfishness. Christ came and restored society. He spoke neither of right nor of interest, but of duty and sacrifice. Charity and cohesion were liberated, and love saved the perishing world. Over the gates of Florence Savonarola inscribed the words, "Christus Rex florentini populi." With this device the Tuscan patriot and his friends strove to restore the democratic liberties of the ancient city. To the same device modern democracy must look for the regeneration of its ideals, and for the strengthening and enlarging of freedom.

Of the coming social changes, therefore—however far-reaching they may be, even though they affect the very foundations of life—this much, at least, is certain: their success will depend on how fully they harmonize with the unchangeable law, the immutable rule of right and wrong, which has its abiding fulfilment in God. Compliance with this law is the necessary foundation of society—the imperishable rock on which alone public order can rest. Any other foundation of right, whether individual or social, apart from this moral law, is a foundation of sand, conducing to confusion and ruin.

In the chaotic teachings of revolutionary and atheistic systems there is, notwithstanding, a form of anarchic order which is liable to mislead even men of good will. Like the fabled locks on the Gorgon's head, they too intertwine and have a unity, yet they sting and wound one another. Over such order, "the Prince of this world" rules. The order of Christian Democracy is quite otherwise: it is a bond of "peace and goodwill,"

a fellowship of freedom and justice, a community of mercy and love. Hear the prophet announce its programme :

“To preach good tidings unto the meek :
To heal the broken-hearted :
To preach liberty to the captives, and deliverance to them
that are shut up :
To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of
vengeance of our God :
To comfort all that mourn :
To appoint to the mourners of Zion, and to give unto them—
A Crown for Ashes,
The Oil of Joy for Mourning,
The Garment of Praise for the Spirit of Grief.”
(Isaias lxi. 1-3.)

Of such Democracy we believe the Catholic Church to be the living witness and the divinely appointed custodian and guide. In her hands are the golden keys which give access to the treasures of life. Under her ægis alone can the struggling nations, now, as in the past, securely gain their birthright of freedom :

“Mother of Arts ! as once of Arms ; thy hand
Was then our guardian, and is still our guide ;
Parent of our Religion ! whom the wide
Nations have knelt to for the keys of heaven !
Europe, repentant of her parricide,
Shall yet redeem thee, and, all backward driven,
Roll the barbarian tide, and sue to be forgiven.”—

BYRON.

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